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                                                                 INTRODUCTION 
  
   By 2006, when I and Jim House published Paris 1961. Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, a 
number of books, by Jean-Luc Einaudi, Jean-Paul Brunet, Alain Dewerpe, Linda Amiri, Rémy Valat, 
and others, meant that the main features of the Paris massacre and the demonstration of 17 
October were quite well understood.1 Political controversy has continued to rage, mainly in relation 
to the contested issue of the numbers of Algerians that were killed, but in general the bulk of the 
publications that have appeared since Paris 1961 have had to do with the cultural, artistic and 
memorial aspects of the events, rather than with further research into primary archival sources.2 
This shift from the further excavation of archives, to differing interpretations of cultural and political 
meanings, was exemplified by the debates surrounding Michael Haneke’s film Caché,3  and the 
commemoration of the 50th anniversary in October 2011. The commemoration was marked by an 
enormous range of memorial, artistic and political activity: the organisation of demonstrations in 
Paris and its suburbs, as well as in numerous provincial towns from Caen to Bordeaux; conferences 
in Lyons, Nanterre and elsewhere, including one in the Paris National Assembly; documentary and 
film productions, most notably Yasmina Adi’s Ici on noie les Algériens; photographic exhibitions; four 
new theatre productions; several books, including a bande dessiné by Daeninckx and Mako, Octobre 
Noir; musical-café shows; the ceremonial renaming of streets and squares, the unveiling of plaques 
(Pont de Bezons, Pont de Neuilly).......4 At the heart of this mobilisation was a campaign to bring 
pressure on the French state to officially recognise the massacre through a ‘proposition de loi’ tabled 
in the Senate on 12 October 2006. 
      Jim House closely analysed in Paris 1961 the extraordinary complexity and emotional intensity of 
the political, trade union, nationalist, inter-generational and sectarian memory battles that raged 
openly, or seethed under the surface, throughout the period from 1961 to 2006 over the very 
existence and significance of the Paris massacre. Since 2006 the debates and political skirmishing has 
intensified, both in France and Algeria, and the campaign for official recognition of the massacre by 
the French state has been challenged by an array of right-wing and reactionary forces, from UMP 
conservatives and retired generals, to neo-fascists and die-hard ex-colonialists that defend the 
enlightened ‘civilizing mission’ of France in its oversea empire and its undemocratic and violent 
domination over ‘subject races’. On 17 October 2012 President François Hollande provided the first 
official recognition of the fact of the massacre in a brief statement: ‘The Republic recognises lucidly 
these facts. Fifty-one years after the tragedy, I pay tribute to the memories of the victims’. This 
declaration was met with a cachophany of protest from Marine Le Pen and others on the far-right.  
                                                          
1
 For a full bibiography see Jim House and Neil MacMaster, Paris 1961. Algerians, State Terror, and Memory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 341-359, French edition, Paris 1961. Les Algériens, la terreur d’Etat et 
la mémoire (Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 483-509. I have updated this in a short bibliography of works that have 
appeared since 2006, see below page 145. 
2
 The major exception here is Emmanuel Blanchard’s book, based on his 2008 thesis, La Police Parisienne et les 
Algériens (1944-1962) (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2011). Linda Amiri’s doctoral thesis on the FLN in France, based 
on many years of archival research, also promises to bring new elements to our understanding of October 17 
and its context. 
3
 There is a considerable, and growing, literature on Haneke and the 17 October: see, for example, Nancy E. 
Virtue, ‘Memory, Trauma, and the French-Algerian War: Michael Haneke’s Caché (2005)’, Modern and 
Contemporary France, 19:3 (2011), 281-96; Jonathan Thomas, ‘Michael Haneke’s New(s) Images’, Art Journal, 
67:3 (Fall 2008), 80-85; Susannah Radstone, ‘Caché: Or what the past hides’, Continuum: Journal of Media and 
Cultural Studies, 24:1 (2010), 17-29. 
4
 On some of this cultural activism see the homepage of the ‘Collectif “17 Octobre 61”’, www.17octobre61.org; 
also the bibliography and references in Marcel and Paulette Péju, Le 17 Octobre des Algériens. Suivi de La 
Triple Occulation d’Un Massacre par Gilles Manceron, (Paris: La Découverte, 2011), 187-195. 
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     Had a point been reached by 2007 in which debate was no longer about gleaning further evidence 
on the 17 October, but offering different cultural and political readings of the established ‘facts’? 
Was little more to be discovered from the archives in which research was no longer worth the effort 
because it promised diminishing returns? Such a claim would be absurd, since no historical 
investigation can ever claim to be definitive and each generation of historians will bring to the body 
of evidence quite new and different interpretations. In 2006, however, after several years research 
on the massacre, I decided to move on, not because the topic was exhausted, but because I had a 
number of others projects that were waiting. However, the peculiar interpretations that Jean-Luc 
Einaudi continued to develop in his book, Scènes de la guerre d’Algérie en France (2009), and 
elsewhere, led me in early 2012  to re-examination the DST archives.5 
   To mark the 50th anniversary commemoration in October 2011, which drew enormous media 
attention in France and Algeria, Jean-Luc Einaudi, the doyen of memory activists, and Mohammed 
Ghafir, who was FLN leader of Amala or Superzone 12, located on the Left Bank of the Seine, joined 
forces in the autumn of 1961 to publicise the claim that Mohammedi Saddek was the head of the 
entire FLN network on French soil and had organised the demonstration of 17 October. The rather 
strange campaign, assisted by members of the Saddek family, to construct a mythical status for 
Mohammedi Saddek was intended to counter the research of myself and Jim House that had shown 
that the top-level co-ordinator in France was Mohamed Zouaoui.6   This inspired me to re-examine 
much of the archival materials that I had collected a decade earlier and the issues surrounding the 
Paris massacre. My initial, but subsidiary interest was in an anthropological examination of how and 
why Einaudi and Ghafir went about the construction or defense of such a myth through the 
sacralisation of Saddek, especially by religious commemorative rituals in his village of origin in 
Kabylie. This case-study serves to throw light on wider processes of memory activism and the 
‘ideologisation’ of history and  why it is that the charged emotional investments that result from the 
confusion or mixing of commemoration ritual and historical interpretation and fact can make for 
poor history. I have placed this case-study at the end, since it can be read on its own standing apart 
from the main drive of the study, as a separate essay under the title,  Jean-Luc Einaudi and the 
Sacralisation of Mohammedi Saddek. I have also examined the question of the biography and role of 
Saddek in the FLN, who appears nowhere in the DST and police archives, in a separate Appendix 1 
(page 132). 
    The more substantial reason for writing this study arose from a re-examination of my research 
notes from the Archives of the Paris Prefecture of Police (APP) which reminded me how 
extraordinarily rich and important these documents were for an understanding of the Paris 
massacre. This was especially true of the extensive reports of the counter-intelligence agency, the 
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), its arrest of numerous top FLN cadres in early 
November 1961, and the seizure of hundreds of key FLN documents. In our previous publications we 
had referred to the DST files, but editorial restrictions on word-length meant that full justice could 
not be done to this important and extensive body of source material. Since the publication of our 
2004 article it would appear that no historians have followed our lead by further investigating what 
constitutes the richest and most significant, but still largely unused, archival source on the Paris 
massacre and its context. My aim in this study is to fill this gap.7 
    The DST archive is important to an understanding of the Paris massacre for a number of reasons. 
On 22 September 1961 DST agents, who were tailing an FLN cadre Medjoub Benzerfa, were led to 
                                                          
5
 Jean-Luc Einaudi, Scènes de la guerre d’Algérie en France. Automne 1961 (Paris: Le Cherche Midi, 2009). 
6
 Neil MacMaster, Jim House, ‘La Fédération de France du FLN et l’Organisation du 17 Octobre 1961’, 
Vingtième Siècle 83 (July-Sept. 2004), 145-160; reprinted in Raphaëlle Branche (ed.), La guerre d’indépendance 
des Algériens 1954-1962 (Paris: Tempus, 2009), 127-149. 
7
 In doing so I have tried to avoid as far as possible repeating the ground already covered in J. House and N. 
MacMaster, Paris 1961 and I do not set out to provide a more general overview of the massacre. This present, 
largely complementary, study does not pretend to a complete examination of all aspects of the October 
events, but focuses mainly on the decision-making process of the leadership of the FLN French Federation. 
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the Café Luxembourg on the Boulevard Saint Michel where they located a group of top leaders, 
including a heavy-set individual who was later to be identified as Mohammed Zouaoui. According to 
a standard DST procedure the cadres were not arrested, but subjected to a long and painstaking 
surveillance that enabled agents to locate further contacts and to build up a detailed network chart 
or ‘organigramme’ of the Paris FLN network, before executing co-ordinated mass arrests during an 
operation code-named ‘Flore’ on the night of 9-10 November 1961. By an extraordinary stroke of 
good luck for the historian the seven week tracking (‘filatures’) of the Zouaoui network between 22 
September and 10 November 1961, along with the subsequent interrogations, and police analysis of 
hundreds of internal FLN documents, cut precisely across the crucial timescale of the planning, 
execution and brutal repression of the 17 October demonstration.  
     Secret underground networks are, by definition, difficult to investigate or reconstruct.The 
clandestine FLN organisation in Paris during the long war of 1954 to 1962 is no exception, especially 
as the French Federation sought to block police surveillance by constantly changing the structure as 
well as personnel by moving them from one region (Wilaya) to another. Ali Haroun remarks that the 
average period of time between the appointment and arrest of Wilaya heads was six to eight 
months, hence a constant replacement or circulation of top cadres.8 However, the police and DST 
files from Operation Flore provide, like a camera image, a detailed picture of the FLN network and its 
transient members at the precise moment that the demonstration of 17 Ocober was organised.  
     Ali Haroun, a member of the five-man Federal Committee, notes that the counter-intelligence 
service was the most skilled of the many police and security agencies in France and presented the 
greatest single threat to the FLN: ‘les deux personnes les mieux informées de l’état de la structure 
du FLN en France étaient Ladlani, responsable de l’organisation, et Roger Wybot, directeur de la 
DST’.9 The archives of the secretive DST, like those of Britain’s equivalent MI5, are not open to 
historians, and the unusual survival of the DST papers relating to Operation Flore in the Prefecture of 
Police archive, where they are open to inspection by dérogation, is in itself of considerable interest 
in providing a rare window into the policing methods of the intelligence service. 
      The use of police records is, of course, subject to caution. Some ex-FLN militants and former 
European porteurs de valise have strongly objected to the historical use of such an ‘enemy’ archive, 
as if to do so was to be in some way complicit with, or to give credence to, the deceptions and lies of  
a violent and oppressive state. Firstly, in reply to this position, it can be noted that the historian will, 
hopefully, subject police records to the same critical examination as any other body of evidence. 
Secondly, the great bulk of the Prefecture archive consists of internal and often classified or secret 
reports and internal correspondence in which agents, far from warping intelligence, had a self-
interest in the accurate analysis of FLN organisations, the better to locate and neutralise them. For 
example, the transcripts of reports received from Algerian informers were subjected to very close 
scrutiny by intelligence officers and classified according to their degree of reliability. Finally, and 
most conclusive, is the fact that the Prefecture deposits consist of literally thousands of pages of 
original internal FLN documents that were captured in November 1961 and placed under seal by the 
Police judiciaire (PJ). The FLN in France was a supremely bureaucratic organisation, and the 
extraordinary detailed monthly financial and ‘organic’ reports that full-time ‘responsables’ were 
required to produce enabled police analysts at the time, and the historian today, to engage in a close 
reconstruction of Federation structures, decision-making and morale.        
 
Reframing the massacre 
 
    Most studies of 17 October have, apart from those concerned with the post-colonial cultural, 
literary and media representations of the massacre, tended to focus on two interrelated issues. 
Firstly,  there is the highly contested and often political issue, of the nature and extent of the 
                                                          
8
 Ali Haroun, La 7e Wilaya. La Guerre du FLN en France 1954-1962 (Paris: Seuil, 1986), 57. 
9
 A. Haroun, 7e Wilaya., 52. Kaddour Ladlani, like Haroun a member of the Federal Committee, was 
responsable for the FLN clandestine organisation in France. 
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brutality and killings to which Algerians were subjected in Paris, a process of verification or 
measurement of state violence that has involved identifying and counting the victims. Closely 
related to this has been the investigation of the police services, how they were organised, and the 
role of Maurice Papon and the Gaullist government in unleashing the unprecedented repression of 
October 1961.  
    Where the present study marks a new departure is in the attempt to piece together the structure 
and decision-making processes of the FLN French Federation that took the momentous decision to 
organise the demonstration of 17 October and how the crisis was lived from ‘inside’ by those who 
carried responsibility for steering the Algerian nationalist community through the subsequent 
repression. Until now historians and other commentators have paid considerable attention, often 
through oral history sources, to the experience and testimony of the ordinary men and women who 
participated in the Paris demonstrations of 17-20 October and provided witness to the savage 
violence of the police. In general, less attention has been given to the higher-level decision-making 
processes of the FLN leadership, in part because it has been singularly difficult to reconstitute the 
inner workings of a clandestine organisation that has left only fragmentary evidence. As Ali Haroun 
has remarked, the clandestine structures designed to prevent penetration by French police and 
intelligence services, by which members of one cell, or echelon, had a restricted knowledge of the 
identity of individuals in other groups, meant that even higher level cadres might have little 
understanding of the wider or global network: ‘Le cloisonnement, indispensable à la survie de toute 
l’organisation clandestine, ne permettait à aucun cadre du FLN en France, aussi haut-placé dans la 
hiérarchie fût-il, de connaître dans ses détails le fonctionnement d’un service ou d’un échelon 
parallèle’.10 This explains why, for example, even a high-placed cadre like Mohammed Ghafir might 
have a quite limited or partial knowledge of what was going on during October 1961 in other parts of 
the FLN hierarchy in Paris and Germany.  
     The purpose of the DST and police intelligence operations was precisely to penetrate the 
clandestine structures of the FLN and to reconstruct the totality of the networks, the better to 
combat it. The DST was significantly successful in achieving this goal by late November 1961 and this 
enables the historian today to have a clearer picture of the overall organisation than was available to 
many, if not most, of the Algerians present in Paris at the time. 
    The main interest in this study, apart from Chapter 6, is not with the rank-and-file, but with the 
higher level leaders from the position of Régional upwards that constituted the decision-making 
apparatus. This leadership can be defined as those senior cadres (usually referred to as 
‘responsables’) who spent so much time in day-to-day organisation and administration that they 
were waged by the FLN on a full-time basis. In Paris this leadership, apart from the armed groups of 
the Organisation spéciale (OS), constituted about fifty individuals.11 This was the élite group that the 
Federal Committee banned from attending the demonstration of 17 October so that they would not 
be arrested or identified. This book is essentially about this strata that did not demonstrate, rather 
than the rank-and-file that fell under the police truncheons and gunfire. 
   What does this monograph have to say that is new? Firstly (Chapters 1 to 3) it is concerned 
primarily with the close reconstruction of the FLN organisation that was in place during October 
1961, from the ‘Federal’, Mohamed Zouaoui, and the ‘central commission’, down through the head 
of propaganda Medjoub Benzerfa, to the leaders of the Wilayas, Amalas and Regions, and the 
European liaison agents like Rolande Mingasson. Piecing together the networks has not been an easy 
task, in part because the sources are fragmentary, and the archival documents have been scattered 
through numerous cartons, often in disorder and without sequence. In places the reader might find 
that there is an overload of detail, but I have deliberately sought to reconstruct the organisations 
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 A. Haroun, 7e Wilaya, 8. 
11
 This Paris leadership was made up of the Federal (Zouaoui), three Regional controlers, two  heads of Wilaya, 
four Amalas, eight Zones, twenty-four Regions, one head of propaganda (Benzerfa), and about four advisers. 
These figures do not include others on the FLN payroll, including lawyers of the collective, and European 
support agents. 
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and personnel as closely as possible, in part because these issues have been contested, but also 
because the finer points of detail often hold an important key to an understanding of the events. For 
example, the fact that the Federal Committee in Germany took the decision to call, and to plan, the 
demonstration in the small window of time between the 7th and 10th of October raises interesting 
questions about how, during three days, it was able to consult with militants in Paris as well as with 
the provisional government (GPRA) in Tunis.    
     Secondly, the study develops the thesis that the Federal Committee faced a serious crisis or 
challenge during 1961 from Paris-based activists and armed groups. The history of the French 
Federation from 1954 to 1962 shows that it faced, unlike the FLN in Algeria, an underlying 
contradiction between whether to adopt violent, armed actions in metropolitan France or whether 
such a strategy of a ‘second front’ might prove counter-productive in exposing the community of 
migrant workers to unbearable levels of state repression, while also alienating the French public, 
political left and trade union movement. As we show (Chapters 4 and 5), the opening of negotiations 
between the FLN and French government from May 1961 onwards, led the GPRA to compel the 
Federal Committee to enforce a secret truce on the armed groups in Paris. However, the Paris 
militants, unwilling to stand aside while the police and harki forces seized the opportunity to rack-up 
the repression, unilaterally unleashed a wave of assassinations of the security forces from mid-
August 1961 onwards, a counter-violence that the Federal Committee had great difficulty in 
containing. Chapter 6, a case-study of the 13th arrondissement, shows how at the grass roots, 
between August and October 1961, enormous tensions were building up within the Algerian migrant 
community that threatened to explode in an uncontrollable mass action, unless the Federal 
Committee acted quickly to resolve the problem. The highly unusual decision, in the context of the 
war, to organise a mass demonstration, provided a neat solution to the contradiction between 
maintaining a pacific truce, so as to satisfy the FLN leadership in Tunisia, while simultaneously easing 
the demand from the militant base that something had to be done to counter Papon’s remorseless 
campaign of psychological terror. However, in planning the 17 October (Chapter 7), which served as 
a kind of safety-valve and point of focus for a demoralised Algerian community, the Federation 
fatally underestimated the degree to which the Paris police might be prepared to unleash violence, 
even when women and children were present, while also rejecting the possibility of securing 
protection through association with the French anti-colonial left, and in particular the French 
Communist Party (PCF), in a joint demonstration.        
      A third theme relates to the implications of the DST and police operations that virtually destroyed 
between 3rd and 10th November, first the financial networks controlled by Abderrahmane Farès that 
centralised the monthly collection and moved it out of France through the banking system and 
shadow companies (Chapter 8), and then the top level of the Federation leadership in Paris. Farès, 
ex-President of the Algerian Assembly, and close to Gaullist circles, was a political figure of 
considerable stature, and the DST archives reveal how he played a crucial role during 1961 in 
mediating between the Algerian negotiators at Evian and the Federal Committee in Germany, acting 
as a powerful moderating influence against FLN violence. Farès, present in Paris with Zouaoui on the 
night of 17 October, played an important role both in planning the demonstration, but also in 
channeling huge sums of money directly from the Algerian factory workers and businessmen of Paris 
to the commanders of the ALN maquis. While historians and many ex-Federation militants tend to 
focus on the armed struggle as the prime contribution of the FLN in France to the overall struggle for 
independence, it is argued that this emphasis has tended to obscure or relegate to a secondary level 
the importance of the financial system. In opposition to this I argue that the FLN structures, cohesion 
and working climate, can be better understood as a bureaucratic apparatus for the maximum 
collection and centralisation of funds, than as a quasi-military organisation.  
     Finally (Chapter 9) examines the short-to-medium term impacts of the October-November crisis. 
Up to now most studies, including Paris 1961, have limited themselves to a study of the impacts of 
the repression of the demonstrations of 17-20 October on the FLN and the Algerian community. 
However, the FLN in Paris had barely recovered from this shock, when it was hit two weeks later by 
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two further heavy blows, the arrest of the Farès network (3-4 November) and the decapitation of 
the Zouaoui structure (9-10 November). There is a strong argument for treating the three events as 
component parts of a single crisis, especially as the November arrests led to the capture of the key 
personnel that had planned and implemented the 17 October, along with numerous documents and 
militants’ reports on the events. Although police violence on 17 October inflicted enormous physical 
and psychological trauma on the mass of ordinary workers, it is argued that the repression was far 
less damaging to the smooth running of the FLN organisation than the dislocation of the financial 
network and top leadership by the DST.  
     Overall the study sets out to provide the most detailed picture yet provided of the FLN 
organisation during the traumatic events of mid-1961 in Paris.12 One of the most extraordinary 
achievements of the French Federation was, despite the setbacks which it faced, its success in  
organising such an extensive and complex urban network under conditions of ferocious state 
repression that were not dissimilar to those faced by the French Resistance movement in occupied 
Paris. 
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 However, I do not claim that the research is complete, far from it, since to date I have not had the means to 
consult the important FLN Federation archives that have been deposited in the Algerian National Archives in 
Algiers by Mohamed Harbi and Ali Haroun. So this monograph can be regarded as work in progress, and if and 
when I can make my way to Algeria I would hope to revise this study. What I can claim, is to have attempted to 
piece together, as thoroughly as I can, the documents deposited in the Archives of the Paris Prefecture of 
Police.  
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                                                                            1 
                 “Operation Flore” and the arrrest of Mohamed Zouaoui. 
    The headquarters of the Direction de la surveillance (DST) in the Rue des Saussaies, a few paces 
north of the Elysée Palace, was a hive of activity on the night of 9 November 1961. The director 
Daniel Doustin, who had only been in his post since August 1961, was co-ordinating from his third 
floor bureaux, a joint DST-Police operation code-named “Flore” to arrest over thirty top-level FLN 
cadres and their European agents (porteurs de valises).13 Normally the Algerian section of the DST, 
country coded ‘CAYA’, operated from first floor offices, but now five levels of the entire building had 
been taken over to prepare twenty-eight separate interrogation rooms, equiped with thirty 
typewriters, lamps and telephones.14 Down in the courtyard intervention teams waited by their cars, 
twenty-four of them DST and fifteen Prefecture, while the commissioners in charge of each group 
received their instructions: ‘Chaque chef de groupe, Commissaire, Officier de Police Judiciaire 
recevra une envelope contenant la liste des individus à arrêter – la perquisition à effectuer – les 
fiches individuelles avec ou sans photo des personnes en cause – un plan d’interrogatoire – le 
numéro de la pièce où il fera cet interrogatoire et son poste téléphoniques. Tous les fonctionnaires 
seront armés...’.15 The teams headed out to twenty-nine adresses scattered widely over central Paris 
and its suburbs, and simultaneously raided the target flats and houses at 3 am. 
     The meticulous undercover work, planning and execution of Operation Flore was typical of 
standard DST procedures and very different from the anti-FLN methods then being deployed under 
the Prefect of Police, Maurice Papon. This was to have significant implications for the extraordinary 
rich body of detailed documentation that has survived in the archives and which is so valuable to the 
historian today. The basic operating mode of the specialised police bodies developed by the 
Prefecture of Police (PP) from late 1958 onwards was to act as fast as possible to arrest suspects. As 
soon as the Prefecture had a lead on an FLN suspect, from intelligence gathered from seized 
documents, informers and interrogations, rapid intervention teams would immediately seize the 
individual and, on the basis of quick extraction of further intelligence, work their way into a network, 
before his or her contacts could take cover.  
    By 1961 the recognised expert in such rapid-reaction techniques was Captain Montaner who 
commanded the brutal Force de Police Auxiliaire (FPA) or harkis brigades based at Fort Noisy. 
Montaner, with the support of the Prefecture, quite deliberately avoided the legal requirements of 
due process in effecting such arrests, on the grounds that the need for urgent intervention to 
capture dangerous armed ‘terrorists’ simply did not give time to notify the Police judiciaire (PJ) so 
that they could be present to verify correct procedures and to place seals on documents, weapons 
and other material evidence that would be used in any future trial. Faced with a choice between 
legality and a brutal efficacy, Montaner opted for the latter. 
    In early 1961, when de Gaulle’s government was facing strong media and political pressure in 
regard to the harki torture of FLN suspects, a Prefecture internal report defended Montaner’s 
methods. ‘Il sait que l’exploitation d’un renseignement doit être immédiate...La régle d’or de l’action 
menée par la FPA réside en conséquence dans l’intervention foudroyantee portée où besoin est et 
par conséquent il faut bien le dire en marge du Code de Procédure Pénale’. The report went on to 
                                                          
13
 Daniel Doustin was regarded as an effective moderniser of the DST: Roger Faligot and Pascal Kop, DST. Police 
secrête (Paris: Flammarion,1999), 193, 213. On his key role in counter-insurgency operations in Cameroun in 
1957-1958 see Augusta Conchiglia, ‘Ghosts of Kamerun’, New Left Review no.77 (Sept.-Oct. 2012), 140; and 
below, pp. 12-13. 
14
 On the design and layout of the HQ at 13 Rue des Saussaies see the illustration in R. Faligot and P.Kop, DST, 
218. 
15
 H1B28, Plan of Preparation for Operation “Flore”, 4.pp. 
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illustrate the need for such methods by reference to a specific operation on the night of 17-18 
January when Montaner had to move fast to arrest two men and seize weapons, so that it was not 
possible to inform the procureur or to assign an officer of the PJ, nor to properly record the procès-
verbal of arrest. The seizure of weapons, noted the report, was ‘parfaitement illégales’ and as a 
consequence, there could be no later trial of those arrested. More crucially the Service de 
coordination des affaires algériennes (SCAA), the Prefect intelligence unit, was perfectly happy, as 
was Papon, to avoid due process since the system of justice was viewed as radically incapable of 
dealing with the dangers of terrorism suffering, as it did, from ‘un formalisme ridiculement inadapté 
à la lutte contre l’Organisation’.16 The dark downside of this was that captured FLN suspects could be 
‘disappeared’ and, without any legal protection, subjected to every form of abuse and violence.  
     One very significant consequence of such police methods is that the absence of detailed written 
procedures and judicial documentation is very evident in the Prefecture archives: the amount of 
information available to the historian to reconstruct FLN networks, biographical data, the conditions 
of arrest, the description of evidence, and the documents that were seized, is often very thin or 
simply missing. The DST procedures, and consequent archival traces, could not be more different. A 
secret DST internal mission statement of 1950 emphasised the great importance of carefully building 
up intelligence on a particular clandestine network, without disturbing its agents, so as to ‘identifier 
le plus grand nombre de complices, de rassembler les éléments constitutifs des délits, de connaître 
l’organisation du réseau de renseignements, au besoin en le “pénétrant”, c’est-a-dire en y 
introduisant des agents en vue de le contrôler. La phase répressive ne doit être entreprise que 
lorsque, par l’exploitation complête des informations de sources les plus diverses, les recoupements 
d’archives, les surveillances et les filatures, le plus gand nombre de complices ont pu être localisés et 
le maximum d’éléments de preuves recueilli’.17 Such counterintelligence methods, that had been 
long honed against the Communist Party, Soviet agents, and other networks seen as a threat to the 
French state, was readily applied to the FLN and consequently have left a massive paper trail in the 
archives. 
     In addition the DST-led Operation Flore was surprising in the extent to which, unlike Montaner’s 
harkis, it conformed to correct legal procedure, with the extraordinary exception of the 
“disappearance” of Baba Hamed, which is examined later (Chapter 2). The DST was, by its very 
nature, quite prepared to operate in secrecy and to engage in assassinations and torture. In 
December 1958  FLN militants initiated a court action against Roger Wybot, the most famous of all 
DST directors, and published La Gangrène (1959), a harrowing account of their torture in the Rue de 
Saussaies, revelations which brought about Wybot’s downfall.18 It was probably this scandal that led 
the DST to be much more careful not to expose itself to charges of ‘extra-legal’ activities and, as will 
be seen later, by 1960-61 the counterintelligence service seems to have been happy to ‘outsource’ 
more brutal interrogations to Montaner. More to the point, Operation Flore involved the arrest of 
some fifteen European support agents, and it was politically impossible to treat such a large number 
by anything other than due process and trial, unlike Algerians who could be incarcerated by 
administrative orders in camps and prisons, or flown to Algeria, under emergency powers, without 
any political or judicial repercussions. After 17 October Papon and the Minister of the Interior, Roger 
Frey, were keen to score a major success against the FLN, one that inevitably involved open legal 
procedures and possibly even a grand show trial, so as to counter the very real threat to their 
personal position following the revelations of the Paris massacre. It also helped that the DST, unlike 
Britain’s equivalent service MI5, had a juridical existence and its agents were officers of the police 
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judiciaire, which in turn facilitated the legal procedures and drawing up of procès verbaux during the 
arrest of suspects, and the careful recording and sealing of captured FLN documents which have 
consequently survived in the Prefecture archives.19 
     Traditionally the DST, like many other French security services (Renseignements généraux, Surêté, 
Gendarmerie....) tended to remain jealous of its authority and autonomy and disliked sharing 
information, materials and logistics with other police organisations. Why did Doustin decide to bring 
in the Prefecture to share in the glory of Operation Flore, what was likely to be a major and 
prestigious coup? During the first four years of the war, under the Fourth Republic, the DST seems to 
have taken centre stage in combatting the FLN in Paris by, for example, ‘decapitating’ the first and 
second Federations under Terbouche and Lebjaoui in 1956 and 1957.20  However, from the summer 
of 1958 onwards, as Maurice Papon created his own, specialised and aggressive intelligence and 
policing apparatus to combat the FLN, notably the SCAA, SAT and FPA, the DST was forced to 
recognise the existence of this dynamic competitor.21 The DST was a relatively small organisation of 
about one thousand agents, given that it operated throughout metropolitan France and the 
colonies, and although it dedicated a third of its total manpower to anti-FLN surveillance, the service 
must have been severely stretched.22  
     Papon, ambitious to expand his anti-FLN operations in Paris, suggested to the Minister of the 
Interior a division of labour between the DST and the Prefecture. The role of the DST, claimed 
Papon, was to focus on the tracking down and arrest of top-level FLN cadres, but this was to 
overlook the fact that the FLN was always able to rapidly replace those arrested, by recruitment or 
promotion from the massed ranks of the ‘cadres intermédiaires’. The DST might grab attention 
through its ‘spectacular’ operations, but no less crucial was the role of the Prefecture, ‘opérant à la 
base’, and especially through the harkis, by taking on, ‘ces cadres subalternes, audacieux et 
agissants’, who were ‘trop souvent impunis ou mal punis’.23 This dual strategy was put in place 
through late 1960 and 1961 by which the DST would play the ‘long game’, penetrating the top-
echelon FLN networks by careful surveillance, while the Prefecture, especially through Montaner’s 
FPA, engaged in a much more brutal and rapid deployment action against tough mid-rank militants, 
and especially the armed groups (GA) and collectors that imposed discipline at the level of the 
street, café and lodging houses. This dualism has left a distinctive mark on the structure of the 
archive record: it is the DST sources that provide the most detailed evidence of the structure, 
strategy and overall organisation of the FLN leadership in Paris.24  
      The year 1961 saw a growing convergence and co-operation between the DST and Prefecture of 
Police in the battle against the FLN, a joining of forces that offered a particularly formidable 
challenge to the French Federation. This co-operation derived in part from the close relationship 
that developed between Maurice Papon and Daniel Doustin, men who shared quite striking 
similarities in their careers and expertise in counter-insurgency. Doustin, born in Bayonne on 25 
February 1920, the son of a railway worker, studied law and then at the Ecole nationale de la France 
d’outre-mer, before being posted to Indochina as an administrator in 1945. As head of the province 
of Kontum he had considerable experience of counter-insurgency, which he later applied in 
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Cameroun as head of the region of Nyong-et-Sanaga from January 1957 to October 1958.25 Doustin 
masterminded, with Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Lamberton, an extremely violent operation called 
ZOPAC (Zone de pacification de la Sanaga-Maritime) between December 1957 and December 1958. 
This reproduced all the features of the revolutionary warfare theories and methods concurrently 
being used in Algeria, including mass displacement of populations (regroupement), burning of 
villages and crops, massacre and torture.26 Doustin pushed hard for the elimination of Ruben Um 
Nyobé, the most gifted and charismatic of the nationalist leaders, who was assassinated by French 
forces on 13 September 1958. Doustin, who after leaving the DST in 1964, went on to various 
Prefecture posts (1964-1976), director of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister Raymond Barre (1976-
78), and President of the Compagnie nationale du Rhône (1979), followed a career pattern that was 
remarkably similar to that of Papon, who after leaving the Prefecture of Police (1967), became PDG 
of Sud-Aviation and Budget Minister, also under Raymond Barre, in April 1978. 
       These two ‘grand commis de l‘état’, both of whom were deeply involved in colonial warfare in 
Africa during 1957 and 1958, brought to the policing of the FLN in Paris a similar experience and 
outlook, and this assisted in the close co-operation and trust that developed between the DST and 
the Prefecture of Police in Operation Flore, intelligence sharing, and other joint actions. The Director 
of SCAA, in his annual report for 1961, noted, ‘Des rapports confiants se sont institués aussi avec la 
DST. Ils devaient permettre aux deux services d’oeuvrer en parfaite concordance des vues, et en se 
complétant’. Through daily exchanges of intelligence and a, ’partage rationel des tâches, SCAA et 
DST ont abouti à l’anéantissement des groupes armés et de l’OS, ainsi qu’à la destruction, en fin 
d’année, de la Fédération de France du FLN’.27 Doustin not only sent to Papon copies of the final DST 
reports on the Zouaoui and Farès networks, but also a huge volume of photocopies of the 
documents seized during these operations, which helps to explain why, quite exceptionally, such a 
mass of secret DST documentation that would normally not be available to the historian, can be 
found today in the Prefecture archive.   
   The remaining part of this chapter examines how the DST surveillance system operated during the 
seven weeks that it tracked, identified and finally arrested the members of the FLN Paris network. 
On 19 July 1960 Medjoub Benzerfa, a young school teacher in Colombes, was seen by DST agents in 
West Germany in contact with two members of the French Federation, and a third unknown man 
who was later identified as Mohamed Zouaoui. Benzerfa was questioned by the DST at Dusseldorf 
station, and said he had come to Germany to visit his girlfriend, Elisa Brunk. From that moment 
Benzerfa was identified by the DST as head of propaganda for the Federation in France and was 
placed under constant surveillance on the grounds that he would eventually lead the police to the 
head of the FLN in Paris. In July 1961 Benzerfa again met Zouaoui, as yet unidentified, in Paris, and 
agents concluded, ‘La déférence qu’il lui montre, les instructions qu’apparement il reçoit, 
permettent de penser que cet individu est le supérieur de Benzerfa et par conséquent, le reponsable 
fédéral que nous recherchons. La surveillance de cette personne nous conduit dans les jardins du 
Luxembourg où elle perdue de vue’. 28  But on the 22 September 1961 Benzerfa inadvertently led the 
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DST to the Café de Luxembourg, at 58 Boulevard Saint-Michel, opposite the Jardin du Luxembourg, a 
contact that proved to be fatal to the Paris network.  
    It is not known who the DST agents were who staked out the Café Luxembourg, but the Algerian 
section of the Rue des Saussaies under Jean Baklouti, a specialist in Maghreb and Middle-East 
intelligence, directed a team of Arab speaking officers, many of them Europeans or indigenous North 
Africans who could eavsedrop on conversations or operate from vans, disguised as window-cleaners, 
postoffice (PTT) or other commercial workers.29 Zouaoui made the fatal error of holding almost daily 
meetings with his key lieutenants and advisers in the Café Luxembourg, although a driver acted as 
lookout: on the 4 October, for example, an agent reported, ‘la réunion se déroule à voix basse et le 
chauffeur Haddour, qui s’est assis à une table voisine, surveille visiblement les entrées du café’. 
When Zouaoui had particularly important information to exchange with a contact he would 
frequently meet them in the grounds of the adjacent Luxembourg Gardens. From the gatherings in 
the café, which involved numerous top cadres, the DST had no difficulty in trailing each individual, 
and through the minutely recorded movements (Compte-rendu de surveillance), photographic 
surveillance, phone taps and archival or fichier research, built up a detailed picture of each person 
(address, car registration, employment, associates....) and a rapidly expanding diagramme 
(organigramme) of the network.30 As the DST unravelled the FLN linkages they were not to know 
that this was the organisation that would, within two weeks, be coping with the crisis caused by 
Papon’s night curfew of 5 October, and the subsequent planning and execution of the 17 October 
demonstration. 
    Who was Mohamed Zouaoui and what was his function within the French Federation? Zouaoui 
was born in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, the city of the French Foreign Legion, on 8 March 1920 and grew up in an 
imposing house in the Rue de la Mosquée in the popular district of Graba. His father was a well-to-
do landowner and after his secondary schooling Mohamed left to study in France where he joined 
up with several nationalists from his home town.31 He is described by Ali Haroun as one of the older 
generation of militants who had cut his teeth in the post-war MTLD movement of Messali Hadj, and 
by 1957 was a mid-level militant who helped organise the early clandestine FLN networks in Paris. In 
late 1958, he moved up the hierarchy to replace an arrested leader, and in June 1959 he became 
head of the Marseille region, Wilaya 3B, before being recalled to Paris to head the information 
services.32  
   In late 1960 the FLN in France, following two damaging police operations, decided  to carry out a 
significant restructuring that put in place an entirely new organisational and financial network that 
has, until now, remained undetected by historians. It was this deep, clandestine team, that was 
established in January 1961, that oversaw the later planning of 17 October, before being virtually 
decapitated in early November 1961. Between the 18th and 21st November Ahcène Chibane, who 
held the position of RC1 (responsable contrôleur) or chief deputy in France to Kaddour Ladlani, was 
found brutally murdered in a ditch in Colombes. The death of Chibane, almost certainly killed by 
state agents, came as a shock to the Federal Committee which found it difficult to replace such a 
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capable leader.33 His assassination raised worrying questions about security at the highest level of 
the FLN in Paris, and in promoting Zouaoui in January 1961 the Federal Committee sought to put in 
place a new team that could operate in deep clandestinity. On 20 October 1960, the police arrested 
Henri Curiel, an Egyptian communist who had, until then, master-minded the system by which the 
FLN monthly collection was safely transferred abroad through the banking system.34 The lawyer and 
senior politician Abderrhamane Farès, as we will see later (Chapters 4 and 8), was called to meet 
Omar Boudaoud and asked to construct a totally new banking network, which was achieved with 
remarkable skill. Finally, the arrest of many agents in the Jeanson network, followed by the capture 
of Curiel, who had largely taken over from Jeanson, provided Omar Boudaoud with the opportunity 
to quietly settle a long-standing issue that had caused him deep irritation. Jeanson and Curiel, and 
many French militants active in their networks, had long claimed the right for European support 
agents to engage in opposition to the colonial state according to their own revolutionary agendas, 
which were quite autonomous from those of the FLN. Boudaoud was angered by the diversion and 
security threat created, in his eyes, by rival militant organisations such as the Mouvement anti-
colonialiste français (MAF) and Jeunes Résistance (JR), and felt that French agents should ideally 
abstain from political activism and dedicate themselves to purely technical assistance to the FLN, 
providers of safe-houses, printing presses, weapons, and chauffeurs.35  
    After the arrest of Curiel in October 1960 Boudaoud relied increasingly on a support network 
provided by Vignes and Mattéi, survivors from the Curiel organisation, that was largely non-political 
and technical. But, as will be seen in Chapter 3, Boudaoud and Zouaoui from January 1961 onwards, 
with the assistance of Rolande Mingasson, created an additional clandestine network that seems to 
have operated parallel to the Mattéi group, abstained from any political adventurism, and dedicated 
itself to the unquestioning execution of FLN orders. Its members, deliberately selected because they 
had no previous police record, would, it was hoped, prove impenetrable by the French intelligence 
services. The clandestine cellular structure of the FLN in Paris explains in part why many French 
support agents have, in later years, had no recollection of Zouaoui. However, Claude Vinci, a 
deserter from the army in Algeria who achieved subsequent fame as a singer, served as the regular 
chauffeur to the Federal until his arrest in November 1961.36 The student Gérard Chaliand, who was 
recruited into the Mattéi network in January 1961, provides rare evidence of a linkage across to the 
Federal group: ‘Le contact avec le Front passait par Mattéi et moi. Notre interlocuteur habituel était 
Zouaoui, alias “M.H” ou “Mustapha le noir”.37 
     As the DST surveillance on the Café Luxembourg continued through late September and October 
1961, agents pieced together a pattern of daily meetings in which Zouaoui conferred, often for 
hours, with a small group of advisers, a kind of brains trust or Commission centrale. ‘La commission 
centrale, véritables collège de conseillers politiques, assiste le fédéral dans ses tâches de haute 
direction de l’organisation. Le fédéral confère avec eux journellement et certaine de ces réunions 
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ont duré plusieurs heures’.38 The existence of this influential advisory group is unexpected since it 
figures nowhere in existing literature or in the standard diagrammes of the ‘official’ FLN structure. 
The Commission members, aged 41 to 51, constituted an older generation of militants, all of them 
like Zouaoui from Oranie, who had joined the nationalist struggle in the 1930s or 40s, and were able 
to camouflage their FLN activities in Paris as small business-men or commerçants. The three leading 
figures in this mysterious commission were:-  
*Mohamed Benabderrahmane, born in Zemmora on 22 October 1913, was well known to the 
colonial police as an activist in the Messalist Parti du peuple algérien (PPA) and Mouvement pour le 
triomphe des libertés démocratiques (MTLD) during 1940-1950. In 1953 he was active in a school 
(medersa) of the reformist Ulema, “Djemiat El Falah” in Oran, and President of the Cercle du Progrès 
that met in the brasserie “El Widad”, which he managed. After he was identified by the police in late 
1956-57 as an organiser of FLN finances in Oran, he fled  with his wife and seven children to Paris, 
where in July 1957 he found a job as manager (Maitre d’Hôtel) of the restaurant ‘Le Hoggar’ at 54 
Rue Monsieur-le-Prince in the 6th arrondissement.39 ‘Le Hoggar’ was owned by Ahmed Belghoul who 
had arrived in Paris in 1916 and, as one of the founders of the Etoile nord-africaine (ENA) in 1926, 
turned his restaurant into a famous centre of nationalist activity.40 In late 1957 Belghoul, to avoid 
imminent arrest by the DST, fled to Switzerland and Benabderrahmane took over this hub of FLN 
activitism since in the restaurant-hotel, noted Desbons, ’il dispose d’une grande liberté pour recevoir 
de la correspondance et prendre des contacts utiles à l’organisation rebelle’.41 
    Benabderrahmane was arrested at ‘Le Hoggar’ during Operation Flore and then taken by the 
arresting team to Room 101 in the DST HQ where, during his interrogation, he denied any political 
role and only admitted to paying FLN dues since 1960. Although he had known Zouaoui since 1957, 
he claimed the group in the Café Luxembourg had only met to discuss the cloth trade and business 
affairs.42 The Desbons report noted this : ‘insistance même sur le caractère purement amical et 
commercial de ces relations permet d’affirmer qu’il ne s’agit que d’une système de défense depuis 
longtemps mis au point et ayant pour prétention de camoufler d’importants responsables FLN en de 
paisibles commerçants’. 
*Othmane Ben Kelfat, born in Tlemçen the 26 May 1920, moved to Paris in 1948 and set up business 
as an import-export carpet merchant at his shop at 17 Rue Bergères in the 9th arrondissement. His 
passport showed that he had travelled to many countries, including Switzerland (1954), Morocco 
(1955), Spain (twice in 1955), Yugoslavia (1957) and Germany, and this probably enabled him to 
carry out FLN missions under the cover of business. He was already known to the police since in 
March 1957 Malika Allag, the sister of the FLN reprentative in Guinea, had worked as his liaison 
agent.  
    Five days after the DST first located the Zouaoui group in the Luxembourg, Ben Kelfat made 
contact with Mohamed Zeghari and his son, the former a high placed figure in the government of 
the newly independent Moroccan state, former vice-president of the Conseil des Ministres, director 
of the Moroccan State Bank, and owner of the flour-mills, Minoterie de Fez. Ben Kelfat’s links to such 
high-placed individuals suggests that he was playing a significant role in the FLN international 
networks, probably in the banking and transfer abroad of funds collected in France. Arrested during 
Operation Flore, and interrogated in Room 103, he recognised his membership of the FLN to which 
he contributed 30,000 francs a month.43 When he was confronted with the liaison agent Rolande 
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Mingasson, whom he had met on 22 September, both claimed not to know the other and refused to 
give any further information. Desbons concluded that Ben Kelfat, ‘d’une mauvaise foi évidente’, was 
lying when he said his many trips abroad, ‘n’ont qu’un intérêt touristique ou familial’. During his 
later interrogation Baba-Hamed disclosed that regular Federation meetings had been held in the 
home of Ben Kelfat.44  
* Lakhdar Bouri, born in Nedroma 22 April 1910, was a market trader living at 18 Rue de Chartres in 
the famous Algerian ghetto of the Goutte d’Or in the 18th arrondissement. He was already known to 
the police since he had been interviewed on 7 February 1957 about his brother who had leant his car 
to the FLN to transport tracts. Interrogated in Room 7/9 by the DST on 10 November he claimed to 
be, ‘un commerçant n’ayant que des rapports amicaux et de commerce avec Zouaoui’. He pretended 
that Zouaoui, ‘doit apprendre un métier qu’il ignore complètement’, and to this end had signed a 
legal contract by which Zouaoui had paid 8,000 New francs into a bank account opened by Bouri in 
the Barbès branch of the Banque nationale pour le commerce et l’industrie (BNCI) on 26 September 
1961, and Zouaoui had opened an account in the same bank. This looks very much like a cover for an 
FLN operation. Bouri had been identified crossing the Swiss border on 7 June 1961, and again on 17 
July, and his claim that he had not paid any FLN dues for some time was an indication, thought 
Desbons, that he was sufficiently senior to be on the FLN payroll. 
     The Luxembourg circle, in addition to these three, included various minor figures like Mekki ben 
Kaddour Gaddi, born at Ouled el Abbes, near Mostaganem (Oranie) 25 July 1935, who was living at 
the Lux Hotel, 17 Rue Lacépède in the 5th arrondissement, and a former activist in the proscribed 
UGEMA (Union générale des étudiants musulmans algériens). Desbons thought that he was probably 
a link between the FLN and the university milieux. The market trader Abdelkader Laguer who, like 
Zouaoui was born in Sidi-bel-Abbès (29 September 1910) and his driver, Kouider Haddou, who both 
lived in the Hotel Home Latin at 17 Rue de Sommerard (5th arrondissement), appear to have 
played a minor support role. Although both were arrested and interrogated during Operation Flore, 
neither was on the list of those who were held in prison to be brought to trial. 
    Although, in principle, the FLN attempted to eliminate ‘regionalism’ within its organisation, the 
Commission centrale of Abderrahmane, Ben Kelfat and Bouri, appears to have been constituted 
through long-term contacts between militants from the Oran region, men that Zouaoui knew well 
and could trust. None of those arrested gave away much information on the subject matter of the 
intense, daily discussions that took place in the café, nor did they leave any record or minutes, but a 
few captured documents revealed, for example, that the group had decided the overall themes that 
were to be developed by the head of propaganda, Medjoub Benzerfa. ‘La commission centrale, qui 
tiennent conseil, mais évitent de transcrire eux-mêmes leurs décisions, laissant aux agents de liaison 
ou au responsables le soin de matérialiser par des communiqués, des tracts ou des décisions, 
l’orientation de l’action de la rébellion’.45 Although the precise role and nature of the Commission 
remained unknown to the DST, it appears to have provided a kind of informal, but non-the-less 
highly influential, body of older and experienced nationalists that could advise Zouaoui in relation to 
the more difficult strategic choices that he had to make. It seems likely that the Commission would 
have been involved in discussing the response to Papon’s night curfew and the political logic of the 
demonstration of 17 October. 
      Each day DST agents followed Zouaoui from the Café Luxembourg as he walked through the Latin 
Quarter to his home at No.8 in the Impasse des Deux Anges just north of St. Germain des Prés. A 
creature of habit, he liked to stop off en route to play cards in the Café Le Tournon, just to the north 
of the Senate. During the 1950s this café was the favourite meeting place of many Afro-American 
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writers, artists, journalists and musicians, including James Baldwin, Chester Himes, Richard Wright, 
William Gardner Smith and Duke Ellington. The ex-pat US community became bitterly divided during 
the so-called “Gibson Affair” over the issue of supporting the Algerian nationalists, and William 
Gardner Smith, in his semi-autobiographical novel The Stone Face, recorded his dawning realisation 
that Paris was not, as compared to the deeply racist society of the USA, the liberated multicultural 
society that so many exiled black Americans believed. In the streets and cafés of Paris Gardner Smith 
became aware of the racial violence meted out to Algerian workers by the police. As a journalist and 
interpreter with Agence France-Presse he was well informed on the actions of the French army in 
Algeria, including bombing of villagers, and in The Stone Face, which he began to write in 1961, he 
provided the first and perhaps most famous literary account of the 17 October massacre.46 That the 
Black novelist of the Paris demonstration of 17 October, and Zouaoui its key planner, should have 
habituated the same café is  no doubt a coincidence, but Zouaoui’s choice of Le Tournon in which to 
relax at the end of the day is not, since in this bohemian and multi-ethnic setting the man who was 
also known as ‘Mustapha le Noir’, must have felt at ease with the clientèle, could merge in, and felt 
relatively secure from the police patrols that constantly intercepted those of North African 
appearance. 
      No.8 in the Impasse des Deux Anges (see Photo 1) is tucked away at the bottom of a small cul-de-
sac where Zouaoui may have felt safer from police surveillance and inquisitive neighbours or 
informers. The fiche de renseigement provided to the team led by the DST officer Mousseigne who 
arrested and interrogated Zouaoui in Room 201 indicates that he had already been identified. The 
attached identity or police photograph shows a thick-set figure with a bullet-shape head and thick-
framed, darkened glasses, which explains three of his many pseudonymes, “Mustapha le Noir” , 
“Bouledogue”, “Quatre Yeux”. Zouaoui refused to reply to any questions, beyond stating that he was 
‘un militant du FLN’, but the DST was particularly keen to prove, for judicial reasons and any 
subsequent trial, that he was indeed the same person as used the principal cover name of 
“Maurice”. This detail is of considerable importance, as will be seen subsequently, since the key 
correspondence and orders sent by the Federal Committee to Paris relating to the planning of the 
demonstration of 17 October were adressed to “Maurice”, which also happened to be the 
pseudonym of Mohammedi Saddek. The police took great pains to prove that “Maurice” and 
Zouaoui were one and the same person. The fiche issued to Mousseigne, the arresting officer, 
emphasised in bold capitals that no mention was to be made to Zouaoui of the pseudonym 
“Maurice”, ‘NE PAS FAIRE ETAT DU PSEUDO “MAURICE”‘. Mousseigne managed to get Zouaoui to 
identify a document as in his own hand, and writing experts were able to verify this was identical to 
another text that had been signed “Maurice”: ‘le texte incomplet, révèle cependant que les 
préoccupations de Zouaoui portent sur l’ensemble du territoire et dépassent même les 
circonscriptions des contrôleurs de wilayas’. Another letter signed “Maurice” found in the home of 
Mingasson, his liaison agent, showed Zouaoui, ‘est bien le responsable fédéral du FLN résident en 
France’.47 
    When the DST raided Zouaoui’s home they did not find very much in the way of FLN archives, 
almost certainly because the highly sensitive documents that he exchanged with Germany were held 
for security reasons at other safe-houses or in the Tunisian embassy.48 However, the DST did find an 
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address, at 31 Avenue de Versailles in the 16th arrondissement, that led them immediately to the 
home of Josette Berry in which they seized 108,390,000 old francs, accounts for Wilaya 3B 
(Marseille) and, in her workplace at the Touring-Club de France, typed stencils relating to the activity 
of the ALN in Algeria from 1 to 10 September 1961.  
    One of the bizarre incidents of Operation Flore concerned the arrest of a wealthy, eccentric 
American called Georges Hasslacher who shared the same house as Zouaoui at 8 Impasse des Deux 
Anges. DST investigation revealed that Hasslacher, a freelance journalist and financial speculator,  
 
              
Photo.1. The home of the Federal, Mohamed Zouaoui, at No.8 Impasse des Deux Anges (6th arrondissement). 
The location in the heart of the Latin Quarter enabled FLN cadres to merge into the Left Bank world of 
students, artists and tourists. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
October demonstration. These documents had originated in the Tunisian embassy:  Mohammed Harbi 
communication to the author, Lyons, 19 June 2006.  
20 
 
 
had been under suspicion of money trafficking in 1953-54, and an anonymous letter to the DST in 
1956 denounced him as a, ‘trafiquant d’armes ayant effectué un voyage en Algérie et au Maroc et 
devant se rendre en Israel’, but an investigation had been inconclusive. Hasslacher and an associate 
Francis Hoerler had travelled to Holland and Germany by car on 16 October 1961 with a young 
woman “Haidi”, and met up in Germany on 20 October with Gisela Seidler who had gone ahead by 
train from Paris on 13 October in a seat reserved by Hasslacher. The DST suspected a classic FLN 
support network, placed a phone tap, and arrested both Hasslacher and Hoerler during Operation 
Flore. Hasslacher, in his autobiography, recounts how he had decided to escape from his bourgeoise 
life-style as a businessman in Versailles by training as an artist and, after renting a studio in the 
Impasse des Deux Anges, painted young nude models, among them ‘a young false blonde named 
Gisèle’. The trip to Holland and Germany appears to have been more an amorous pleasure excursion 
than an FLN operation. Hasslacher describes how a ‘dozen gorillas burst into my room’ and took 
Gisèle and himself for separate grilling at the Rue de Saussaies. But the DST quickly released 
Hasslacher after forcing him to sign, under threat of ninety days detention, a form stating that he 
had been well treated by them.49 However, rather curiously, Francis Hoerler, whom Hasslacher knew 
as an artist friend, was identified by the DST as a lycée monitor at Vanves who had been arrested at 
a UNEF demonstration for peace in Algeria in October 1960. He was identified on 21 September 
1961 driving Zouaoui away from 8 Impasse des Deux Anges, so there may have been more to 
Hasslacher than meets the eye. 
      After the DST location of the FLN group that met regularly in the Café Luxembourg, the agents 
had little difficulty in tracking their further contacts, so that a detailed picture of the overall network 
began to appear. The next two chapters investigate the remaining part of the network. 
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                                                                                 2 
                                 The Zouaoui network: the role of the Contrôleurs 
 
      The geographical structure of the FLN in France was frequently modified throughout the war, in 
part to take account of changes in the numbers of Algerians on the ground, but also to counter the 
fact that the intelligence services, over a period of time, invariably built up a clear picture of the 
organisation. Marcel and Paulette Péju, who worked closely with the Federation during 1961, noted: 
‘Certains policiers, devenus de véritables techniciens de la structure FLN, réussissaient à 
reconstituer, à recomposer le puzzle avec une précision remarquable. Simplement, comme cette 
structure changeait constamment, ils n’y parvenaient qu’avec un certain retard: quatre à six mois en 
général’.50 The SCAA, in a study of FLN structures, remarked with a sense of pique, that the FLN was 
able to rapidly modify its organisation, ‘du jour au lendemain, réduisant ainsi à néant le travail des 
services spécialisés, chargés de la synthèse des efforts de tous’.51 On the 1 September 1961 the 
Federation carried out a major reorganisation of the Paris Wilaya boundaries in order to effect a, 
‘mouvement de ses cadres supérieure menacés par les nombreuses arrestations’ and to prevent 
penetration by the ‘services spécialisées’. In particular the previous Wilayas for Paris-Centre (W1) 
and  Paris-Périphérie (W2), were replaced by a demarcation line marked by the River Seine, with 
Wilaya 2 on the right bank and Wilaya 1 on the left.52 The metropolitan territory was now divided 
into seven Wilayas, and these were in turn grouped into three blocks each of which was under the 
direction of a ‘responsable contrôleur’ (RC) based in Paris. 
         Contrôleur 1, Mustapha Baba-Hamed, was in charge of Wilaya 1 (Paris south of the Seine) and 
Wilaya 1B (‘Atlantic’) that covered all of western France as far as Bordeaux and the Pyrenees. 
Contrôleur 2, Younès Aberkane, directed Wilaya 2 (Paris north of the Seine), Wilaya 2A (Normandy, 
Pas-de-Calais, and the Nord), and Wilaya 2B (the North-east, Alsace-Lorraine, up to the Swiss 
border). Contrôleur 3, Saïd Amroun, covered Wilaya 3 (the Lyons region and Massif Central), and 3B 
(Marseille and Languedoc). The DST was able to build up a detailed picture of this organisation since 
during Operation Flore on 10 November it arrested all three RCs, and seized a major part of their 
archives, including a map of the new Wilaya boundaries (see  Map 1). It is important to take account 
of this new structure and its personnel, which only lasted from 1 September to 10 November 1961, 
since without this it becomes impossible to decode correctly the source of each FLN internal 
document. For example, as will be seen later, an important account of the 17 October 
demonstration, seized during Operation Flore, and coded ‘A12’, can be traced to Mohammed Ghafir 
who was in charge of one of the two Amalas (or Superzones) south of the Seine (‘12’ being the code 
for Wilaya 1, Amala 2). 
  The Responsables contrôleurs, the existence of which is barely mentioned in histories of the 
Federation, played a crucial role in the overall running of the FLN networks across the entire 
geographical space of metropolitan France. Like the Commission centrale they conferred regularly 
with Zouaoui but, unlike these politically wise ‘elders’, they also performed an executive function, 
receiving orders that arrived from the Federal Committee and the Federal, and passing these down 
the chain of command to the seven Wilayas and the lower rungs of the hierarchy (Amala, Zone, 
Region, Secteur, Kasma, Section, Group, Cell).53 In turn, the seven Wilaya heads were required to 
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Map 1 
 
 
 
 
 
to constantly liaise with their controler in Paris, especially during the complex monthly operations 
when they usually travelled with a European driver to the capital, bringing the collection to safe 
houses (dépôts) to be counted, centralised and finally banked (see Chapter 8). The Wilaya heads, 
through elaborate financial and ‘organic’ reports, were answerable to the RCs for a range of issues 
that included diffusion of propaganda, internal FLN discipline, the control of armed groups and 
weapons supply, and plans to execute attacks on the police or other targets. The DST Desbon report 
summed up the function of the RCs who, ‘au contrôle des wilayas dirigent et coordinent l’ensemble 
de l’activité des wilayas qui leur sont rattachées. Chaque mois, ils centralisent le produit des 
collectes qui leur est remis à l’agent financier du Fédéral. Ils coordinent l’action politique, assurent la 
diffusion de la propagande écrite et contrôlent étroitement la lutte armée. Ils reçoivent les comptes-
rendus d’assassinats, corrections, amendes, sanctions diverses dont sont victimes les adversaires et 
les récalcitrants. Ils tiennent comptabilités de l’armement, des effectifs, des mouvements de la 
population musulmane’.54 The arrest of all three RCs, along with a mass of documents, on the 9-10 
November represented a huge coup for the DST, and explains why the archives contain such a 
wealth of records on the global administration of the organisation as well as documents relating 
specifically to the planning of the demonstrations of 17-20 October as well as a numerous eye-
witness reports of militants who had been present. 
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Figure 1. The structure of the FLN organisation in France, October 1961.55 
                                                                    
Federation Committee (Germany) – 5 members (Boudaoud, Ladlani, Bouaziz, Souici, Haroun) 
 
Federal   -  Zouaoui                                                                                                      
 
Wilaya Controlers (RCs) – RC1 (Baba-Hamed), RC2 (Aberkane), RC3 (Amroun)                                                                                               
 
Wilayas –  W1 (Maama), W1B (Mellah), W2 (Attaba), W2A (Hamadene), W2B (Boudraâ), W3 
(Benyounès) and W3B (Achab) -      total FLN numbers in  a Wilaya, 36,000 
                                                         
Amala                                           2 to 3 Amalas per Wilaya     
                                     
Zone                                              2 to 3 Zones per Amala                                    
 
Région                                           2 to 4 Regions per Zone    -   total FLN numbers in a Region 3,500                                
 
Below the level of Région, the FLN subdivided the structure, for security reasons, into three parallel 
hierarchies of militants, adhérentes, and sympathisantes. 
 
Secteur 
Kasma  -  total FLN numbers in a Kasma about 300 
Section 
Groupe – total FLN numbers in a Groupe about 30-35 
Fraction 
Cellule  -  between 3-5 members. 
................................................................................................................................................ 
    
      All three of the controlers, Aberkane, Amroun and Baba-Hamed, were arrested in the early hours 
of 10 November, and these figures are considered in turn, although Baba-Hamed is examined in 
greater detail since there is a lot more information on his background, activities and subsequent 
‘disappearance’ and interrogations. Baba-Hamed’s biography provides a case-study of the typical 
career pattern of a militant who succeeded in climbing up through the ranks of the FLN.    
  
The Younès Aberkane group (RC2) 
 
     Younès Aberkane was born on 28 October 1928 in Taourirt-Mimoun (Grande Kabylie), a village 
famed for its rich cultural and nationalist traditions. During Operation Flore he was arrested in the 
southern suburb of Antony (38, Rue des Pivoines), along with his partner Geneviève François and his 
cousin Brahim Aberkane. The DST seized a considerable number of documents relating to Wilayas 2, 
2A and 2B, a pistol and ammunition, 172,388,000 francs and a forged identity card in the name of 
Roberto Santoni.56 During interrogation Younès, after admitting that he was RC for Wilayas 2, 2A and 
2B, refused to speak, but the captured documents showed clearly that he exercised under the 
`autorité exclusive’ of Zouaoui, ‘dans tous les domaines de cette organisation subversive’. His cousin 
Brahim Aberkane, born on 31 December 1932 in Fort National (Kabylie), was already known to the 
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police as member of a groupe de choc who had been interned in the camps of St.Maurice and Larzac 
between 9 December 1959 and 27 September 1961. Described by Desbons as a ‘garde de corps’ for 
his cousin, he had the misfortune of falling under arrest within weeks of being released from Larzac. 
      The French Federation frequently recruited European, or even American women, to undertake 
the role of liaison agents and drivers since they could more readily avoid detection by the police. 
Throughout the long history of Algerian labour migration to France, many exiles had entered into 
relationships and marriage or cohabitation with European women, and in the case of the Paris FLN 
leaders such a relationship, often with students, could provide access to a secure house, a car and 
driver, and secretarial and liaison support.57 A cadre of the Organisation spéciale (OS), during 
interrogation, said that he had been asked in early 1961 to recruit European agents who could liaise 
between Paris and the Federal Committee in Germany, preferably those who had no previous police 
record, could travel abroad frequently on the pretext of academic study, and female, ‘since they are 
generally regarded as less suspect than men’. The OS militant, in addition to his French fiancée, was 
able to recruit a female sociology and a philosophy student, who carried out two or three trips to 
Düsseldorf between March and December 1961.58  
     Younès partner, Geneviève François, falls into this pattern. The DST investigation showed that she 
frequently liaised with other support agents, including Mingasson, to whom she was introduced by 
Aberkane in August 1961; transported packages, including collected money; had visited Zouaoui’s 
house in the Impasse des Deux Anges; and acted as the RC’s secretary during meetings. During the 
DST surveillance of François they were led to the house of Ali Riche at 233 Boulevard Jean Jaurès in 
Boulogne-Billancourt, and when Riche was arrested on 10 November it was discovered that this had 
been used as an FLN safe-house since 1958 and Aberkane, who had a key to the door, met here with 
other cadres at the end of each month to receive and count money that was delivered in large 
scotch-bound bundles. Aberkane also drew up his reports here for Zouaoui and François served as 
his secretary and also took notes during meetings.59 The DST agents seized a large number of 
documents relating to Wilayas 2, 2A and 2B which were particularly detailed on actions carried out 
by armed groups during September and October 1961 (43 assassinations, 4 attempted 
assassinations, and 9 ‘actions terroristes diverses’), and on the number of arms held by each Wilaya. 
Wilaya 2 (Paris north), for example, had a reserve of 67 automatic pistols, 10 machine-gun pistols, 3 
rifles, a light machine gun, and 5,478 shells. The DST investigation led to the arrest of two other 
members of the Aberkane cell. Marcel Verger, a mechanic (born 5 April 1931 in Calvados), who lived 
at 113 Avenue Jean-Jaurès (19th), had transported weapons for the FLN on several occasions. 
Mohamed Sallat, born the 17 April 1918 in Sidi-Bel-Abbès, and therefore a contemporary of Zouaoui, 
had been visited at home by him at 13 Rue de Sentier (2nd), and had attended meetings of the RC2 
group in Ali Riche’s home. 
 
The Saïd Amroun group (RC3)  
 
  Saïd Amroun, born in Tigmount Azouz in Kabylia on the 15 December 1928, was probably the most 
politically experienced and important of the three Contrôleurs, and the most trusted of advisers to 
Zouaoui. He had arrived in France in 1948 and was a member of the MTLD federal bureau in 1953, 
but in 1954 rallied to the Centrists in the internal schism that led to the breakaway FLN.60 In 1957 he 
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was head of Wilaya 1 (Paris-Centre) but was arrested in October 1957 in possession of a typed, 
threatening letter and was condemned by the Seine court on 6 December 1958 to two years prison. 
On his release from Larzac on 6 February 1960 he was banned from the greater Paris region and 
several weeks later he went to Germany, shortly before the Orleans Cour d’Appel condemned him 
(in absentia) as a danger to state security (ASES). In Germany he received medical treatment and on 
his return to Paris in September 1960 he was identified as linked to the Curiel network. By January 
1961 he had been located by the DST as RC3 for Wilaya 3 and 3B, but they were unable to find his 
whereabouts until he was sighted in the company of Zouaoui on 9th and 12th October, days before 
the 17 October demonstration, and then arrested during Operation Flore at 18 Rue Clauzel (9th). 
Amroun, who was known under several pseudonyms, “Mustapha”, “Saïd”, and “André”, was found 
to be in possession of numerous documents, ‘en particulier des rapports organiques et financiers 
des wilayas 3 et 3bis, des comptes relatifs à des mouvements importants de fonds, une carte de 
France avec le découpage des wilayas, des directives diverses de la Fédération de France du FLN’, as 
well as 240,000 fr and a false identity card in the name of Youcef Touati. Also implicated with 
Amroun was Si Tahar Ben Yahia, a street trader, born in Azazga 21 February 1930, who had been 
sentenced to two years prison (suspended) on 28 September 1961. On 9 October he was seen with 
Zouaoui and Amroun, but was arrested by the DST on 30 October, shortly before Operation Flore, as 
a suspected high level cadre of the Organisation spéciale.                  
   Amroun’s liaison agent Nicole Grumbach, born in Paris 27 October 1934, a secretary who lived with 
her parents at 40 Avenue Duquesne, was frequently seen by DST agents making contact with 
Mingasson and Amroun during October. Also arrested at 26 Rue Spontini (16th) was Monique 
Antoine, a copywriter (rédactrice) at the Caisse Centrale de Crédit Immobilier et Commercial, who 
claimed that Grumbach had tried to recruit her to work with the FLN, but admitted that, ‘pendant 
ses loisirs, elle s’occupe d’un comité d’aide aux enfants algériens’. But her attempt to create a cover 
story was blown when, during the search of her home, Yahia Achab, head of Wilaya 3B arrived by 
chance from Marseille, carrying 16,670,000 francs and numerous documents. The DST quickly 
moved to search his home in Marseille where they found further documents, including the address 
of Mosze Joseph Hamburger at 3 Impasse Lemiere, Paris (19th). Born in Warzaw (11 June 1925), an 
ex-PCF militant, Hamburger was found to have 4,625,000 francs and tried to explain away why he 
had crossed the border into Switzerland between 15 and 20 August 1961 with 20 millions. 
 
 The ‘disappearance’ of Mustapha Baba-Hamed (RC1). 
     One of the most sinister aspects of Operation Flore is the way that the DST and the Prefecture of 
police collaborated in the carefully planned enforced disappearance of Baba-Hamed, Controler of 
Wilayas 1 and 1B. According to Amnesty International, enforced disappearance, today one of the 
most widespread abuses of human rights, ‘takes place when a person is arrested, detained or 
abducted by the state or agents acting for the state, who then deny that the person is being held or 
conceal their whereabouts, placing them outside the protection of the law’.61 This is precisely what 
happened in the case of Baba-Hamed. In the detailed DST plan for Operation Flore Baba-Hamed was 
identified as one of those to be arrested on the night of 9-10 November at 29 Rue des St.Pères by a 
three man team consisting of officers Guyral and Delham, and a driver Dubois, and then taken to the 
HQ Rue des Saussaies for interrogation in Room 2.62 However, it was claimed by the police that 
Baba-Hamed was absent and his flat was then placed under surveillance awaiting his eventual 
return. Press reports on Operation Flore, as well as a statement by Roger Frey during a speech in 
parliament, while listing the names of all those who had been arrested, made no mention of Baba-
Hamed.63  
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    However, the FLN was aware that Baba-Hamed had probably been spirited away and lawyers from 
the FLN collectif, Oussedik and Benabdallah, wrote to Alain Simon, the Juge d’Instruction, on 24 
November to investigate the matter. The two lawyers said they were acting for their clients, 
‘Zouaoui et de ses co-inculpés qui sont actuellement détenus à la maison d’arrêt de Fresnes’. Their 
clients had been interrogated by the DST in relation to Baba-Hamed, alias ‘Slimane’, and, ‘La photo 
de ce dernier fut notamment présentée à Monsieur Zouaoui à qui l’on reproche de l’avoir recontré 
le 25 octobre 1961’. Baba-Hamed had also been sighted in police custody and the accused 
demanded to be legally ‘confrontés’ with this man, ‘dont il ne connaissent pas les déclarations’. 
Baba-Hamed had not been imprisoned at Fresnes, despite police claims that he had played an 
important role in the FLN, and Zoauoui, Amroune and other accused , ‘ce demandent si la police n’a 
pas fait disparaître ce témoin’, and asked that his place of detention be revealed.64 On 27 November 
Simon, the Juge d’Instruction, wrote to the Procureur de la République, who in turn requested on 8 
December the director of the DST, Doustin, and the Minister of the Interior, to send him, ‘des 
éléments de réponse’. Doustin handed the investigation over to the Commissaire Principal Etienne 
Desbons, who had earlier written the key report on Operation Flore, and he duly reported that Baba-
Hamed had not been located on 9-10 November and subsequent searches had proved negative. 
‘Une perquisition opéréé le 25 novembre 1961, dans les formes légales, fut négative. Aucun élément 
à charge contre l’interessé ne put être recueilli’.65 However, Desbons admitted, he had come to learn 
that several hours before Operation Flore Baba-Hamed had been arrested by the police of the 
Prefecture and ‘assigné à résidence’. ‘Je n’ai pu obtenir de renseignements sur les résultats de cette 
intervention’.66  
     The DST officers were, however, engaged in an elaborate cover-up as we know from other 
documents that recount how Baba-Hamed had indeed been arrested as planned by the DST early on 
the 10 November, and after interrogation at the Rue des Saussaies, was transferred to the harkis at 
Fort Noisy for eight days where he was again interrogated by the DST, and officers of the Prefecture 
of police and FPA.67 After that he was moved to the holding cells (the ‘dépôt’) of the Prefecture de 
Police on the Cité for seven days before being flown from Orly on about 25 November to Algiers and 
the camp of Béni-Messous.68 In Algeria Baba-Hamed was handed over, not to the camp authorities, 
but to the infamous détachement opérationnel de protection (DOP)  torture teams who subjected 
him to further interrogation. The DOP, working in small, mobile teams, specialised in the 
interrogation of FLN suspects in secret detention centres throughout Algeria, acting in isolation and 
in an autonomous matter outside the control of military, police and legal organisations.69 The DOP 
tried to camouflage  its existence by frequent changes of name and, in the case of Baba-Hamed, he 
was held and interrogated by a special DOP ‘Section de Liaison Paris’ that was disguised as the 123rd 
Brigade or the 58th battalion d’infanterie (BI).70  
     The DST, which  had been considerably damaged in 1959 by the publication of La Gangrène that 
revealed in detail the systematic torture of Algerians at the Rue des Saussaies, appear to have 
‘outsourced’ their interrogation practices, just as the American and British authorities were to do 
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after 9/11 in the rendition of suspects to Egypt, Morocco and elsewhere.71 During late 1960 and 
through 1961 there is archival evidence of Montaner’s increasing role as the expert of choice in Paris 
when it came to the urgent need to interrogate suspect senior FLN cadres.72 Montaner had also 
attracted unwanted attention for the torture of Algerians by the harkis in the cellars of the 13th and 
18th arrondissements in early 1961, but after the transfer of the FPA back to the base at Fort Noisy 
in June, he and his team were able to act in greater security and more concealed from public 
attention.73 When Viatte of the Commission de sauvegarde visited the Fort on 31 October to 
investigate claims that five ‘disappeared’ Algerians were being held there, Montaner reassured him 
that Papon had forbidden him to hold and interrogate any Algerians at Noisy. Viatte, in his report, 
praised Montaner since he, ‘seems to have put a stop to certain previous excesses. Captain 
Montaner appears to keep a very strict discipline at the fort’.74  
     The harki brigades shared Fort Noisy with the Service Action (SA), a commando wing of the 
counter-espionage agency the SDECE, which carried out special operations, including the 
assassination of targetted FLN agents in France and abroad. From 1960 until the end of the Algerian 
War the SA and FPA officers at Noisy, although officially under separate commands, in reality 
cooperated informally on a day-to-day basis and shared views on how to wage ‘unconventional’ 
warfare against the FLN in Paris. The SA, which was increasingly infiltrated by the OAS, even supplied 
plastic explosive from its base at Cercottes that was then used by the harki against Algerian café-
hotels.75   
     One of the SA officers, Raymond Muelle, a veteran of Indochina and North Africa, who had been a 
close friend of Montaner’s since the Second World War, has left a detailed account of his daily 
relations with the harki officers at Noisy.  Muelle provides an eye-witness account of Montaner’s 
interrogation of Baba-Hamed after his arrest in the Rue des Saints-Pères, under the false identity of 
François Baldini, born 18 January 1933, and living in Grenoble.76 Muelle, without admitting to 
torture, signals that Baba-Hamed was subjected to some gruelling treatment:- 
‘La journée a été rude pour lui. De large cernes de fatigue soulignent ses yeux inquiets; une barbe 
drue bleuit ses joues et son menton. Il n’a plus ni ceintures ni cravate, ses poignets sont liés dans le 
dos par des menottes trop serrées. Devant lui, se tiennent les inspecteurs et trois hommes, la tête 
recouverte de cagoules noires. 
    Il voit bien qu’il s’agit de musulmans malgré la lumière trop violentes qui lui dévore les yeux. L’un 
des policiers se penche vers l’homme masqué à sa droite qui hoche la tête, le deuxième cagoulard se 
contente de faire oui de la tête à une question de son voisin’. 
        We do not know exactly what ‘treatment’ Baba-Hamed underwent or what threats were made, 
but the Contrôleur RC1 followed the standard FLN instructions of resisting pressure as long as 
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possible, to give other militants time to seek safety or to remove documents and arms. Suddenly, 
says Muelle, ‘après un long soupir, sans doute épuisé par les heures d’interrogatoire, sans doute 
aussi persuadé que son silence a déjà sauvé les autres...[il] se met à table’. So elaborate was the 
attempt to sustain the ‘disappearance’ of Baba-Hamed that the transcript of his interrogation by 
Montaner was disguised as that of “Abdelkader El Fasi”, born the 14 October 1935 in Oran, living at 
41, Rue Claude Decaen in the 12th arrondissement.77 This interrogation, along with a further Fiche de 
Criblage sent by the DOP from Algiers to Papon in Paris on 9 January 1962, provides a fascinating 
insight into the events surrounding the 17 October as well as biographical information on one of the 
three highest ranking FLN leaders in Paris after Zouaoui.   
     Mustapha Baba-Hamed [or Baba-Ahmed], who was born in Tlemcen 15 June 1935, had received 
an elementary education up to CEP level. He first arrived in Paris in October 1955, at the age of 
twenty, and lived initially in the 13th arrondissement (96 Avenue de Choisy) while working as a 
mechanic at a garage in Orly, and later with Panhard. During 1956 he attended a nine month 
apprenticeship course at the Centre de formation professionnelle des adultes (CFPA) at Foix, in the 
Pyrenees, and it was probably after his return that he was contacted by Abderamane to join the FLN 
and to act as a collector, while working as a lathe-turner at the company ACMA in the north-west 
suburb of Asnières. He followed a typical militant trajectory, working his way up the FLN echelons, 
until he had sufficiently proved his worth to become in 1958 a full-time activist on the meagre FLN 
wage of 550 NF a month. At first he operated as a commissaire politique in Wilaya 2 , the Paris 
suburbs of Gennevilliers and Asnières, until promoted Régional of Colombes-Nanterre (2222)  in 
December 1958. 
    Baba-Hamed, like so many migrant workers, moved frequently from one cheap lodging to another 
and during 1958-1959 he lived for a while in a workers’ hostel, a Foyer Nord-Africaine in Genevilliers, 
the type of centre that was a target of FLN penetration and recruitment.78 He then moved on to 
rooms at 82 Rue Vaillant-Couturier and then 2 Avenue de la Gare in Gennevilliers. Baba-Hamed was 
thus deeply immersed in the north-west industrial suburbs that had one of the biggest 
concentrations of Algerian migrants and FLN militants. In August 1959 he was again promoted to the 
level of Zonal head of Colombes (222) with three Regional leaders under his orders, Petit Mohamed 
(2222), Lakhdar (2221) and “El Chaouia” (2223). He was thus in charge of an area that stretched out 
to Argenteuil, Bezons, Houilles, Sartrouville, Maison-Laffitte, Herblay, Cormeilles-en-Parisis, and 
Conflans-Ste.Honorine. In December 1959  he progressed to Amala or Superzonal (22), with three 
Zonal leaders under him, Si Mokrane (222), Si Mahmoud (221) and Si Djillali (223). 
     At some time in 1960, probably in May, Baba-Hamed was sent by the Federation to Germany on a 
special, six-month training course. While, as we will see (Chapter 5) the OS were initially trained at 
Larache in Morocco, by 1960 militants were sent in increasing numbers to courses that were 
developed by the Federal Committee in Germany, either to form a special commando to attack the 
FPA or to train as higher echelon leaders.79 The numerous arrests of senior cadres in France had, by 
1961, begun to take its toll, as many of the most experienced and politically aware men were 
confined to prisons and camps. Replacements drafted in from the mid-level hierarchy were, often 
within a few months, arrested in turn. The gradual decline in the quality and experience of leaders 
began to present a serious challenge to the Federation, a situation that was not helped by the fact 
that the GPRA and the military in Tunisia and Morocco were also attempting to increase their 
recruitment in France. It was in response to the growing dearth of able leaders that the Federal 
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Committee began to select promising militants for accelerated training in an école des cadres in 
West Germany. On his arrival at Bad Godesberg, the Bonn suburb in which many embassies were 
located, Baba-Hamed was instructed to go to the Hotel Diplomatique and to phone the Tunisian 
Embassy. From there he was transferred to a training centre near Cologne where he followed a 
course with eighteen other recruits.80 Baba-Hamed said little about the content of the training 
programme, but interrogations of others arrested in 1961 provide some detail. For example, 
Mohand Bachiri, recounts how he received an ‘éducation politique....Pour commencer, il m’a 
longuement entretenu de l’histoire et de la géographie de l’Algérie’. He also learned how to write 
reports, and throughout the six months between January and July 1960, received an ‘entraînement 
au maniement des armes et au sabotage’.81 Djouder Akli recounted how, installed in an isolated 
house in the countryside, ‘Tous les matins un instructeur algérien nous donnait des cours sur les 
armes et les munitions. Nous avons effectué des tirs dans la cave. Il nous faisait aussi l’analyse 
politique des événements, nous apprenait les méthodes de reconnaissance, celles de la police, 
l’établissement de plans d’opération, comment répondre aux interrogatoires’.82 On completion of 
the programme Baba-Hamed was smuggled, via Switzerland, back across the French border in the 
usual system of car drop, foot crossing, and car pick-up. Soon after his arrival back in Paris he was 
introduced to “Le Rouquin”, the head of Wilaya 1 (Paris-Centre), whom he replaced in about 
December 1960 or January 1961.83  
    One of the key concerns of Baba-Hamed’s interrogators was to establish the identity and function 
of his FLN contacts during 1960 and 1961, so as to construct a detailed picture of the changing 
networks. From the enormous volume of archival material it is difficult to build up a coherent 
overview of the network since many individuals were only known through a plethora of 
pseudonyms, and cadres constantly moved from one échelon to another, or between different 
regions of France. However, there is enough to go on to arrive at a fairly clear picture of the 
particular clandestine sub-network that Baba-Hamed operated during his period as contrôleur (RC1) 
between September and 9 November 1961, a phase that corresponded to the police crisis and 17 
October demonstrations. He was appointed RC1 at the moment that the Wilaya structure in Paris 
was re-organised on 1 September 1961, and under his control was Wilaya 1, in the hands of  Kaci 
Mâamar (“Kaddour”), and Wilaya 1B headed by a Kabyle, Belkacem Mellah, who was transferred 
there from Amala 11 on the right bank.84  
     In Wilaya 1B,  which covered a huge area of south-west France from Nantes and La Rochelle down 
to Bordeaux and Toulouse, the FLN had a very weak presence and, according to Baba-Hamed, ‘il n’y 
avait pratiquement pas d’organisation, pas de responsables’. Belkacem Mellah was actively trying to 
reorganise the Wilaya, particularly in the region of Nantes.85 The monthly collection amounted to 
the relatively tiny amount of three to four millions, but even this was, ‘en baisse de plus de la moitié 
à cause des arrestations qui suivirent la manifestation du 17 octobre’.86 Belkacem’s ‘pointe de chute’ 
in Paris, the location of occasional meetings with RC1, and where correspondence was received from 
the provinces was at the house of a taylor called ‘Oukaci’ at 43 Rue du Faubourg-Saint-Martin.87 This 
turned out to be Rabah Sassi, born at Bordj-Ménaïel 15 January 1904, who was arrested during Flore 
                                                          
80
 H1B16. 
81
 H1B18, Interrogation of Mohand Bachiri by André Podborski, Commissaire-Adjoint SCAA, 11 February 1961. 
82
 R. Muelle, 7 Ans, 258. 
83
 H1B16. The dates at which Baba-Hamed returned from Germany and assumed control of Wilaya 1 are 
contradictory and confusing, probably because Baba-Hamed was feeding disinformation to Montaner, in part 
to avoid his connection to armed attacks on the FPA that may have exposed him to the death penalty.  
84
 H1B19, the SAT intelligence officer Captain Parrent to Director of SCAA, 11 December 1961, identified 
“Belkacem” as Belgacem Mellah, who was passing under the identity of Mohamed Boubekeur, born at 
Michelet 20 June 1922.  
85
 Belkacem had previously been head of Amala 11 (Paris banlieue). 
86
 Wilaya 1B was in disarray in 1961, as shown by the inefficient collection due, reported DST analysts, to a 
‘comptabilité désordonnéé, détournements importants, pertes élévées’, H1B17. 
87
 H1B16, Montaner interrogation of Baba-Hamed. 
30 
 
and interrogated the following day. He claimed, as might be expected, that he had only worked with 
the FLN under duress when about one and a half to two years earlier Baba-Hamed (alias “Alfred”) 
and Belkacem had come to demand the use of his car and threatened him, ‘parce que je refusais’.88 
In January or February 1961 Baba-Hamed, Mellah and a man who was identified from a photograph 
as probably Ahmed Belakbi, had held a meeting in his house: ‘Je leur ai demandé que cela ne se 
reproduise plus’.89 In time letters from Wilaya 1B arrived by post or were delivered by hand and then 
collected by agents. 
   Far more important was Baba-Hamed’s role as controleur over Wilaya 1, Paris south, one of the 
most heavily populated and militant areas in the whole of France. Like the other two RCs, Saïd 
Amroun and Younès Aberkane, Baba-Hamed retained a safe-house that could be used for regular 
meetings with the head of Wilaya 1 and his two Amala lieutenants.This ‘point de chute’ was at 
28/28b Rue Daubenton in the 5th arrondissement in the flat of a French artist, Savatier. At the last 
such meeting, on 5th November, Baba-Hamed had met there with “Kadour” [Kaci Mâamer], “Ahmed” 
of Amala 11 [Mohamed Tahar Labane], and “Rachid” of Amala 12 [Mohammed Ghafir].90 Quite 
separate from this ‘organic’ structure was the extremely important system for the monthly 
movement of the funds for the whole of France, which was collected at the local Regional level by 
Algerians and then transported by European agents through a sequence of Paris counting houses 
and eventually centralised and banked by the Farès network. Baba-Hamed’s remit within this 
accounting chain was to oversee the centralisation of the collection for Wilaya 1 at the home of 
Rovenstach, 6 Rue de Panama in the 18th, and for Wilaya 1B in the home of ‘Mohammedi’, 42 Rue 
Richet in the 13th, from where it was transferred by Jacques Girard to the RCI counting house in the 
home of Capon, at 78 Vaillant-Couturier in the south-east suburb of  Alfortville.91 
     A third, and even more secretive, component of Baba-Hamed’s network, that he was particularly 
loath to disclose to his interrogators, was that relating to his key role in the operation of the GA and 
OS armed groups. The police were particularly keen, in view of the FLN attacks on the FPA and 
individual police officers, to extract information on the structure and membership of the armed 
groups. Baba-Hamed had played a key role in planning the attacks on the harkis in late 1960: for 
example the major operation against the FPA base in the 13th arrondissement on 23 October 1960 
had come about through orders transmitted from the Federation by ‘Si-Said’ [ie. Bouaziz] to him and 
‘Slimane’ at a meeting in an HLM flat in the northern suburbs of Staines during which Baba-Hamed 
was ordered to prepare a commando of 30 men. After the massive arrests and dislocation of the 
Amirat commando in January 1961, Baba-Hamed was given the task of re-organising the GA, and 
documents found in his archives showed that it was he who received and monitored some of the 
plans relating to assassinations of police officers during and after September. 
     Montaner was particularly interested in documents that had been delivered to Baba-Hamed in a 
café on 25th October and had later been seized in his archive during Operation Flore. This consisted 
of a map of Fougères in Normandy, where the FLN had located a Brigadier de Police, Giner, who had 
been moved there in 1959 and was now living in the Gendarmerie in the Rue Laval. Giner had been 
condemned to death by the ALN in 1956 and had escaped an assassination attempt: ‘Plus de cinq 
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cents (500) victimes lui sont imputables’. There followed a description of this ‘type espagnol’, 
probably a pied-noir, who spoke Arabic.92   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  The Structure of the Zouaoui network, before Operation “Flore” 
 Sources: figure2 has been based mainly on sources and an ‘organigramme’ to be found in the DST 
Desbons Report, H1B16. The identification of the leaders of Wilayas 2, 2A, 2B, and 3 is from a table 
in Mohamed Akli Benyounès, Sept Ans, 124. Benyounès table incorrectly identifies Saddek as head of 
Wilaya 1 when, as Mohammed Ghafir’s memoirs show beyond doubt, this position was held by Kaci 
Mâamar. The leader of Wilaya 1B “Belkacem”, has been identified from H1B19,  as Belgacem Mellah. 
.......................................................................      
 
   A key objective of the security forces was to locate FLN arms caches, so vital to operations of the 
armed groups, and a major coup for Montaner was his rapid location of two OS dépôts.93 On the 
night of 10 November an FPA officer, Champsavin, assisted by the Police judiciaire and BAV police, 
raided the workshop of a tapestry-maker (or upholsterer?), 33 year-old Roland Morne, at 43 Rue de 
Montreuil (11th). Morne, who was known to the police from 1958 as a Communist militant, must 
have been tipped off via FLN contacts since he escaped before he could be arrested and phoned his 
workman on 11 November to say, rather wisely, that he was, ‘en voyage pour une durée 
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indéterminée’.94 At Morne’s the police found a significant cache of twelve automatic pistols, 
dynamite, electric fuses and cartridges. A second arms dépôt was found in the home or practice of a 
dentist, Dr.Maurice Lambert, at Clichy-sous-Bois.95 
     At the next level down from the responsables contrôleurs, the DST failed to identify the seven 
Wilaya heads, with the exception of Yahia Achab who had the bad luck to arrive from Marseille  at 
his FLN contact address at the very moment that the secret service was searching it. The fact that RC 
documents and interrogations failed to identify the Wilaya heads is significant, since it suggests that 
the clandestine structure of the FLN, by which at any one level only one militant would have contact 
with the cell above, so as to prevent discovery by the police services, appears to have worked 
effectively. Omar Boudaoud remarks that each full-time responsable, at Wilaya, Zone and Region 
level, tended to construct his own local network and the Federal Committee members only found 
out the identity of these individuals when they were arrested and their organisations broken up.96 
      A quite secure bulk-head seems to have operated between the Federal and the 
Wilaya/Superzonal level. As Desbons noted, Zouaoui’s daily contacts remained circumscribed to a 
small circle: ‘Pratiquement, Zouaoui n’avait de contacts directs et fréquents qu’avec ses contrôleurs 
de wilayas (Amroune Saïd, Baba-Hamed, Aberkane Younès), les membres de la commission centrale 
ou les individus ayant un rôle sur le plan national’. The hermetic nature of the upper-Zouaoui circle 
helps to explain why it was that quite high-placed militants in the Federation, such as Mohammed 
Ghafir who was head of Amala 12, could be both close to the action during the autumn of 1961 in 
Paris and yet remain, apparently, without any knowledge of the identity of the Federal and his 
activities.  
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                                                              3  
 
                The European Support Network, Renault, and FLN Propaganda 
 
     Europeans, mainly French, German, Belgian and Swiss, were vital to the operations and security of 
the French Federation and yet the so-called porteurs de valises who were arrested by the DST during 
Operation Flore have, until recently, remained largely unknown. Hamon and Rotman, in their 
standard history, Les Porteurs de Valises, do not identify or name a single agent in the Zouaoui 
network. This anonymity is itself of interest and can be explained in relation to the longer term 
evolution of the support networks in France. Omar Boudaoud, throughout his leadership of the 
French Federation, from July 1957 to the autumn of 1962, disliked the fact that the most prominent 
heads of the support networks, notably Francis Jeanson and Henri Curiel, strongly asserted the right 
of the European militants to pursue their own political agendas, that were not to be confused with 
those of the Algerian independence movement. Boudaoud, in his first meeting with Jeanson in 1957, 
bluntly asserted, ‘Vous faites un travail clandestin et vous continuez à avoir une activité publique, à 
donner des conférences. Tout ça, c’est fini’.97 Boudaoud’s view was that the Europeans should 
confine themselves to a purely technical support function, and he was suspicious of any autonomous 
political agendas, especially if they should be linked in any way to international communism. 
Boudaoud was unable to impose his position, especially on Curiel’s Mouvement anticolonialiste 
français (MAF) founded in July 1960, but by late 1960 the Jeanson network, and Jeanson himself, 
had been marginalised through mass arrests, and the DST captured Curiel in October.  
     On 1 November 1960 Boudaoud seized the chance to call a top-level meeting of the French 
network in Germany and was able to put in place, through Jacques Vignes and Georges Mattéi, an 
organisation that recruited new people who prioritised technical support over sectarian politics and 
were happy to abandon the culture of intellectual ‘stardom’ for one of anonymity and the quiet 
acceptance of the FLN payroll and directives.98 Gérard Chaliand, a student in Oriental studies 
(“Langues O”), described the climate in January 1961 among the post-Curiel network, one in which 
there was little political debate, and quite a number of “solitaires” who were not connected to any 
competing organisation or movement. The Zouaoui network that was arrested in November 1961 
was formed from January 1961 onwards, in deep clandestinity and far away from any media 
attention. Chaliand, however, like Claude Vinci, was aware of the fact that the support networks 
were essentially under the control of the Federal: ‘Le contact avec le Front passait par Mattéi et moi. 
Notre interlocuteur habituel était Zouaoui, alias “M.H” ou “Mustapha le noir”.99 
      From this it can be seen why the European support network which was so heavily implicated in 
the events surrounding the demonstration of 17 October has remained, until now, largely unknown. 
The Zouaoui network was constructed from January 1961 onwards, as had the earlier Jeanson-Curiel  
organisations, through key activists recruiting trusted friends or associates in an ad hoc way, 
contacts who were judged to be discrete and who were able to offer quite specific skills or materials, 
as secretaries, owners of cars, print workers, or who could secure flats or homes that could 
accommodate FLN cadres, collect money, or conceal documents and arms. 
   By far the single most important organiser of the Zouaoui network was a twenty-six year old 
woman, Rolande Mingasson, who was variously described by the DST as Zouaoui’s ‘agent financier’, 
‘sécretaire’, ‘agent de liaison’ and ‘agent d’exécution’. Mingasson, born at St. Cloud on 25 July 1934, 
had no previous police or security record, but the DST investigation showed that between 1955 and 
1960 she had been very active on the Catholic left, notably in the Jeunesse Ouvrière Catholique (JOC) 
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and in CFTC trade union circles. In the municipal elections of 8 March 1959 she had stood as a 
candidate for the Union des Forces Démocratiques (UFD), a cartel of the non-Communist left that 
was in opposition to de Gaulle after he returned to power on the back of the Algerian army coup of 
13 May 1958. Private correspondence, seized on 9 November, shows that in 1961 Mingasson, like 
many of the activists opposed to the Algerian War, was deeply anxious that France was threatened 
by a dangerous fascism, and thought that clandestine opposition to the military, the OAS and the 
Gaullists, was legitimated by values that were synonymous with those of the French Resistance. In 
July 1959 Mingasson joined the Union de Gauche socialiste (UGS) and eventually, on 1 November 
1960, the Parti socialiste unifié (PSU), the party that was to mark the emergence of the “New Left” 
out of the cauldron of the Algerian War.100  
    From February 1957 to January 1961 Mingasson worked as a librarian for the Renault Comité 
d’Entreprise at Boulogne-Billancourt. During these years Renault employed about 3,000 Algerian 
workers and, as a bastion of working-class militancy, represented a crucial support base for both FLN 
and French liaison cadres.101 An unusually high percentage of French support agents were current or 
ex-Renault workers, and the enormous factory, with its trade unions, and rich political and social 
networks that reached out into the surrounding urban quartiers, provided an ideal environment for 
close, personal contacts between individual Algerians and French anti-war activists. Mingasson was 
representative of this pattern and in 1960 Renault internal security had noted her association with 
the FLN militant Mohamed Aït Aissa. Mingasson left Renault in January 1961 and it seems highly 
likely that this was the moment that she became a full-time salaried worker for the FLN and Zouaoui, 
in itself an indicator of her importance to the nationalists.102  
     As DST agents tracked her every move between 22 September and 9 November 1961 they built 
up an extremely precise picture of her contacts and her pivotal role in orchestrating the entire 
Zouaoui network. Since the FLN was well aware that the police intercepted telephone calls, the 
leaders in Paris communicated on a daily basis through a secure system of courriers that carried 
verbal and written messages. Mingasson was tracked as she constantly moved, sometimes on her 
scooter, between Zouaoui, all three of the RCs, and other top-level cadres. She carried out 
secretarial functions, for which she held a copy of the official FLN stamp, and assisted in the drafting 
of tracts and communiqués through liaison with the propaganda officer Medjoub Benzerfa, 
delivered copy to the clandestine printer Abdelkrim Hamza, and organised mail distributions to the 
press, politicians and embassies. Mingasson, who lived in a flat at 18 Avenue de Verdun in the 
suburb of Vanves, paid for by the FLN, also helped to locate and rent properties that served as safe-
houses, as in the case of the RC1 Baba-Hamed in the Rue des Saints-Pères.103 Particularly onerous 
was the end-of-month process of co-ordinating the arrival of the bulky money collection by courriers 
from the Wilayas, its counting in ten different reception dépôts, and eventual centralisation at 
Federal level before banking and transfer abroad. 
    Mingasson also helped to recruit or co-ordinate the activities of other European members of the 
Zouaoui network. She appears to have been particularly close to Denise Brière, a twenty-seven year 
old shorthand typist at Renault, with whom she shared an FLN-financed flat in the Avenue de 
Verdun. Brière moved in similar political circles to Mingasson and in 1959 headed the section Le Pré 
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St.-Gervais-Pantin-Lillas of the Union de la Gauche Socialiste. Brière was already known to the police 
in early 1961 for her contacts with a member of the FLN collective of lawyers, Mireille Glaymann, 
and an unidentified Renault worker “M.H” who controlled FLN funds. On her interrogation in the 
Rue des Saussaies, ‘Elle déclare être membre d’un réseau de soutien du FLN, mais ne veut donner 
aucune précision sur son action’. However, in her bedroom at her parents home, 68 Rue Eduard 
Vaillant (Le Prés-St.Gervais), the DST found various FLN leaflets, including two draft AGTA tracts that 
were partly in her hand, and a manuscript, ‘Liste des martyrs algériens guillotinés au fort de Montluc 
à Lyon’. The clandestine trade union, the Amicale générale des travailleurs algériens (AGTA), which 
played a crucial logistic role in the FLN French Federation, had its main base at Renault under the 
leadership of Omar Ouhadj. Brière was, evidently, providing secretarial assistance to the 
underground union that, as we will see later, was to play a significant role in planning the 
demonstration of 17 October. 
  Among other arrested support agents working in the Mingasson circuit was Josette Bery [or Berry], 
Jacques Delaunay, Solange Landa, and Roger Fligitter. The DST found in the office of Bery, a 
secretary in the Touring-Club (65, Avenue de la Grande Armée), 108,390,000 francs, a significant 
deposit of the FLN monthly collection, documents relating to Wilaya 3B (Marseille), and various 
stencils typed out at the request of Mingasson, who had been seen visiting the Club on 7 October. 
Solange Landa, a psychology student, who lived with her husband Michel at 61 Rue de Rennes, also 
did  typing, and had various documents in her possession, including FLN accounts, seals and 
envelopes left by “Geneviève” (Mingasson) on 8 November. Landa admitted that she had travelled 
to Brussels as a courrier on 17 October, using a seat reservation that was booked and paid for her by 
Mingasson, and had delivered an envelope, almost certainly from Zouaoui to the Federal 
Committee, to a liaison agent, “Anna” [Boddaert].  
    Typical of the piece-meal growth of the network through personal contacts was the way in which 
Landa introduced her friend Jacques Delauney, an official in the Air Ministry (Service de 
Documentation et d’Information), to Mingasson who then recruited him as a driver. Mingasson 
asked him to act as a courrier and on 27 October she had given him 30,000 francs and two 
envelopes, also to be taken to Boddaert in Brussels. On 9 November the DST arrested Delaunay and 
Mingasson as they left Landa’s to post an FLN statement to the press and various embassies and 
politicians.104 Finally, Roger Fligitter, a senior accountant at Renault, admitted that as a member of 
the PSU he had collected money in the factory for Algerian prisoners, and had acted as a courrier to 
Brussels in late August and early September, and, using a train reservation booked by Mingasson, on 
14 October 1961. The role of Landa, Delaunay, Fligitter and Mingasson as courriers between Paris 
and Brussels is, as will be seen in Chapter 7, particularly significant since these agents carried the 
vital exchange of orders and correspondence that passed between Zouaoui and the Federal 
Committee during the planning for the 17 October. 
      Needless to say there were other support agents whom the DST failed to locate, or who were 
identified later. For example, after the arrest of Yahia Achab, head of Wilaya 3B, during Operation 
Flore, the police searched his home in Marseille where they found, among other documents, the 
Paris address of Joseph Mosze Hamburger, an ex-PCF militant and businessman born in Warsaw in 
1925. When the DST raided his home in the 19th arrondissement they found 4,625,000 francs which 
he explained, according to Desbons in a ‘fantaisistes’ way, as a tax-evasion fraud linked to his 
business. Hamburger went on to support this story by recounting how between 15th and 20th August 
1961 he had driven to Switzerland with 20 millions, of which 5 millions belonged to his mother. The 
DST suspected, certainly with good reason, that Hamburger was an FLN support agent.105 Later, on 
12 December 1961 the police also arrested Naceur Bouchouchi, known as “Khemal” or “Philippe”, a 
law student living at the Cité Universitaire at Antony. Bouchouchi was in charge of OS logistics, the 
safe storage of weapons, who admitted that he had deposited two suitcases of arms with Robert 
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Letrous, the father of his girlfriend. Letrous, PDG of the Compagnie générale du Disque Populaire, 
also happened to employ Hamburger as his ‘secretary’.106   
    The French support agents, apart from providing safe houses, dépôts, and chauffeurs, in part 
through their links to the intellectual world of higher education, journalism, publication and 
secretariats, played a particularly important role in the writing, printing and distribution of FLN press 
releases and tracts. This is examined in the remaining part of this chapter in relation to Mejdoub 
Benzerfa, the head of Federation propaganda in Paris, and also through the significant role of 
Renault as a centre of militant and trade union support.                                 
 
Mejdoub Benzerfa and propaganda 
 
     On the 22 September 1961 DST agents, after patiently tracking Mejdoub Benzerfa for many 
months, were eventually led to Zouaoui and his network. Investigation of Benzerfa, a school teacher 
from Colombes, revealed one of the most politically experienced cadres of the Paris Federation who 
was head of press, information and propaganda. During the events of October 1961 he was involved 
in the writing, printing and distribution of at least seven tracts and communiqués that provide 
important information on the way in which the FLN attempted to use propaganda to influence both 
Algerian and French public opinion in relation to the 17 October massacre, and the ‘official’ 
interpretations that it wished to diffuse. 
     As the Algerian War progressed, the FLN became increasingly aware of the enormous importance 
of propaganda to the eventual outcome: indeed, historians have increasingly recognised that 
independence was won as much through the influence gained over international opinion, 
particularly through the UN and the global media, as through military means.107 Ali Haroun, who was 
head of propaganda on the Federal Committee, remarks, ‘En effet, dans la lutte que mènent les 
Algériens, un tract percutant, une déclaration convaincante, un communiqué opportun, un appel 
entendu, ou une mise au point qui arrive à son heure, font autant pour la cause qu’une embuscade 
dans les maquis ou l’attentat contre un policier tortionnaire’.108 The key propaganda body that 
Haroun organised from June 1958 onwards was the Commission centrale de presse et d’information, 
which co-ordinated the activities of the délégué à la presse et à l’information (DPI) who worked with 
the head of each Wilaya. Benzerfa, as DPI attached to Zouaoui, was in effect the highest level 
information officer for France as a whole. Following Benzerfa’s interrogation and the analysis of 
documents seized from his home on 9 November, the Desbons report summarised his role, ‘A 
l’échelon national, le responsable à la propagande prépare la rédaction, l’impression et la diffusion 
des tracts, communiqués, instructions générales destinés aux militants ou parfois à l’ensemble de 
l’opinion publique. Les thèmes sont choisis par le Fédéral et la Commission Centrale avec lesquels le 
responsable à la propagande entretient des liaisons constantes. Ce responsable dispose d’une 
imprimerie clandestine’.109 The DPI was, however, far more than a technician for the printing and 
distribution of materials, but an intelligence officer and intellectual whose task it was to gather and 
analyse information relating to the state of  opinion and morale among both Algerian migrants as 
well as the French public, including trade union, church and political groups.110 On the 5th and 20th of 
each month the DPI sent a report to Haroun and the Commission centrale de presse in Germany 
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which included, ‘l’opinion de l’émigration, exprimée par les militants, les cadres et les non-
militants...la synthèse des rapports politiques et des informations diverses émanant de la base’, as 
well as,’l’opinion française vue à travers les partis politiques, les syndicats, les églises, l’homme de la 
rue’.111 Benzerfa thus played a pivotal role in the Federation during the crisis of 1961 since he, more 
than anyone, was required to gather intelligence as to the state of Algerian and French opinion in 
relation to the unfolding violence in Paris, intelligence on which both the Federal Committee and 
Zouaoui depended for assessing the situation. 
     Benzerfa was born on 2 February 1930 in the small town of Perregaux (today Mohammadia) in 
Oran province, and was raised in a strong nationalist family that supported Messali’s PPA. By 1957 
he was already known to the French police as a communist militant, possibly the head of the PCA in 
France, who had attended the 6th World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow that opened on 
28th July 1957, and was suspected to be the author of a text intended for the UN. However, 
Benzerfa, like other communist militants, was required to join the FLN on an individual basis, and by 
1958 he was listed as a student in law and active in the Union génerale des étudiants musulmans 
algériens (UGEMA).112 The UGEMA was a hot-bed of nationalist militancy, and from its ranks the FLN 
recruited numerous cadres. In mid-August 1958 Ali Haroun organised his new team of DTI officers:  
Ali Kara-Mustapha (“Karl”), a law student, appointed to Wilaya 2; Mustapha Francis (“François”), a 
dental student, allocated to Wilaya 4; Abdelatif Rahal (“René”), a student in political science and law, 
Wilaya 3; and Medjoub Benzerfa (“Marcel”), a teacher at a boy’s school in Colombes, to Wilaya 1 
(Paris-Centre).113 Within a few months the network was decimated by arrests, only Benzerfa 
remaining in place at Wilaya level, and Ladlani, in March 1959, noting that, ‘le service presse et 
information est pratiquement inéxistant’, ordered a reorganisation of the network. This was finally 
achieved by Haroun through a clandestine meeting on 6-7 September 1959 in Lausanne attended by 
Benzerfa and other newly appointed DTIs, among them Zouaoui for Wilaya 3B (Marseille).114 It was 
agreed in Lausanne that Haroun and the DTIs should meet to co-ordinate activities every three 
months and, mainly with the assistance of Catholic support networks, such clandestine gatherings 
were subsequently held in Switzerland (Geneva), Belgium (Liège, Lustin), and Germany (near 
Sarrebrucken).115  
     During one such liaison trip in July 1960 Benzerfa was located by DST agents in Germany in 
contact with two unidentified Federation cadres, one of whom was later identified as Zouaoui, and 
when intercepted catching a train for Dusseldorf he said that he was visiting his mistress Elisa Brunk. 
From that moment Benzerfa was identified as the head of propaganda in France and was tracked 
continuously by the DST with the hope that he would eventually lead them to the Federal, which he 
eventually did in June 1961.116  Ali Haroun recounts in detail a further incident at Brussels station on 
7 January 1961 when he narrowly escaped arrest, but all four DTI agents, including Benzerfa, were 
arrested and interrogated by the Belgian police. Although quickly released, information was passed 
to the French police that then arrested two of the Wilaya DTI soon after, and eventually Benzerfa.117 
By October 1961 Benzerfa was the longest surviving and most experienced FLN specialist in 
propaganda on French soil, although, unknown to him at the time, he owed his longevity to a 
deliberate DST tracking policy. Haroun notes that the highly able DTI cadres were often later 
promoted to act as Wilaya heads or RCs, and this was true of Zouaoui who was made Federal, in 
January 1961. Among his closest advisers in Paris was Benzerfa, whom he already knew well from 
the quarterly liaison meetings with Haroun and the other Wilaya DTIs during 1959 and 1960. 
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    When the DST officers arrested Benzerfa in the early hours of 10 November at his home, 208 Rue 
d’Estienne-d’Orves in Colombes, they found a number of tracts and communiqués, some in a 
handwritten form with his corrections.118 Although Benzerfa did not give much away during his 
interrogation in Room 110 of the DST HQ, the police had little difficulty in piecing together the 
network that he used for typing, printing and distribution. This is reconstructed next, before moving 
on to analyse more closely the content of the tracts and press releases, and the propaganda 
intentions of the Federal Committee and the Paris FLN. The publication and distribution network are 
here divided into two distinct, although interconnecting, parts: the Renault-AGTA organisation, that 
constituted a trade union branch of the FLN, and the autonomous Federation network that included 
the FLN clandestine print works. 
 
The Renault-AGTA organisation 
 
     The huge Renault factory at Billancourt, the so-called “Fortresse Ouvrière”, played an exceptional 
part in the post-war history of Algerian nationalism. As Laure Pitti has shown, the 3,000 Algerian 
workers in the plant, through their long contact with one of the great centres of French working 
class militancy, trade union activism, and left-wing politics, received an invaluable education in 
political organisation. Numerous top FLN cadres received their formation at Renault, such as Saïd 
Slyémi, Aboubeker Belkaïd, Slimane Ben Rahou, Omar Ouhadj, Arezki Ziani, Larbi Bendaoud, Mohand 
Aït Aissa and Laïfa Lattad, mainly through the CGT commission nord africaine, and the AGTA that was 
founded in 1957.119 Omar Ouhadj, the head of AGTA, remarks that Renault provided a recruitment 
ground for FLN cadres and that the Amicale had a specific function in educating and training 
militants: ‘L’AGTA avait aussi pour rôle de former des militants, politiquement, et ces militants 
devaient être mis à la disposition du FLN sur simple demande. Et à partir de ce moment-là, ils 
quittaient la structure de l’AGTA, on ne les connaissait plus et ils rentraient directement dans la 
clandestinité’.120 When the French Communist Party supported the repressive Special Powers act in 
March 1956, what Ouhadj referred to as ‘la grande trahison’,  and campaigned for ‘peace’ in Algeria, 
but not independence, many Algerians left the PCF, and a deep rupture took place between Algerian 
militants and French workers. From mid-1956 onwards Algerian workers at Renault, under 
instructions from the FLN, participated in autonomous strikes or actions that received little support 
from the CGT and French workers who were either hostile or apathetic towards the struggle for 
independence.121 Increasingly from February 1957 Algerians organised themselves in the Conseil 
d’Entreprise de l’AGTA and, after this was banned by the government in August 1958, continued to 
operate as a clandestine arm of the FLN.122 Despite the rift between the AGTA militants and the main 
body of workers, the Renault plant still offered exceptional conditions of protection for nationalist 
activism. Firstly, although Renault had its own internal security service that spied on Algerians and a 
minority of French supporters, the high level militancy of the French work force meant that the 
police or other state agents dare not put foot into the factory since this would be met by immediate 
muscular opposition, if not violence. This meant that FLN militants had a relatively police-free and 
protected environment in which to operate and they could, for example, move freely around the 
factory under the cover of shop-stewart work.123  
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     Secondly, among the 27,000 French workforce, there existed a small, but extremely important 
and disparate body of militants who were deeply committed to the Algerian cause and fully 
prepared to risk imprisonment. Among them were communist militants like Clara and Henri Benoits, 
who were prepared to defy the PCF party line, Trotskyists, left-Catholic radicals, CFTC trade unionists 
like George Lepage, and socialists who were moving away from the Socialist Party towards a left 
current that eventually became the PSU.124 This diverse group of militants, many of whom worked 
within the Renault social or trade union secretariats, possessed skills or had access to equipment 
and materials, that enabled them to type, duplicate, print and distribute FLN tracts. Yvette Magué, 
for example, a PCF militant at Renault who was disowned by her party on her arrest in February 
1961, justified her ‘aide tant morale que matérielle’, as ‘une Française consciente de ses 
responsabilités et tout en restant dans les perspectives révolutionnaires qui sont celles qu’on lui a 
toujours enseignées’.125 Likewise Francine Riquier, who was arrested along with the AGTA leader 
Aboubekr Belkaïd on 6 February 1961, was immediately excluded by the PCF.126 Operation Flore 
revealed in great detail the central role of Renault personnel in the Zouaoui network, in particular of 
Rolande Mingasson who left Renault in January 1961 to take up the role of full-time paid agent in 
the FLN network. Mingasson worked closely, as we have seen, with with Denise Brière, a shorthand 
typist in the Renault Comité d’entreprise, and among documents seized by the DST were two AGTA 
tracts, part of which had been written by her.127 The arrest of Roger Fligitter, a senior accountant at 
Renault, who admitted his role as a courrier, suggests how far the FLN support network had 
penetrated even into higher management levels of the company. 
     After the arrest of Aboubeker Belkaïd in February 1961, Omar Ouhadj remained as the head of 
the AGTA organisation both for Renault and the whole of France. Ouhadj, who worked at Renault 
from 1952 to 1963, worked in the Comité d’Etablissement, and was a CGT and PCF militant until he 
left the party in 1956.128 It was Ouhadj who played the key role in organising the clandestine AGTA as 
an integral part of the FLN network from 1958 onwards, and during the crisis of October 1961 he 
was not only consulted directly by Omar Boudaoud in Belgium, but also assisted in the clandestine 
publication of various tracts, including two important AGTA leaflets dated the 10th and 12 October 
(see below). As Haroun, head of propaganda on the Federal Committee acknowledged the, ‘AGTA 
fournira à l’organisation du FLN en France un soutien inestimable en lui procurant des agents de 
liaison, des lieux d’hébergement, des moyens d’impression pour sa littérature, des transporteurs 
sûrs ou les caches indispensables pour ses fonds’.129 Among the documents seized by the DST from 
Geneviève François, who acted as secretary and liaison agent to Younes Aberkane (RC2), were typed 
copies of the two AGTA tracts, with a hand written note signed “Maurice” [Zouaoui] in which he 
requested, ‘Veux-tu communique les 2 tracts inclus dans cette lettre à l’AGTA et leur demandent de 
faire le tirage et la distribution aux Français’.130 This would indicate that AGTA-headed publications 
were, in some instances, actually written by FLN cadres, probably Mejdoub Benzerfa. 
     The Federation, in addition to the support of AGTA, thought it important to control its own 
clandestine printing operation. Among those arrested during Operation Flore was Abdelkrim Hamza, 
a forty-two year old carpenter from Algiers who lived with his wife and two children at 56 Boulevard 
Diderot in the 12th arrondissement. Hamza was already known to the police since he had been 
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interviewed by them in late 1959 and was accused of providing a car to Mohammed Aït El Hocine, or 
Idir, head of Wilaya 2 for an FLN operation. DST agents were led to Hamza’s house on 11 October by 
an unsuspecting Mingasson (“Michel”), who, as Zouaoui’s liaison agent, sent his orders and also paid 
for printing paper and equipment and delivered a Beretta pistol. While the DST found nothing in 
Hamza’s home, they quickly moved to his atelier at 11 Rue des Haies in the 20th arrondissement 
where they found concealed behind a false wall a clandestine press, including a ton of printing 
paper, two ‘ultra-modern’ roneos, a calculating macine, and three typewriters.131  During his 
interrogation, ‘Hamza reconnait que le stock de papeterie et le matériel d’imprimérie lui ont été 
confiés par le FLN depuis un an environ. Il tire avec ce materiel, tous les mois, des tracts ou 
communiqués en 5 ou 6,000 exemplaires. Le matériel lui a été fourni par un nomme “Michel”’. 
Mingasson would give him publication deadlines for particular tracts, and had also been present at 
the delivery of a new Girda duplicator.132 
  
 FLN-AGTA tracts, 10th to 18th October. 
 
     The final part of this chapter sets out to look more closely at the content of several tracts and 
communiqués that were disseminated by the Zouaoui network during the planning stage of the 
October 17 demonstration.133 These publications, beside illustrating the propaganda methods of the 
Federation, provide important clues as to official FLN thinking at this precise moment. In 
chronological sequence, the first three tracts were published as a Lettre Ouverte de l’AGTA (10 
October 1961), Après Bab El Oued, and Des Précisions (both 12 October 1961), and indicate an 
intense flurry of propaganda activity during the lead-in to 17 October. These tracts, as we have seen 
above, although issued under the AGTA letterhead were almost certainly composed by Benzerfa, 
and provide a good example of the way in which the Federation attempted to influence French 
opinion through ‘parallel hierarchies’, organisations that would not necessarily be recognised as 
instruments of the FLN.  
    By early October the Federation was becoming increasingly concerned and bitter at the failure of 
the French media and public opinion to take any notice of the dramatic and deepening nature of 
police assaults and killings of Algerians in Paris. Among the documents seized during Operation Flore 
was a draft tract or communiqué by Medjoub Benzerfa in which he attacked the failure of the French 
press to address the issue of state violence and protested, ‘contre le mur de silence élevées par 
certaines organes d’information’, and what was a virtual “black out” [in English] in relation to the 
FLN Appeal and other press releases.134  
     The Lettre Ouverte de l’AGTA of 10 October, addressed to the main trade unions (CGT, CFTC, FO, 
UNEF...), newspaper editors, the political parties, the President of the Conseil Général de la Seine, 
Cardinal Feltin, and various human rights organisations (the MRAP, the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, 
and the Commission des Sauvegarde des Libertés), was a heart-felt cri de coeur. The Lettre, written 
immediately prior to decision of the Federal Committee to organise a mass demonstration, set out 
to expose and detail the deepening barbaric repression and killings that Algerians were undergoing 
at the hands of Papon’s police. ‘Au coeur même de Paris, de paisibles travailleurs algériens sont 
journellement abattus par des rafales de mitraillettes.[...]...à Nanterre, à Puteaux, à Suresnes, 
Coubevoie, Colombes, Boulogne-Billancourt, etc.... d’autres de nos compatriotes ont été  torturés, 
assassinés, étranglés et jetés dans la Seine..[..]...A tout ceci, s’ajoutent les déportations en masse 
vers les camps de concentrations en Algérie.[...]..Nous savons que tous ces crimes sont le fait de la 
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police française dans sa majeure partie et à la solde du facisme’.135 The intention of the FLN was to 
shake public opinion out from its state of lethargy, indifference or hostility towards the Algerian 
situation in France, and to compel all representative bodies, from the political left to trade unions, to 
assume their responsibilities. ‘L’AGTA accuse une nouvelle fois une partie de l’opinion publique 
française dont vous êtes les porte parole, d’encourager le génocide perpétré à l’égard des 
travailleurs Algériens par votre silence et votre désintéressement. Nous vous demandons une fois de 
plus de prendre conscience du rôle complice dont l’histoire vous accusera demain, si, à l’instar des 
populations de Puteaux, Saint-Denis, Nanterre, Aubervilliers, qui ont manifesté concrètement leur 
indignation, vous ne prenez pas vos responsabilités, si vos voix ne s’élevent pas pour mettre un 
terme à de tels crimes’. 
      Only two days later the Federation issued a further AGTA tract Après Bab El Oued that followed 
an identical line in denouncing the ‘barbarie repressive’ of the police, and ‘une grande partie de 
l’Opinion publique français qui, par son silence devient complice et responsable de ces crimes’.136 
This second tract, published on 12th October only two days after the Lettre Ouverte, might appear 
superfluous, but it closed with a highly significant, if oblique and coded statement: ‘Le temps des 
pétitions et des communiqués est dépassé. L’heure des actes courageux et concrete a sonné, et ce 
n’est que ainsi que seront sauve-gardées les chances d’une coopération fructueuse et fraternelle 
entre nos deux peuple’. The author was evidently aware of the decision of the Federal Committee on 
10 October to go ahead with a mass demonstration, but crucially without the participation of the 
French left and trade unions. The Renseignements généraux, in an analysis of this key moment and 
the Lettre Ouverte, noted that the FLN had, in moving to unilateral action, simply lost patience: 
‘quant à l’opinion française, il apparaît que le FLN se soucie peu de lui déplaire. La Fédération dira 
qu’elle a plusieurs fois averti le peuple français de prendre position en faveur de l’indépendance de 
l’Algérie. Et depuis six ans, le peuple français n’a rien fait’.137 
     Politically the most important tract, the Appel au peuple français, 138  was drafted by the Federal 
Committee itself and dispatched to Zouaoui with the order to distribute it, ‘largement dans les 
milieux français de la presse et radio françaises’.139 Archival sources indicate that this text, which was  
dated 18 October, was in reality drawn up on the 17 October or just before. The timing is significant 
since the Appel was not composed in reaction to the violent repression, but reveals the intentions of 
the Federal Committee before the event, and what it was hoping to achieve.140 The Appel conformed 
to the overall strategy that the Federal Committee had finalised on 10 October, which was to 
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exclude any forces of the French left from participating in the mass demonstration of 17 October 
since the FLN wished this to be reported as a unique and heroic action of Algerians. Any joint action 
with the PCF, CGT or other forces of the left would, it was feared, be reported in the press in such a 
way as to marginalise or obscure the primary role and objectives of the FLN (see Chapter 7). But, 
clearly the FLN hoped that the demonstration would have such a huge media impact as to galvanise 
the left that had, until then, shown such hostility or indifference to the Algerian cause, and compel it 
to take notice and provide support. The Appel was designed to call, after the demonstration was 
over, for solidarity from the French people: ‘Français, Françaises, travailleurs, étudiants, 
intellectuels, militants des partis politique, des syndicats, des mouvements de jeunesse, hommes et 
femmes de toutes opinions et de toutes confession!’ and to combat forms of racism that were as 
odious as those suffered by the Jews, and to defend the highest humanitarian values of France. The 
Appel asked them all to fraternise in factories, work places, universities and quartiers, in the street 
and metro, and by petitions, meetings, demonstrations and stoppages, to end the repression and to 
resume negotations to find a rapid and peaceful resolution, ‘au cauchemar qui vivent nos deux 
peuples’. However, the decision to associate the French anti-colonial left with the FLN after, rather 
than before and during the demonstration, was to carry fatal consequences for the participants.  
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                             The Problem of Violence and the Federation U-Turn 
 
     Between 19th January 1961, when de Gaulle gave a green light for the resumption of secret talks 
with the FLN, and the final Evian Accords of 19 March 1962, French and Algerian representatives in 
Geneva were in almost constant daily contact, both during formal  sessions (Evian 1 - 20 May to 13 
June; Lugrin - 20 to 28 July 1961; Rousse - 11 to 18 February 1962; and Evian 2 - 7 to 18 March 1962), 
as well as during ‘off-the-record’ meetings to try and hammer out agreement and to prepare the 
ground for resumption of talks. This background  is important to an understanding of the nature of 
the crisis in Paris, since the Federation was throughout the period from 20 May 1961 to 18 March 
1962 subject to strong pressures from the FLN team in Geneva. At the centre of the Franco-Algerian 
negotiations lay a number of highly contentious issues, such as the rights of the European minority 
in a future independent state and claims to the Sahara, in which the French Federation had no 
particular or specific stake. However, there was one crucial question that had immediate bearing on 
the situation in metropolitan France, that of FLN armed struggle and violence.  
      Since 1956 the French government had insisted that a cease-fire agreement was a necessary pre-
condition to any negotiations and eventual elections, while the FLN, as a guerrilla movement, 
refused to demobilise its fighters, thus handing the initiative to the French army, until the colonial 
power had formally recognised an independent Algeria. From the first day of secret talks on 20th 
February 1961 Georges Pompidou stated that a cease-fire, or at least some form of truce (‘trêve’), 
be initiated, even if it was kept a secret.141 The FLN refused to accept any such deal, in spite of 
French attempts to upstage them by introducing a month-long unilateral cease-fire on 20 May, and a 
full-scale war continued in North Africa until 19 March 1962.142 However, there remained room for 
manoeuvre on this question in relation to the situation in metropolitan France, and this was to have 
major implications for the deepening cycle of violence in the metropolis during 1961.   
    For the French government the issue of terrorism in metropolitan France, and especially in the 
capital, assumed an importance out of all proportion to any military threat that it might offer. 
Continuing FLN violence in Paris carried symbolic and political weight. On 10 April the chief Swiss 
intermediary Olivier Long reported to the Algerian representatives that de Gaulle had commented, 
‘que la recrudescence des attentats en France et en Algérie crée une atmosphère défavorable à la 
négociation’.143 Bernard Tricot, de Gaulle’s chief Elysée adviser on Algeria, remarked how difficult it 
was for the French negotiators, ‘gênés d’avoir à discuter avec nos partenaires après avoir lu dans les 
dernières dépêches la liste des embuscades, des enlèvements, des égorgements’.144 What Tricot 
found humiliating was not that the men sitting opposite were engaged in conventional military 
actions, the mutually shared field of the honourable soldier, but in acts of ‘terrorism’, which was 
precisely the modus operandi of the FLN in France. Moreover, complained the French, the FLN 
dramatically increased its terrorist attacks on both sides of the Mediterranean between 20 May and 
8 June, just as Evian 1 got underway.145  
      As the cycle of violence deepened in Paris during 1961, so the French negotiators showed 
increasing concern and attempted to find a resolution. While the French eventually came to concede 
that an official cease-fire was not going to be accepted by the GPRA, they still sought a resolution to 
the impasse by making a distinction between a formal ‘cessez-le-feu’ and an ‘unofficial’ and even 
secret truce that could be implemented immediately as an ‘acte de bonne volonté’.146 The GPRA 
would never accept such an agreement in relation to the main field of combat in North Africa, since 
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to do so would involve the ALN in virtually demobilising its forces, while the huge French army 
remained in situ, and from, ‘la crainte de ne pas pouvoir remettre en marche la marchine si on 
l’arrêtait’.147 However, the situation in France was rather different and, as I will show later, the GPRA 
was prepared to offer as a bargaining deal a form of secret ‘truce’ in France, a deal that would not 
endanger the global military strength of the FLN. To understand why this decision was to carry such 
major implications in precipitating an internal crisis within the French Federation requires taking a 
step back in time to look at the history of the debate among FLN leaders as to whether they should 
engage in armed struggle in mainland France and what form this should take.  
      The question of armed action presented quite different issues in metropolitan France from that 
of colonial Algeria. In Algeria, where the FLN was confronted with a full-scale war in which tens of 
thousands were the victims of military violence on a vast, mechanised scale, the nationalists were 
prepared to take actions that might include civilian European targets, as during the famous bombing 
campaign in Algiers during 1957.148 But the Federation abstained from such a policy, because the 
political context in France was quite different and any such forms of ‘terrorism’ would have 
massively alienated French public opinion, the national and international media, as well as a large 
number of European supporters and agents. In 1956 some leaders, like Abbane Ramdane, were 
pushing for the French Federation to open a ‘second front’, co-ordinated attacks on economic and 
political targets that would tie down French security forces in metropolitan France, relieve military 
pressure on the ALN in Algeria, and increase the costs of the war so as to rapidly force the French to 
the negotiating table. 
    Many Federation leaders appear to have opposed such a hard-line position and In February 1957 
the Commission de la presse et de l’information (CPI), of which Mohammed Harbi was a prominent 
member, offered an oblique critique of this position. Abbane, the driving force in the FLN, advocated 
a strategy based on the key premise that the Algerian War would be of short duration and that the 
French would be soon brought to negotiate by spectacular mass actions, like the insurrectional strike 
of January 1957 that was to become known as the “Battle of Algiers”.149 But by late February the 
highest executive body of the FLN, the Comité de coordination et d’exécution (CCE), was forced to 
flee abroad and by October the French army in Algiers had dismantled the Zone autonome d’Alger 
(ZAA). The Federal Commission de la Presse, aware that the Battle of Algiers represented a crushing 
defeat, offered the alternative of ‘une lutte de longue durée’, and an implicit critique of Abbane’s 
agenda of a short, violent push that was seen as premature and damaging and which, if extended to 
France, would invite repression and paralysis of the FLN. The CPI favoured a  strategy that would 
create a broad anti-imperialist alliance with the French left, including the PCF, so as to force the 
French government by political rather than military action to end the war. An immediate offensive 
shock strategy, argued the CPI, would have consequences that would be ‘très dures’ for workers in 
France: ‘n’avons-nous pas le droit de demander de lourds sacrifices pour des résultats politico-
militaires aléatoires?’.150  
      In June 1957 the Comité de coordination (CCE) led by Abbane, ignored the Federation position 
and ordered that a new Federation head be appointed with instructions to intensify the armed 
struggle in France and to wipe out (‘abattre’) the leaders of the MNA.151 Omar Boudaoud, who had 
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the status of an ALN commander, was appointed by Abbane on 15 June to carry out this mission, to 
form OS commandos in Moroccan training camps, and then to launch co-ordinated ‘second front’ 
attacks throughout France.152 In the autumn of 1957 the imprisoned leaders Ben Bella, Aït-Ahmed, 
Boudiaf and Khider wrote to the CCE to oppose its order of 10 June to, ‘déclencher le terrorisme’ in 
mainland France, despite the fact that the Federation had already discussed such a proposal and 
rejected it. The CCE appears, they remarked, to have taken no heed of, ‘des avis autorisés de 
certains frères, ni des conditions économiques, morales et humaines dans lesquelles vivent les 
émigrés algériens. Ces conditions déjà précaires sont rendues particulièrement graves par l’hostilité 
chauvine de toute une nation...’. They therefore supported the position of the Federal CPI that a 
massive offensive against strategic and personnel targets in France would invite unacceptable levels 
of state repression against the Algerian community that already faced desperately harsh living 
conditions and police violence. 
      Despite the opposition of the historic leaders imprisoned in the Santé prison, Omar Boudaoud, 
who constantly travelled to Tunis and Cairo to consult with the CCE, went ahead and closely 
implemented Abbane’s strategy. Harbi, supported on the Federal Committee by Messaoud 
Guerdroudj and Zine El Abidine Moundji, sustained a strong challenge to the authoritarian methods 
imposed by Boudaoud that transformed, they claimed, the Federation into a purely military 
apparatus of a Stalinist kind that ruled out any meaningful political debate of key policy issues. 
Subsequently Harbi offered a devastating critique of the FLN in which he identified the emergence of 
anti-democratic processes, including the use of internal violence to discipline or crush oppositional 
voices, and which was eventually to culminate in the post-independence dominance by a military, 
one-party state apparatus.153  
     An important meeting of the Federal Committee, attended by the French Wilaya heads, near 
Cologne on 23 July 1958 was informed of the CCE order to launch the ‘second front’ on 25 August. 
Harbi led a last-ditch challenge by demanding that the thinking behind such a crucial strategic 
decision be subject to debate, rather than imposed as a fait accompli. He argued that initiating such 
an offensive in France would expose the Federation, ‘une des rares organisations en ascension’, to 
repression and dislocation. The Committee was accountable, he remarked,‘du sang des innocents, 
algériens et français’.154 Harbi, concerned, and with good reason, for his own safety, immediately 
resigned and departed for Switzerland. As Daho Djerbal notes, this moment marked the end of 
internal opposition to Boudaoud on the Committee and a crucial watershed in metropolitan France 
as OS and GA commandos accelerated an armed struggle that was matched by the 
counterinsurgency policing and repressive policies introduced by Maurice Papon in late 1958.155 
     Between 1958 and 1960 Boudaoud succeeded in transforming the FLN in France by creating a 
remarkable parallel state in which the Federation aimed to exert an absolute control over the 
Algerian population through its own taxation, judicial, and social welfare system, a system that was 
policed and enforced by armed groups attached to each Region (see Chapter 6). This evolution, 
along with the creation of  the OS, a highly sophisticated paramilitary organisation, and the 
extension of local armed groups (GA), soon moulded an ‘activist’ mentality among mid-rank militants 
and cadres who controlled the FLN organisation at the base.156 Harbi and others, have argued that 
the ‘shockists’, recruited from young, physically tough men who were often quite illiterate and 
lacking in political formation, were encouraged to develop forms of brutal violence and torture that 
were directed as much against ‘deviant’ FLN militants as against the MNA and French security forces. 
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The activist culture became so embedded at the local or Regional level that the Federal Committee 
would find it almost impossible, following GPRA orders, to contain or reverse after July 1961.  
     The extent of the ‘militarisation’ of the Federation and its conversion to armed struggle was 
significantly revealed when in June 1960 the Provisional Government made a first attempt to impose 
an informal armed truce. The ensuing debate was to be repeated in precisely the same terms one 
year later, except that by mid-1961 the Federal Committee had undergone a complete U-turn, while 
its own 1960 position against the dangers of demobilising the armed struggle was now fiercely 
defended by the Paris FLN.      
     On 21 June 1960, shortly before negotiations with the French government first got under way at 
Melun between 25-29 June, the GPRA ordered, ‘la cessation de toute action armée contre tout 
individu français ou algérien, à l’interieur ou à l’extérieur de l’organisation’. In 1957 the Federal 
Committee, as well as the imprisoned leaders, Ben Bella, Aït-Ahmed, Boudiaf and Khider, had firmly 
opposed armed struggle in mainland France. Now the Committee, led by Boudaoud, challenged the 
GPRA order for a truce on the grounds that it would have, ‘une très fâcheuse répercussions sur le 
moral de la base. L’organisation était comme une “chaudière sous pression prête à éclater” (se 
reporter aux différentes rapports sur les harkis). Nous avons réorganisé les groupes de choc, préparé 
la Spéciale [OS] ou une action impatiemment attendue depuis août 1958, action qui aurait seule pu 
redonner plus de vigeur à l’organisation. S’il faut aujourd’hui lui imposer de se croiser les bras, ce 
serait la démobiliser et lui faire toucher du doigt le rôle mineur qu’elle joue dans la révolution (rôle 
politique)...’. 157  Armed struggle, far from presenting a grave threat to the FLN in France, was now 
perceived as a vital cement in the revolutionary élan and unity of the people. The Committees  
discourse represented the demand for energetic ‘activism’, the heroic fighting capacity of the 
militants, as a vital force inherent in the base, but elided the fact that many Algerian migrants deeply 
resented the brutal ‘disciplinary’ powers of the GA that enforced tax collection and a puritanical 
moral code.   
    In its letter of 23 June to the GPRA Minister of the Interior the Committee went on to predict that 
the French state would seize on the opportunity of an FLN truce to redouble its repression and to 
seize control of the terrain. However, it would be impossible to refuse militants a right of ‘legitimate 
defense’ against police violence, and this would then be exploited by the media and enemies to 
show that the, ‘FLN est incapable de faire respecter ses décisions’. Finally, a truce would lead to a 
decline in vigilance among the militants, a relaxing of the nerves that were geared up for the 
liberation struggle, and ‘la naissance d’une sorte d’euphorie dangereuse qui immobiliserait nos 
masses’. If negotiations failed, it would be impossible to galvanise or reinstate the highly demanding 
level of committment and sacrifice demanded of the rank-and-file: ‘Si nous laissions s’installer la 
dangereuse illusion que la lutte active, c’est-à-dire essentiellement l’action directe, n’a plus sa raison 
d’être, il est à craindre que notre organisation se “refroidisse” à un point tel qu’il serait 
pratiquement impossible de la replonger dans le bain de la lutte révolutionnaire’.  
      The GPRA, following the abortive negotiations at Melun (25-29 June 1960), appears to have 
abandoned its order of 21 June for a truce on armed action. During 1960 the Federation selected 
numerous militants who were sent on training courses in Germany and formed into a special armed 
commando group under Slimane Amirat with the express purpose of attacking the FPA. The Paris 
FLN, far from restraining its attacks, between October 1960 and June 1961, planned and executed a 
series of major actions against the harkis posts and patrols. However, with the resumption of more 
meaningful discussions at Evian (20 May – 13 June 1961), the issue of a truce in metropolitan France 
returned to the agenda. Now both the French and Algerian representatives at the talks were 
prepared to use continuing police and FLN violence in Paris as a bargaining counter. A well-informed 
journalist of L’Express learned from unnamed contacts that FLN delegates had protested that over 
2,000 Algerians had been arrested in Paris even as talks were under way, while a French spokesman 
was ‘particulièrement amers’ that the Federation had chosen this particular moment to organise a 
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spectacular attack in Paris on the night of 4-5 June.158 The FLN had successfully penetrated the ranks 
of Algerian conscripts based with the 93rd Infantry Regiment at Frileuse, just outside Paris, and 
persuaded thirty-one men to take part in a heavily armed attack on the harkis posts in the 13th 
arrondissement, during which nine deserters were killed and three wounded.159  This seems to have 
confirmed, in some respect, that the ‘second  front’ strategy had worked since the French were as 
sensitive to the political impacts of armed struggle in France, as in Algeria itself.  
     A strong media campaign by the French left against harkis torture in the cellars of central Paris 
forced the government, despite Papon’s angry opposition, to order the withdrawal of the FPA from 
its bases in the 13th and 18th arrondissements to Fort Noisy on 27 June 1961. The French delegates, 
who remained in place after the closure of Evian 1 on 13 June, attempted to turn this defeat to their 
advantage by offering the withdrawal as a gesture of goodwill that should be reciprocated by an FLN 
truce.160 L’Express correctly surmised that the Evian delegates had struck a deal: ‘Tout se passe 
comme si une sorte de “trêve de fait” s’était instaurée en Métropole, chacun des adversaires 
décidant “unlitéralement” de mettre une soudine à ses activités soit d’action terroriste, soit de 
répression.’161 The French intelligence service (RG) in a report of 6 July confirmed these press 
accounts. The Federation had been, it claimed, hostile to the opening of the Evian negotiations, and 
had continued to mount armed actions during the talks, including the dramatic Frileuse commando 
attack of 4-5 June.162 The report went on to note that the Federation had finally responded to the 
pressure that was brought to bear by the GPRA and the French left to contain such offensive actions: 
‘la Fédération de France s’oriente donc vers un certain apaisement du terrorisme pour montrer tout 
à la fois sa bonne volonté et un contrôle parfait de l’immigration. Elle est prête au combat mais elle y 
renonce car elle entend enlever leurs arguments aux éléments français qui assurent qu’on ne peut 
discuter avec les chefs d’une organisation terroriste pratiquant une politique d’attentats et 
d’assassinats sur le territoire même de la métropole. En outre, elle ne veut pas choquer l’opinion 
publique qu’elle estime beaucoup plus sensible à ce qui se passe en France qu’aux événements 
d’Algérie...’.163  
     The Renseignements généraux, it appears, had intercepted a specific Federation order of 5 July 
which it summarised as follows, ‘il a été demandé de cesser tous attentats jusqu’à nouvel ordre. 
Cette décision a un caractère essentiellement politique et est destinée à créer un climat favorable au 
déroulement des négociations d’Evian’.164 More recently Omar Boudaoud has denied that the 
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Federation ever agreed to a ‘cease-fire’ in France since this could only be constitutionally decided by 
the CNRA, the GPRA and agreement between both Algerian and French negotiators, but he is being 
disingenuous since, beyond doubt, ‘informal’, if rather secretive, FLN instructions for a truce were 
sent to Paris.165   
    The dramatic U-turn by the Federal Committee did not come about easily, indeed it only assented 
to an informal truce because of considerable pressure from above. Boudaoud, however, so 
respectful of the military hierarchy and obedient to orders, was not the man who was likely to 
oppose decisions from above, even when he strongly disagreed with them. But the decision, which 
went against everything that the Committee had argued one year earlier in June 1960, was to prove 
costly indeed and, by causing a temporary loss of control over the Paris militants, triggered off a 
chain of events that was to culminate in extreme state violence in October 1961.  
     During the summer of 1961 the GPRA, at a moment when it was engaged in crucial negotiations 
with the French, was faced with a deepening internal crisis as various political factions, most notably 
the army generals of the Etat-major géneral (EMG) in Tunisia and Morocco led by Boumedienne, 
entered into a protracted struggle for power. As the competeing groups jockeyed for position, each 
power-block attempted to bring the Federation on side since it held, in addition to considerable 
political weight, control over major financial and manpower resources. The EMG and other self-
proclaimed ‘radical’ currents opposed to the GPRA attempted to undermine it by attacking the Evian 
negotiations as a sell-out of Algerian interests by conservative, bourgeoise delegates, ex-UDMA and 
centrists, who were in the pocket of de Gaulle.  
    Such oppositional currents began to appear inside the ranks of the FLN in France and the GPRA 
responded by asserting a strong and growing disciplinary control over the Federation. The French 
intelligence services began to pick up signs of a key shift in the Federation towards compliance 
during the Evian talks (20 May to 13 June). The SCINA reported on 5 July that the Federation before 
Evian, ‘était decidée à faire preuve d’intransigeance et de dureté’, but was now more prepared to go 
along with the negotiations and to accept, ‘certains formules de compromis jusqu’alors absolument 
exclues’. The causes of this shift were as yet unclear to the SCINA, but a further indication of 
significant change was the abandonment since 5 June (ie the Frileuse incident) of, ‘attentats 
spectaculaires contre les forces de l’ordre’.166 A month later the SCINA remarked on rumours among 
FLN militants that the GPRA was exerting an ever stronger control over all armed actions to prevent 
unauthorised or ill-prepared attacks that might damage ongoing negotiations.167 Until that moment 
the Federation had exercised considerable autonomy in selecting targets and planning operations, 
but now it was undergoing, ‘de plus en plus le contrôle du GPRA et qu’elle se verrait retirer certaines 
de ses prérogatives. Ainsi, on dit qu’elle ne serait plus souveraine pour décider de certaines 
sanctions graves à appliquer aux militants de la métropole en désaccord avec l’organisation’. All such 
internal sanctions must receive prior authorisation from Tayeb Boulahrouf, GPRA representative in 
Europe, and a key negotiator in Geneva.168   
   Boulahrouf, it was thought, was also responsable for imposing a further control over the forms of 
violence through an order to halt the assassination of MNA militants and to encourage their 
integration into the FLN.169 Up to July 1958 Harbi had fought within the Federation Committee, but 
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to no avail, to contain or halt the enormously costly fratricidal MNA-FLN war that was to lead to over 
4,000 Algerian deaths in France. He argued that such brutal internecine killings served to alienate 
even their strongest supporters on the French left, who simply did not understand the logic of such 
killings.170  Moreover, FLN armed groups in France (GA) that had first developed as a defense against 
Messalist aggression, had, under the direction of Ladlani, increasingly become an instrument that 
was turned inward against FLN militants to impose an authoritarian police state by deploying the 
worst forms of intimidation and violence, including torture.171 This now changed dramatically and 
the SCAA reported on 23 August, ‘la volte face la plus spectaculaire’. The Federation issued a tract in 
which it asked militants to help persuade MNA militants to join the FLN, to welcome ‘les frères 
égarés’ who had for several years been led astray by Messali Hadj and by the French government 
that had supported the MNA as part of a divide-and-rule strategy. Here also a kind of ‘truce’ was 
proclaimed and MNA cadres could now join FLN ranks without any prior investigation or suspicion 
hanging over them. 172. The double truce, in relation to both the police and MNA, meant that the 
armed groups, both OS and GA, were virtually ordered to stand down and condemned to inactivity. 
 
The Farès-Boulahrouf grouping 
 
    The role of Tayeb Boulahrouf as the GPRA representative in Europe, with powers of control over 
the French Federation, is highly significant. Boulahrouf, who had been active from 1938 at age 
fifteen in the PPA and had a long and distinguished career as a leading nationalist, returned to 
France in October 1954 and assumed temporary leadership of the French Federation after its top 
cadres were arrested in 1957. He thus had a close working knowledge of the clandestine operations 
of the Federation, before he moved to Rome in 1958 as representative of the GPRA and then to 
Geneva to prepare the grounds for the Evian negociations.173 While acting as transitional head of the 
Federation (September 1956 to May 1957) Boulahrouf, with the backing of Abbane, recognised the 
need for the FLN to build alliances with a class of liberal ‘politiques’, members of a bourgeois élite, 
Senators, deputies, lawyers, and doctors, many of whom had been close to the UDMA or centralists. 
This moderate and francophile élite, symbolised by Ferhat Abbas, represented an establishment that 
had been closely tied to the French state before the War of Independence and which had been slow 
to rally to the FLN.174 Although many from this élite group moved into overt opposition or secretly 
sided with the FLN, they still retained close informal ties to the Gaullists and to the French 
administrative apparatus. As such, while retaining a highly ambiguous position, they were correctly 
seen by the FLN  as a potential source of high grade intelligence, and as facilitating personal contacts 
that would assist in reaching an eventual negotiated end to the war. 
     Mustapha Ferroukhi was encouraged by Boulharouf to cultivate such a network, including 
Abderrahmane Farès, ex-President of the Algerian Assembly, for whom de Gaulle had a high regard 
and had invited in 1958, as part of a ‘Third force’ agenda, to become a minister in his government.175 
In 1959 French journalists reported rumours that Farès was attempting to create a ‘parti algérien 
centriste’ in order to head an eventual Algerian government.176 Le Monde stated that Farès 
appeared, ‘aux yeux des “révolutionnaires” du FLN, comme un grand bourgeois aux allures prudents. 
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Il est donc douteux qu’il ai jamais bénéficié d’un grand crédit parmi les membres du GPRA’.177 But Le 
Monde, along with the media in general, failed to detect the extent to which Farès was by 1961 
deeply embedded as a key figure in the FLN clandestine organisation, and the public was astounded 
at the disclosures made following his arrest on 4 November.178 Far from attempting to constitute a 
‘Third force’, a strategy aimed at marginalising the FLN by the formation of a moderate political 
movement with which the French could negotiate independence, Farès’ mission during 1961 
appears to have been the very opposite, to prevent such a force crystallising out among Algerian 
notables. Farès, by mid-1961, was thus closely associated with a liberal circle of FLN political heavy 
weights, among whom can be included Dr. Chawki Mostefaï, Ahmed Boumendjel, Dr. Ahmed Francis, 
Ahmed Bentounès, Jean Amrouche, Saad Dahlab and Ferhat Abbas, a grouping that played an 
important role in the shaping of the Evian negotiations.179  
     The internal politics of the French Federation in relation to the deepening FLN struggle for power 
remain largely unknown, in part because the central GPRA archives remain closed, or because the 
key actors are either deceased or cling to a facade of ‘official’ unity in which they refuse to accept 
the complex and, often contested, reality of the past.180 The role of the Farès-Boulharouf group in 
the Federation has remained, until now, largely unknown, but the documents captured by the DST 
on 3-4 November throw some light on the unexpected role of the ‘notables’ during 1961. Farès, as 
will be seen in Chapter 8, carried considerable weight within the Federation both through his control 
of the ‘Aboulker’ network that gathered important intelligence from within the French police and 
administration, as well as by his management of the FLN system that centralised the monthly 
collection and transmitted funds abroad.181 The correspondence indicates the extent to which Farès, 
who was to be party to the planning of the demonstration of 17 October, was in liaison with high 
level French and Algerian politicians, including the negotiators at Evian.  
    After the closure of the Evian 1 negotiations on 13 June both sides maintained delegates near 
Geneva to prepare the ground for the later resumption of talks. During the summer of 1961 Farès 
visited Switzerland frequently where, through his close contacts with Jacques Legrand, he acted as a 
high level intermediary between Joxe and the GPRA delegates. For example, Farès tried to convince 
the GPRA of Joxe’s good intentions but that, in order to facilitate proceedings, it should insist less on 
the crucial claim to the oil-rich Sahara.182 At the same time Farès acted as an intermediary or envoy 
between his contacts with the French government and GPRA officials in Geneva and Paris and Omar 
Boudaoud in Germany, conveying to the latter the latest secret developments and its implications 
for French Federation policy.183 Farès pivotal role is also confirmed by the fact that he served as the 
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key channel for international courrier passing between the ALN commanders in the maquis and the 
GPRA in Tunisia.  
    Farès was in Switzerland between the 5th and 10th September, at the crucial moment that de 
Gaulle made a speech in which he finally conceded the oil-rich Sahara to Algeria, thus clearing the 
last major hurdle to a settlement. Among the documents seized by the DST on 4 November was a 
letter from Farès in Geneva dated 10 September, adressed to ‘Mon Cher Président et Cher Frère’, in 
which he recounted his having ‘received’ the French delegate Jacques Legrand who confirmed that 
Louis Joxe, Minister for Algeria, ‘a convaincu le Général de Gaulle qu’il ne pourra y avoir de solution 
valable en dehors de la negociation avec le GPRA’, and that the speech of 5 September, ‘signifiait 
officiellement la reconnaissance de l’unité territoriale de l’Algérie’.184 The identity of the ‘President’ 
with whom Farès was in communication is unclear, but this was almost certainly Belkacem Krim who 
headed the Algerian team at Evian 1.185  Farès went on to confirm that the French were tempted by 
the idea of negotiating into power a provisional FLN government headed by moderate elder 
statesmen, rather than by FLN radicals who would be seen as a real danger to French interests. Farès 
continued, ‘En outre Joxe a compris que le fait que tu sois Ministre de l’Interieur, cela entrainait la 
réunion de tous les rouages du GPRA entre tes mains, et la présence de Saâd Dahlab aux Affaires 
Etrangères est interprété aussi comme étant entre tes mains’.186 This letter may seem to confirm the 
fears of the EMG and of the militant rank-and-file that that the Evian process was in the hands of 
moderates who were prepared to make too many concessions to the French.    
      Farès concluded his letter, ‘Je dois me rendre ce soir à Bruxelles pour y recontrer Omar 
[Boudaoud] avec lequel je dois régler les questions concernant la Fédération dont tu dois être au 
courant’. Farès was soon back in Geneva and on 9 October he wrote again to the ‘President’ [Krim 
Belkacem] providing a detailed analysis of the latest developments among the delegation teams. 
Because of the urgency of this report he dispatched it by Commandant Kaci, a diplomatic emissary, 
but excused himself for not sending this through the normal hierarchical channels: ‘Tu m’excuseras 
donc auprès du frère Omar pour n’avoir pas emprunter la voie organique c’est-à-dire le canal de la 
Fédération’.187  
     In his autobiography Boudaoud recounts how Farès, probably during September 1961, had 
requested a meeting and came to Brussels, ‘Il m’informa de la volonté de l’entourage du général de 
Gaulle de faire aboutir ces négotiations pour l’indépendance de l’Algérie si les Algériens le veulent. 
Afin de faciliter le contact, les responsables au sein du pouvoir français souhaitaient que la 
Fédération fasse une déclaration à la presse décrétant l’arrêt de toute action armée du FLN en 
France. Ma réponse fut un “non” catégorique’.188 Technically Boudaoud was correct in his claim that 
he had rejected an official cease-fire, a decision that could only be made by the CNRA or GPRA, but 
he was being economic with the truth since the Federal Committee had by then passed orders to 
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Paris to cease attacks on the security forces. Boudaoud claims that it was his rejection of the French 
offer that had been conveyed via Farès, that was the main cause of the decision of Debré, Frey and 
Papon to unleash the brutal repression of the FLN in Paris and to introduce a night curfew on 5 
October. In reality police attempts to destroy the FLN was in response to the wave of assassinations 
of police officers, attacks that were executed in defiance of the orders of the Federal Committee. 
What seems clear is that Boudaoud was, from June 1961, under increasing pressure from the GPRA 
and its delegates in Geneva, to bring a halt to any forms of armed action that might damage ongoing 
negotiations. Farès was the key senior figure acting as a direct link between the Geneva circles and 
the Federal Committee. Among the captured Farès archives  is a note dated 10 October, inviting him 
to Belgium.189 This, significantly, was the very day on which the Federation Committee took its 
decision to organise the Paris demonstration, and it seems likely that Farès was being summoned to 
discuss this major event. It appears that Farès decided to go immediately since another document, 
that the DST attributed to him, was dated Brussels the 11 October, and provides a detailed analysis 
of the crisis in Paris according to which the OAS was penetrating the police force while Papon was 
losing control of his own service. ‘Je ne dois pas vous cacher que les attentats contre les policiers 
nous préoccupait beaucoup’ and ‘ils seraient souhaitable que les attentats contre les polices 
s’arrêtait’.190 As we will see in the next chapter, Boudaoud certainly followed closely the GPRA 
orders that were further reinforced by Farès on the ground, but this volte face, that went completely 
against everything he had strived to achieve since his appointment by Abbane in 1957, soon ran into 
major difficulties in Paris.191    
     Within a few weeks of the Federation Committee order of 5 July to cease armed actions, the FLN 
was plunged into crisis by a wave of assassinations of harki soldiers and police officers in Paris. This 
apparently co-ordinated offensive presented a major challenge to Boudaoud’s authority, and 
threatened to undermine his standing with the GPRA just as the factional struggle for power 
deepened. The FLN attacks in Paris came in three phases: the first involved the assassination of 
individual harkis and informers that began between 12-16 August,  an obvious target since the FPA 
had for weeks been engaged in brutal repressive operations in the Algerian quartiers.192 A second, 
and politically for more significant, series of attacks which began on 28 August targetted isolated 
police officers, many of whom were carefully tracked and killed on their way to or from work. The 
initial killing of the harkis evoked little response from the French media, the government or the 
Prefecture of Police: a latent racism placed little value on Algerian lives that were tacitly viewed as 
expendable. It may have been, in part, this absence of any strong public reaction that inspired the 
Paris FLN to up the stakes by launching a sequence of planned assassinations of French police 
officers. The police reaction was dramatic and immediately precipitated an acceleration of state 
repression that was to lead to the killing of over a hundred Algerians in the next two months, 
culminating with the 17 October.193 Third, Zouaoui, following Committee orders, had just succeeded 
by about 3 October in imposing on Paris militants a halt to such assassinations, when Papon’s own 
riposte, of counter-killings, began to accelerate, and the Federal came under further rank-and-file 
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pressure to resume armed action. The Federation, as Paulette Péju noted, was caught in a 
paradoxical situation since while it had effectively brought an end to police assassinations this secret 
change of direction was unknown to the public, and the Prefect and media continued to attack the 
FLN as a violent terrorist organisation, so legitimating ongoing repression, including the night 
curfew.194    
     The assassination of officers immediately triggered an internal crisis in the police force as the 
unions demanded better protection, and Maurice Papon, who felt that his own position and his 
authority with the government was at risk, responded in cold fury by further deepening brutal 
repression.195 In his memoirs Papon held the FLN uniquely responsable for attempting to unleash a 
‘Bataille de Paris’ and a deliberate cycle of violence, through its unprovoked assault during this 
“septembre noir” on isolated police officers. The FLN, claimed the Prefect, in deliberately provoking 
a violent defensive response from the state, set in motion a train of events that was to lead to what 
he called the ‘unfortunate’ deaths of two or three few fellow countrymen.196 The historian Jean-Paul 
Brunet shares this position since the FLN, he claims, in undertaking, ‘cette offensive brutale – et 
unilatérale – allait être à l’origine d’un engrenage infernal qui allait déboucher sur la violente 
répression des 17 et 18 octobre’, and for this the FLN leaders in Paris, ‘porte une lourde part de 
responsabilité’.197 If they had acted more responsibly, ‘il n’y aurait sans doute pas eu ces dérives 
meutrières’.198  
    Brunet’s argument that the FLN carried ultimate responsibility for the massacre of their own 
people does not hold up to examination and obscures the fact that the Prefect of Police, far from 
respecting a truce by withdrawing the brutal FPA to Fort Noisy on 28 June, had in reality deepened 
violent police operations by sending harki units on what the commander Montaner referred to as 
punitive ‘surprise-operations’ into the key FLN enclaves (see Chapter 6). The resumption of FLN 
attacks from the 12 August onwards was significantly a local riposte by armed groups to the way that 
Papon had been taking advantage of the truce to push forward an aggressive agenda, while militants 
had to stand by powerless to intervene. The reasons that the Federal Committee had given in June 
1960 for opposing the GPRA order for a truce was that, ‘l’ennemi, lui, ne désarme pas. La répression 
va redoubler de violence...’, while the MNA, supported by the police, ‘va, par une terreur qui ne 
connaîtra plus de bornes, essayer de reprendre les quartiers d’ou il fut chassé’.199 After July 1961 the 
Paris militants could throw this argument back in the face of the Committee as its own informal 
truce had enabled Papon and the FPA to engage unchecked in an offensive that threatened the FLN 
in its own key bastions. 
   In the next chapter I move on to identify who were the armed groups that defied the orders of the 
Federal Committee and whether this resistance was supported by the Paris leadership. 
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                                                             5 
 
                     Assassination of  police officers and the Federation crisis 
 
       The dramatic resumption of co-ordinated assassinations by armed groups in Paris, caught both 
the Federal committee and the Prefect of police off-guard and precipitated a crisis in the FLN that 
has, until now, been largely ignored by historians. Much of the correspondence and orders that 
passed between Germany and Zouaoui, the Federal in Paris, during this crisis has survived, and 
reveals an astonishing situation in which the Federation Committee seems to have temporarily lost 
control over the Paris FLN and floundered around in the dark, unable to gain information and 
leverage over a situation that threatened to spiral out of control.200 The Federal Committee first 
demanded on 27 August why the Paris FLN had engaged in these actions, but over six weeks later it 
was still trying to extract information from Paris.201 This failure to elicit information, and the 
deepening irritation and anxiety of the Committee, placed within the context of how the Federation 
hierarchy normally operated, was highly unusual. The FLN in Paris, perhaps more than anywhere 
else in France or urban Algeria, constituted a model organisation, a highly disciplined and centralised 
bureaucratic apparatus that functioned on military lines. The Federation leaders would not tolerate 
any form of dissidence, resistance could be met by severe punishment including execution, and 
cadres, who had been selected and promoted for their loyalty, generally shared in a culture of 
deference to their superiors.  
      The Sou’al correspondence has been frequently studied for what it reveals about the planning of 
the mass demonstrations, but little note has been taken of its relevance to the assassination crisis. 
The sequence of events here can be usefully conveyed by extrapolating the comments made by both 
the Committee and Zouaoui on the FLN attacks in Paris:- 
 
27 August 1961. The Federal Committee (CF) to Zouaoui demanded to know, ‘sur quel principe ou 
directives se base-t-on pour abattre des simples gardiens de la paix?’. 
16 September. CF to Zouaoui,  ‘la même question vous a été réposée’. 
7 October. CF to Zouaoui, ‘nous n’avons reçu aucune explication à ce sujet jusqu’à ce jour’. The 
Committee asked for four things: i) ‘de cesser toute attaque contre les policiers’, save in a situation 
of legitimate self-defense ii) to desist from the ‘liquidation physique et individuelle’ of harkis, as was 
being done by one ‘Djafar’ who was recruiting harkis in order to kill them. It would be better to 
organise a mutiny inside the FPA force and a ‘coup spectaculaire’ in the form of a mass desertion iii) 
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in regard to ‘policiers tortionnaires’ to make a detailed report of all the charges against them iv) to 
provide a list of compatriots murdered by the police, with details such as where the body was found. 
202 
10 October. CF to Zouaoui, ‘nous insistons sur la nécessité de nous envoyer d’extrême urgence tous 
les renseignements concernant les exécutions sommaires’ and ‘les méfaits dont se sont faits 
responsables les policiers abattus’. Detailed reports must reach the Committee by 14 October. A 
new urgency arose in the light of a need to counter Papon’s curfew. ‘L’opinion publique française 
étant retournée contre nous, il nous faut absolument renverser la vapeur et ramener l’opinion 
publique à nous, ce n’est que dans cette mesure que les actions prévues contre le couvre-feu [ie. the 
demonstrations] auront des échos et feront reculer Papon et ses sbires’. 
12 October. Zouaoui to CF. Notes that the reports requested would be sent on 14 October, but if 
incomplete they would arrive by a second courrier on 17 October. This is the first sign that Zouaoui 
was facing difficulty in getting reports delivered to him from lower echelons. 
14 October. Zouaoui to CF. He included a report on the activities of the armed groups (GA), and 
everything he had received to date on the crimes committed by the police. However, while he now 
had a thick dossier for Wilaya 1, with quite complete reports, Wilaya 2 was proving slow to respond 
and its returns would be delivered, in principle, on 17 October by ‘Anne’ [Boddaert].   
17 October Zouaoui to CF. Nothing had been received yet from Wilaya 2, and he hoped to send a 
dossier on 21 October. He was able to enclose more information from Wilaya 1 on actions by the 
armed groups. 
17 October RO [Ladlani] to Zouaoui, written after radio reports had announced several dead and 
wounded during the Paris demonstration, showed a high level of concern and the most strongly 
worded order yet, that police assassinations were damaging the intended impact of the mass action. 
‘Il faut éviter la “politique de réaction” qui ressort dans vos rapports...[.....]....Sachez aussi que 
l’opinion publique est contre nous, elle ne comprend pas les attentats contre de simples gardiens de 
la paix. Votre silence sur ce sujet et surtout votre manque de précision quant aux causes réelles de 
ces attentats ont été pour une grande partie la cause de la réprobation unanime de l’opinion 
française de nos actions’. Significantly, Ladlani went on to suggest that perhaps Zouaoui and his 
lieutenants were falling victim to resistance by the rank-and-file, ‘Surtout les cadres ne doivent pas 
se laisser dépasser par la base. La structure étant solide à Paris, aucun dépassement ne doit se 
produire’. Clearly the Committee felt that the Paris leaders needed to show their authority and had 
no excuse for being dictated to by lower rank militants. 
20 October Zouaoui to CF, enclosed the reports concerning, ‘les assassinats et tortures auxquels 
s’est livrée la police depuis septembre’. 
24 October Zouaoui to CF, was only now able to identify the ‘Djafar’, mentioned by the Committee 
on 7 October as luring harkis to their death.       
 
     The Sou’al correspondence indicates that Zouaoui faced problems in imposing his authority on 
the networks under his command. As early as May 1961 he had complained to the Federation 
Committee that he was being kept in the dark about, ‘activités entreprises en dehors de [sa] 
connaissance’.203 Zouaoui was facing difficulty between late August and mid-October 1961 in 
extracting the information demanded by the Committee, from the RCs, Wilaya heads, or further 
down the chain of command, and especially from Wilaya 2 (Paris north). Was the Federal himself 
facing lower level resistance that he was unable to master, or was he complicit in the dissidence? 
Who exactly were the armed groups that were assassinating harkis and police on such a scale, and 
did they represent part of a wider resistance by FLN cadres in Paris?  
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     The Sou’al correspondence provides no answers to these questions and it has proved extremely 
difficult to find information on the Groupes armées (GA) and Organisation spéciale (OS) in Paris since 
they operated in the deepest clandestinity. The cellular structure of the FLN hierarchy, designed 
precisely to prevent police penetration so that any arrested cadres would have a very restricted 
knowledge of any contacts in the echelon above, meant that even leaders had little idea of the 
overall structure and its dynamic.204 The accounts that have been written by high placed leaders of 
the Federation who were involved in the events of 1961, Haroun, Boudaoud, Ghafir and Benyounès, 
tend to provide an ‘official’ FLN version of the past that denies the existence of any significant 
discord in the ranks of the heroic and disciplined revolutionary movement that they headed. This is 
where the Prefecture of Police and DST archives prove to be so useful to the historian.  
    On the resumption of FLN attacks on the Paris police on 28 August, Maurice Papon, caught off-
guard and sensing a threat to his own authority and position, angrily responded by lashing out at 
Jean Poupaert, Director of the SCAA, for failing to predict this development.205 On 5 September 
Papon issued instructions for a drive against the FLN and to track down the armed groups 
responsible and on 11 September Poupaert submitted a detailed action plan to the Prefect. The 
super-clandestine OS, as well as the GA, had always been a prime target of intelligence operations, 
but now the wave of unprecedented assassinations offered a sense of urgency to the task since it 
had precipitated a dangerous crisis in the police force and also threatened to politically discredit 
Papon for losing control of the capital at the crucial moment that talks were underway with the FLN.  
A key problem that the intelligence services faced was that the FLN, particularly after a phase of 
police arrests, repeatedly restructured its networks so that investigators were constantly faced with 
the problem of having to slowly piece together an organigramme of the new system and its modus 
operandi. Each time the police built up a detailed picture the FLN would secretly change its 
organisation, so that they were forced to go back to the drawing board. As the Director of the SCAA 
remarked, with a hint of admiration, ‘Le FLN, organisation particulièrement souple, on ne le 
soulignera jamais assez, s’adapte sans cesse au combat qui lui est fait’.206  
     During the policing crisis in Paris during 1961, the Federation initiated two such reorganisations. 
The first, in response to the massive arrest of the OS network led by Slimane Amirat in January 1961, 
consisted of a restructuring and decentralisation of the armed groups, so that the GA began to take 
precedence over the OS, a change that was to carry significant consequences for the later 
assassination of police officers. Secondly, on 1 September 1961, the Wilaya structure was changed 
so that Wilaya 1 (Paris centre) and Wilaya 2 (Paris suburbs), was replaced by Wilaya 1, south of the 
River Seine and with adjoining suburbs, and Wilaya 2, north of the Seine. Such technical changes 
may appear to be of minor interest, but after 1 September the police, were unable to work out how 
the FLN networks operated without being able to crack the new number codes by which any given 
echelon was identified, and the geographical area to which it corresponded (see map 1 and  figure 1, 
pp.22-23 above).207  
     The voluminous daily security reports that were produced by the SCAA and SCINA provide a 
fascinating insight into the way in which the police gradually passed from an early stage of 
inadequate intelligence, deep perplexity and speculation about FLN assassinations, to one of 
growing certainty as the DST and police arrested and interrogated a rapidly expanding chain of 
suspects. Papon dedicated extra resources to the urgent task of hunting down the armed groups and 
the commander of the FPA, Montaner, reinforced by other special police units, the BAV and the 8th 
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Territorial Brigade, was highly successful, through arrests, interrogations and analysis of captured 
documents, in locating an ever-widening circle of militants. Between early September and mid-
November the police was able to arrest 91 GA and 19 OS cadres, and the mass of intelligence 
deposited in the archives relating to their activities makes it possible to build a detailed picture of 
the groups involved in the campaign of assassination.208 The SCAA claimed by December 1961 to 
have achieved, ‘une connaissance parfaite des structures du FLN et des modifications que celui-ci y a 
apportées au cours de l’année’.209    
     The first problem the police faced was in identifying the structure of the clandestine commando 
units, and whether they belonged to the OS or the GA, since their function and chain of command 
was quite different. The Organisation spéciale (OS), which was headed by Rabah Bouaziz of the 
Federation Committee, constituted a commando élite that had been carefully selected and intensely 
trained in urban guerilla warfare, including the use of explosives, in camps in Morocco.210 The OS 
manual noted its aim was to make, ‘un véritable Science de l’Action destinée à combattre l’ennemi 
sur son propre territoire’, and to force him to, ‘fixer ses forces en dehors de l’Algérie’.211 A military 
(ALN) rather than civilian organisation, the OS was recruited from young, physically strong and 
courageous men and women who, preferably without any family ties, were prepared to live a 
spartan, isolated and often lonely existence without social contact, embedded like sleeper cells in 
the main urban centres of France. They were expected to live outside the main Algerian quartiers, 
and to avoid police attention by ‘passing’ as Europeans with false identity cards, often wearing 
suites, and even drinking alcohol and smoking in public, since this was banned by the FLN.212 The OS 
only emerged from this deep clandestinity to carry out carefully planned operations to destroy 
strategic targets, place bombs, or to assassinate key political figures. The OS état-major in Paris also 
had a national remit and dispatched units to carry out missions in the provinces where they could 
avoid recognition, including by local Algerians, and quickly depart before any police reaction.213 
Because of the importance of these operations, the OS was directly controlled by Rabah Bouaziz who 
frequently crossed the border into France to plan and supervise attacks, along with his chief 
lieutenant in Paris, Nacereddine Aït Mokhtar.  
     The Groupes armées however, constituted a quite different force, that was recruited from 
volunteer militants at the Regional level and, by the nature of the tasks facing them, tended to be 
tough men, such as former soldiers who had fought in Indochina, who knew how to handle 
themselves in physical combat. The key echelon of GA formation was that of the Region, three rungs 
down from the Wilaya, and corresponding to an urban area that included about 3,500 FLN 
members.214 Each head of a Region had at his disposal a commando of fifteen men, and he usually 
designated any mission that was to be carried out by the GA, an action that was then planned and 
executed by the head of the armed unit. Their activities, among them punitive actions against the 
MNA, as well as the disciplining of Algerians who resisted the monthly collection, consumed alcohol, 
or were subject to the fines of the Comités de justice, meant that the GA were closely involved in the 
daily policing of social and political life within the core immigrant quartiers. Because of this intimate 
knowledge of the quartier and its social life based on the Algerian cafés or lodging houses, the GA 
shared much more closely the general attitudes of the rank-and-file militants, including the growing 
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sense through mid-1961 of the unbearable repressive actions of the FPA forces inside their 
neighbourhoods (see Chapter 6). 
      Despite the claim by Ali Haroun that the GA were well regulated215, the Federation leaders faced 
a constant battle to prevent armed groups engaging in maveric or uncontrolled actions, including 
towards fellow Algerians. The FLN put in place two major safeguards, the first that weapons should 
only be temporarily issued and returned to depôts after each mission, to prevent individuals using 
the guns to pursue their own private agendas, from clan vendettas to extortion.216 Secondly, 
assassinations, whether of MNA, police or other targets, were not to be carried out without prior 
investigation and preparation of a dossier that was then reviewed and clearance given at Wilaya or 
Federal level. However, during 1960 and 1961 in Paris there are numerous signs that while the OS 
operated in a professional way in following such procedures, the GA units, poorly trained and 
inexperienced, retained their own arms depôts and constituted a volatile and often autonomous 
force, that engaged in poorly planned and frequently botched operations. For example, when the 
FPA first created a base in the 18th arrondissement on 20 November 1960, it was met immediately 
by an unplanned Regional armed response. This local initiative, during which the FLN lost heavily in 
men and arms, was condemned by the Amala leader as too ‘hâtives’ and a significant failure.217 The 
police received intelligence that an unidentified  FLN ‘très haute responsables’ had gone on a tour of 
inspection of the Paris region in June 1960, including one ‘Tahar’ who was classified as a ‘non 
violentes’. Tahar, ‘s’élevant contre les attentats ou les répraisailles des groupes d’action locaux’, by 
trying to place men whom he could trust, so as to counter or marginalise certain cadres who were 
ignoring orders.218     
      From early September 1961 onwards, as the police and DST arrested and identified growing 
numbers of gunmen, an unexpected pattern began to emerge which showed that the assassination 
of harkis and police officers, which was normally the responsibility of the OS, was almost solely the 
work of GA units. For example, on 27 September the BAV arrested Lahlah Bentifaouine who, during 
interrogation by Montaner on 10 October, revealed that he was the head of the new Zone 212 in 
Wilaya 2 (Paris north) and had three Regional GA commandos under his control, one under 
Abdelhamid Azzouz in the 11th arrondissement, a second led by Aissa Derbal and Arezki Sadaoui in 
the 3rd arrondissement, and a third under Idir Tachet in the 19th. Bentifaoune had in his possession a 
gun that had belonged to the harki Amar Berani when he was strangled and thrown into the Canal 
Saint Martin on the Quai de Valmy (10th arrondissement) on the night of 15 August. Bentifaoune was 
also involved, on the same night, in the assassination of the FPA informer Moumène.219 The 
synchronised attacks on the night of 15 August, that first breached the truce imposed by the GPRA 
and Federal Committee, thus took place in the north-east area of central Paris under the GA groups 
controlled by Bentifaoune, and the crescendo of mounting attacks on isolated police officers after 28 
August followed the same pattern. Likewise, Ameur Akli, head of the Regional GA at Boulogne-Issy-
les-Moulineux in Wilaya 1, during his interrogation by Montaner, ‘reconnu sa participation au 
meutre d’un gardien de la paix à Boulogne-Billancourt au printemps dernier’ and disclosed the 
location of his arms dépôt.220  
                                                          
215
 A. Haroun, 7eme Wilaya, 59-60. 
216
 H1B18, Abdelkader Ould Saïd, head of the OS in Paris, during interrogations on 18 and 22 July 1961, stated 
that arms were only supplied twenty-four hours before an operation by ,‘le responsable de l’armement’, then 
recuperated after an attack by the OPA network, and returned immediately to a secret cache. 
217
 HA88. Unsigned report, probably by Montaner, 25 November 1961. 
218
 H1B29. Intelligence report 7 October 1961. D. Djerbal, L’Organisation Spéciale, 334-5, shows that 
Naceredine Aït Mokhtar (“Madjid”), head of OS operations in France, after departing to Germany to escape 
arrest, was replaced by Tahar Benyahya (“Ali”), until his arrest in August-September. It seems likely that the 
‘Tahar’ mentioned in the report was Benyahya. 
219
 H1B12, FPA ‘Lutte contre le terrorisme’. 
220
 H1B12. 
59 
 
      The modus operandi of GA attacks on individual police officers is illustrated by a document seized 
by the DST during Operation Flore, a report by the head of Region 1121 at Boulogne-Billancourt 
(Wilaya 1, Superzone 1, Zone 2, Region 1) headed ‘Policiers abattus’. This was almost certainly a 
copy of one of the reports that was sent to Germany at the demand of the Federation Committee:- 
‘Un inspecteur qui habite la même avenue [de Verdun at Issy-les-Molineux] est signalé plusieurs fois 
par nos éléments comme étant très zélé malgré qu’il n’est pas en service: ils rentre dans les cafés 
même européen s’il trouve des Algériens il leurs demandent les papiers et certains sont sortis par 
des coups de pieds sans aucune raison’. On about the 15 September a fifty-year old Algerian from 
Clamart, during a visit to members of his family at 109 Avenue de Verdun, was shot by the inspector 
as he left the hotel. The officer covered his actions by a routine story of self-defense, that the 
unarmed victim had been shot as he rapidly pulled, what was believed to be a gun, from his pocket. 
Because of these ‘crimes’ a riposte was planned by two GA men on 22 September who staked out 
the café-restaurant at 105 Avenue de Verdun that was frequented by the police officer but, because 
of a mistake in their surveillance, they were caught off-guard by a police patrol that chanced to 
make a check of the clients. In an ensuing gun-battle the two officers and one GA were killed, and 
three Algerians were wounded, while the target, it would appear, was able to escape and later 
moved to a different quartier.221 This particular case confirms that standard FLN practice was 
followed by which, after local identification of police malpractice, a report was produced for the 
Regional head who would then give a green light to a particular GA cell to carry out an operation. 
 
The demobilisation of the OS 
  
   In late November 1961 the director of the SCAA, in a detailed report on operations to dismantle 
the armed groups, was able to show that after the 5 June 1961  the OS had mounted only one 
operation, an attack on 22 September on a patrol in the Rue de Temple. All the rest, including the 
assassination of isolated police officers and harkis, was the work of the GA.222 By early August the 
security services were beginning to speculate that the OS had ceased to exist as a separate 
organisation, and had been replaced by the regional GAs.223 The SCINA reported on 31 August 1961, 
‘Les groupes armés remplacent depuis quelques mois l’organisation spéciale (OS), organisation 
autonome, dissoute à la suite d’action jugées inopportunes (attentat de Montfermeil)’.224  
      The Prefecture and DST archives confirm the conclusion reached by Daho Djerbal that during 
1961 the OS, although not ‘officially’ dissolved, underwent an ill-defined crisis and lost terrain to the 
GA.225 Djerbal attributes this, in part, to the fact that since its able organiser Aït Mokhtar was forced 
to flee France in May 1960, the OS was increasingly run by inexperienced men, recruited from 
intermediate cadre levels, who were unable to retain the same, high levels of efficiency and 
cohesion.226 But far worse was to follow during 1961 as the OS was repeatedly dismantled by the 
security forces. In January 1961 the Prefecture of police and DST, in a combined operation, arrested 
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36 men from the special operational commando headed by Slimane Amirat.227 The OS had barely 
begun to recover and to reorganise when its key operatives were again arrested, among them Ali 
Benyahia, Ahmed Benhadi and Mohamed Salah (le “Khal”) in May, followed by the head of the Paris 
network, Abdelkader Ould Saïd, and the controler of weapons, Amouzouarene, arrested respectively 
on 29 June and 5 July.228 At this moment the OS, in significant disarray, appears to have been stood 
down while it regrouped, and the GA were given the task of carrying out attacks on isolated police 
officers.229 However, the GA did not constitute free-booting commandos as they were still 
accountable to the Wilaya heads and Controleurs: as the DST analyst of intelligence gathered during 
Operation Flore reported,’Ces groupes armés paraisent dépendre des chefs de wilayas, sous le 
contrôle étroite des responsables au contrôle des wilayas [ie RCs] qui reçoivent les comptes-rendus 
des assassinats ou des corrections et dont parfois l’accord préalable est sollicité avant l’action’.230 In 
general it would appear that the Federal Committee had significantly lost its means of control over 
both OS and GA actions in Paris and that the GA in particular, that still controlled their own crucial 
arms depots, had a considerable degree of autonomy. Plans for attacks on police officers may still 
have received prior assent at RC or Wilaya level, but the circuit of decision-making had effectively 
come to exclude the Committee in Germany.    
        Daho Djerbal has raised the interesting question as to whether the weakening, and 
demobilisation of the OS in France during 1961, was linked to a rift between Rabah Bouaziz, in 
charge of the OS networks, and Ladlani, responsable for the organic hierarchy, including the GA. He 
notes that Rabah and Salima Bouaziz were spending a lot of time in Switzerland engaged in the 
minor task of assistance to Algerian militants who had sought refuge there. Had Rabah been 
politically marginalised, he asks, since one would not expect the head of the OS to be absent in 
Switzerland at such a crucial time, ‘aussi loin du centre de décision....Y a-t-il eu éloignement ou 
tranfert des responsabilités?’.231 The intelligence services detected signs of tension, as have Harbi 
and Djerbal.232 Whatever the truth of this matter, the fact remains that the demobilisation of the OS, 
just as the FLN in Paris confronted a phase of deepening police repression, had drastic effects on the 
ability of the Federal Committee to control the armed groups in Paris. Normally, since the 
Committee had ordered a virtual truce on 5 July, it would have been able to depend on the highly 
trained OS to contain any potential or growing unrest among the Paris militants and the GA. But 
                                                          
227
 R. Valat, Les Calots bleus, 174-8; P. Péju, Ratonnades à Paris. 
228
 H1B18, DST interrogations 18th and 22 July; H1B13, report by Papon to Minister of Interior, 13 July 1961; R. 
Muelle, 7 Ans de Guerre, 261. 
229
 H1B4. SCAA report for 1961. 
230
 H1B16, Desbons report. H1B4, the SCAA annual report for 1961, notes that after the arrest of Amirat in 
January 1961, the OS that had, until then, been under the direct command of the GPRA [ie the Federal 
Committee] passed under the control of the Wilaya heads, and the GA groups (about 250 men in Paris) were in 
principle assisted by the OS in planning operations. It was ‘ces nouvelles formations’ that, between February 
and July 1961, carried out attacks on the police. However from 15 August, after the brief ‘trêves’, the ‘groupes 
armés et fidaïnes de l’OS ont recouvré leur autonomie. Les premiers ont été chargés des attentats contre les 
fonctionnaires de police’, while the latter began to prepare spectacular operations against economic targets, 
especially oil refineries. 
231
 D. Djerbal, L’Organisation Spéciale, 373. However, the location of Bouaziz in Switzerland is not entirely 
anomalous. When the CF first moved to Germany in 1958 it operated, on a day-to-day basis, as a central body 
located in Cologne. But later, because of the extreme danger of assassination by French secret service agents 
operating in Germany, the five members decentralised into different towns, making collective decision-making 
more irregular. In addition members of the CF were often absent from Germany, Bouaziz and Ladlani rotated 
‘en mission’ in Paris, while Boudaoud travelled frequently by air via Switzerland and Rome to Cairo, Tunis and 
Madrid. Thus it seems likely that the Committee often took decisions in the absence of one or more members, 
and this may explain why Ali Haroun was responsable for penning the ‘directives’ sent to Zouaoui in early 
October 1961 and signed “Kr” on behalf of Ladlani.      
232
 M. Harbi, Une Vie Debout, 221; D. Djerbal, L’Organisation Spéciale, 341. HA56, SCINA report 10 August 
1961, comments on, ‘les rapports – toujours difficile – de l’organisation spéciale avec l’organisation politico-
administrative’. 
61 
 
suddenly the GA was dominant in Paris, an often unruly body of tough gunmen, that Ladlani had 
some difficulty in controlling. Harbi had already noticed in 1958 that, ‘Contrarement à ce qu’il 
affirmait, Ladlani ne maîtrisait totalement ni les groupes de choc ni les militants qui conduisaient les 
interrogatoires dans les caves des restaurants ou des hôtels’.233 As early as May 1961 Zouaoui 
admitted in a report to the Committee that, for lack of information from below, he was losing his 
grip over actions being carried out by militants. He was not informed of, ‘activités entreprises en 
dehors de [sa] connaissance’.234 This is perhaps why Zouaoui, even under intense pressure from the 
Committee after 27 August to explain the assassinations, took so long to extract information from 
the base.  
     On September 1st the Federal Committee sent an order to Zouaoui noting that, ‘il n’est pas dit que 
les harkis vous sont confiés, ces traîtres restent toujours “confiés” à la Spéciale [OS]’, although the 
GA could defend themselves if endangered by a patrol.235 The same message was emphasised again 
by the Committee in further orders that were sent on 10th and 15th of September.236 However, the 
leaders in Paris were frustrated by their inability to follow normal procedure by calling on the OS to 
counter police violence, since it was in such a state of disarray. ‘Nous vous demandons de nous 
permettre de nous “occuper” des harkis, sans attendre la collaboration avec nos frères de la 
Spéciale. En effet, le responsable de l’OS est toujours à l’exterieur ou ailleurs, son remplaçant 
provisoire, visiblement dépassé, se terre et demeure intouchables. Les contacts avec le Spéciale se 
limitent actuellement à des recontres fortuites avec quelques éléments ex-GA’.237 The situation was 
much the same three weeks later, when Zouaoui wrote again, ‘Prière nous communiqué 
“officiellement” les coordonnées du responsable de l’OS. Car nous ne savons plus qui est 
effectivement le responsable à Paris’.238 The OS had been so severely effected by frequent arrests 
between January and July 1961 as to be virtually neutralised and without leadership.  
    At the same time the FLN was having to confront an unprecedented violent onslaught from the 
police. The five week cycle of assassinations of police and harkis came to an end on 3 October. This 
suggests that Zouaoui had finally suceeded in following Federal Committee orders to halt the GA 
attacks. But the Prefecture, as yet unaware of this changing pattern, unleashed even more lethal 
forms of counter-violence following Papon’s notorious speech at the funeral of Demoën on 2 
October: ‘For every blow received, we will render ten’.239 During September and early October the 
OAS was at work in Paris attacking FLN café-hotels with plastic explosive and rogue death-squads 
within the police force were taking Algerians at night to isolated locations where they were brutally 
murdered or thrown unconscious into rivers and canals. Zouaoui, in his letter to Germany on 6 
October, spelled out this desperate situation: ‘D’autre part, la police agit actuellement sous la 
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couverture de “l’OAS” pour plastiquer les hôtels nord-africains. En outre, ils arrêtent au hasard des 
Algériens qu’ils exécutent froidement dans la forêt ou qu’ils jettent dans la Seine. Des rapports très 
documentés vous parviendront incessamment. Actuellement, il nous est signalé une trentaine 
d’Algériens trouvés noyés dans la Seine. En conséquence, nous avons décidé que ces mesures 
arbitraires ne devaient en rien diminuer le “volume” de nos actions’.240 
     Zouaoui could not have been more blunt. The Committee had insisted for weeks that 
assassinations of the police should stop immediately, and this morotorium had in reality been 
achieved by 3 October, but the Algerian community was facing an unprecedented wave of further 
murders by the police. The OS, who should normally have taken on the task of organising a riposte 
to the police, was virtually defunct. In this situation Zouaoui, who still showed a prudent obedience 
to Committee orders by requesting permission to deploy GA cells, was prepared to break rank by 
maintaining high levels of counter-violence. Zouaoui was prepared to re-launch the GA attacks, that 
he had just succeeded in bringing under control at the behest of the Committee, in the light of an 
even more deadly and deepening cycle of police violence.241 The FLN leaders in Paris were placed in 
an increasingly difficult situation as enormous pressures for armed action began to build up among 
rank-and-file militants that were suffering the most direct effects of police brutality in the working-
class quartiers, an issue that is explored in more detail in the following chapter.  
   Before moving on to examine in Chapter 7 Algerian militant life in the 13th arrondissement, I will 
consider three aspects of the position of the Federal Committee: the impact, at this precise moment, 
of divisions at the highest levels of the FLN; the way in which the Committee revealed its primary 
concern with the negotiating position of the GPRA through propaganda that aimed to counter the 
damaging effect of ‘terrorist’ assassinations of the police; and whether the Committee, because of 
its location in Germany, was out of touch with the situation developing in Paris 
    The crisis in the French Federation coincided with, and was affected by, a much wider dissension 
within the FLN leadership, a power struggle that was already developing and eventually erupted in 
1962 in violent division and a situation close to civil war. The growing tensions between the two 
main blocks, the GPRA and the Etat-major général (EMG) burst to the surface at a meeting in Tripoli 
of the highest constitutional body, the Conseil natonal de la Révolution algérienne (CNRA) between 
the 9th and 27th August 1961.242 The EMG group, led by Boumediene and his two lieutenants Mendjli 
and Kaïd, used opposition to the Evian talks as a means of attacking the GPRA. Presenting 
themselves as true revolutionaries, they attacked Abbas and the GPRA as ‘bourgeoise’ sell-outs who, 
in the words of Gilbert Meynier, ‘avait pour dessein de noyer la révolution dans le marais 
néocolonialiste de la coopération avec la France’.243 On the final day of the Council, 27 August, Abbas 
was replaced as President by Benyoucef Ben Khedda who was viewed by many, including French 
intelligence, as a hard-line radical who was expected to take a tough stance. Although the EMG was 
not opposed to Ben Khedda, overall the colonels felt they had lost the initiative on the CNRA and left 
Tripoli early. Boumediene, fearing that he might be arrested and executed by the GPRA, fled to 
Germany where he found temporary refuge with the leaders of the French Federation. What was 
discussed between Boumediene and Boudaoud remains a mystery, but it seems likely that the EMG 
leaders believed that the Federation, which was widely perceived as a radical vanguard of the 
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revolution, was sympathetic to the army and could provide political, material and manpower 
support.244  
     Boudaoud, an astute politician, was faced with the difficulty of how to position himself and the 
Federation, caught between the power blocks of the EMG and the GPRA, at the very moment that 
the police crisis was precipitated in Paris. The global tensions that were fracturing the higher levels 
of the FLN were inevitably reflected inside the Federation. The SCINA intelligence agency reported 
on the 8th August 1961 that some elements in the Federation, among them students, were unhappy 
with the Evian negotiations: ‘Ils pensent que les délégués du GPRA n’étaient pas armés 
politiquement pour répondre à certains questions précises du Gouvernement français’. The students 
looked forward with expectancy to the CNRA in Tripoli, due to open the following day, to clarify the 
issues. 245 For the radicals or ‘activists’ in Paris, the removal of Abbas as President of the GPRA on 27 
August came as good news since, in line with the EMG position, he was viewed as a bourgeois 
conservative who had entered into negotiations that were viewed as a sell-out. Abbas was widely 
disliked by the Federal armed groups since in an interview with the German journalist Arthur 
Rosenberg of Tag on 25 September 1958, he had publically spoken out against the opening of the 
‘Second front’. Asked about ‘l’offensive terroriste en France’, Abbas said the newly installed GPRA 
had only recently agreed to this, on condition that action be restricted to economic and military 
targets. But the Fédération had exceeded its authority, ‘Que voulez-vous! Dans l’acharnement du 
combat, les ordres sont partout transgressés’.246  
    The fall of Abbas on 27 August was regarded by Paris activists as a turning point and the end of the 
man who carried prime responsibility for initiating the hated ‘truce’ imposed after Evian 1. It was no 
mere coincidence that the GA launched the first assassinations of Paris police officers the very next 
day. In this the ‘activists’ in Paris may, wittingly or not, have immitated the EMG that, according to 
Ben Tobbal, increased offensive military actions during Evian in order to compromise the 
negotiations.247 Nothing has been divulged by Boudaoud or other Federation leaders about such 
‘internal’ matters that might shatter the carefully sustained myth of revolutionary unity. But, while 
Boudaoud seems to have preferred a prudent ‘attentisme’, he and the Federation Committee, 
confronted with a dramatic explosion of police assassinations after 28th August decided to uphold 
the GPRA position on the primacy of negotiations and a de facto truce on armed actions.248 The 
removal of Abbas, and the ongoing radical or EMG attacks on the ex-UDMA and ‘centristes’ 
moderates like Boumendjel, must also have threatened the position of Farès. However, Farès 
continued to play a central role within the Paris FLN throughout September and October, and it 
seems likely that he, as an intermediary between the FLN delegates in Geneva and Germany, was 
influential in persuading the Federal Committee to contain the violence in France. 
      The Committee was having to react quickly, and make important judgements, in a rapidly 
evolving situation in which it faced great technical difficulties in ensuring that secure and accurate 
political intelligence was constantly reaching it from Tunisia, Geneva, France and elsewhere. The 
initial priority of the Committee appears to have been how to satisfy the demands of the GPRA, 
rather than taking much heed of the problems that were brewing at the base in Paris. In this sense, 
the Committee took its eye off the ball until, confronted by a growing revolt in the capital, it realised 
that a mass demonstration could be used as an instrument to reassert its authority.   
      The preoccupation of the Federal Committe with the negative political impacts of police 
assassinations can be seen in the propaganda that it prepared in the week before the 17 October 
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demonstration. The GPRA Minister of Information, M’Hamed Yazid, had led the way through a press 
statement on 14 October in which he justified executions by the FLN in Paris as a response to the 
depredations of police killers and torturers and for the, ‘exactions qu’ils auraient commisses contre 
le peuple algérien’, and that had now been reinforced by the curfew and other, ‘mesures de 
discrimination raciale’.249  
       Ali Haroun, as head of the central commission de presse, also sent the text of a tract to Paris that 
had been prepared before the 17 October, a further damage limitation exercise to counter the 
media and public image of militants in France as dregs of the criminal class, ‘racketteurs’, ‘hommes 
de main’ and ‘tueurs’. It was politically important, in the context of negotiations, to counter 
perceptions of FLN militants as criminals, as the French government had tactically done throughout 
the war in order to deny legitimacy to the struggle for independence, and to bring activists before 
the court as common law criminals without political rights. French recognition of the FLN as the sole 
voice of the Algerian people was doubly important at this juncture. The tract emphasised such 
legitimacy by pointing to the fact that the GPRA, ‘est reconnu par vingt-cinq pays représentants les 
deux tiers de l’humanité’. The communiqué concluded by announcing an immediate and unlimited 
hunger strike throughout prisons in France in order to gain recognition of, ‘leur qualité de détenus 
politiques et obtenir l’application du régime politique à tous les détenus FLN de France et 
d’Algérie’.250 The fact that this communiqué was drafted in Germany before the 17 October again 
indicates the considerable political weight that the Federation placed on quickly halting the 
assassinations of police officers since, as we have seen above, this not only alienated French public 
opinion, but could be manipulated by the French government during negotiations as a bartering 
piece. If armed groups acted like criminals to indiscriminately murder innocent police officers, and 
worse if the Federal leaders were unable to control such killings, how could the French treat the FLN 
as a legitimate and trustworthy ‘interlocuteur valable’, that could implement and keep to its side of 
any future agreement? 
    A second tract dated 17 October, the Déclaration du FLN sur la répression et les mesures policières 
dans la région parisienne, was probably written by Benzerfa.251 This represented the first public 
attempt by the Paris FLN to justify its assassinations of harkis and police officers, and also to mollify  
the Federal Committee. Fry and Papon, the tract claimed, were engaged in a campaign, like that of 
Massu’s ‘Bataille d’Alger’, to dismantle the FLN in Paris by striking at the immigrant community and, 
‘en frappant spécialement les centres nerveux de sa structure organique’. The French government, 
to this end, was engaged in a propaganda campaign that represented FLN militants as ‘terroristes 
aveugles et inconscients, abattant à tous les carrefours les inoffensifs agents de la circulation 
parisienne’, lies that were being reproduced by the press and which might persuade Parisians that 
‘toutes les mesures de repression racistes et criminelles’ were legitimate. The Déclaration then gave 
details of how named Algerians, Amrane Chemoul, Dahmane Lamri, Ahmed Smail, Chérif Mehdaze 
and others, had been criminally killed by the police. In such cases the FLN, the tract claimed, would 
carefully investigate and establish a dossier before proceeding: ‘Aucune exécution n’est ordonné 
sans que le coupable ait été jugé criminel’.252 The FLN was not, ‘une organisation anarchique qui 
exécute un policier uniquement parce qu’il est policier’. The assassination of the SAT officer, 
Georges Perrache, on 2 October,  was, for example,  justified on the grounds that he was actively 
collecting intelligence on the FLN: ’qu’il s’occupait davantage de renseigner la police sur les activités 
du FLN que de trouver du travail à nos compatriotes’ and had continued in such practices despite 
several ‘mise en garde’.  
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     Finally, although the Federal Committee was clearly aware of the dangers involved in imposing a 
truce on the armed groups, there is no indication that it responded in any decisive way to the 
demands being made by Paris. One reason for this is that the Committee, located in deep 
clandestinity in Germany, and despite a steady flow of intelligence reports from France, found it 
difficult to keep its finger on the pulse of the daily lived experience of the Algerian rank-and-file. One 
of the reasons why Mohammed Harbi had opposed the relocation of the Federal Committee to 
Germany in early 1958 was that this ran the danger of isolating it from the ‘interior’, and meant that 
leaders could make poor decisions that carried huge, repressive consequences for the population, 
but which they themselves did not experience.253 To a certain extent the tensions in the French 
Federation over this issue, mirrored the much more serious political battles at the higher levels of 
the FLN between the role of the ‘exterior’, the bureaucratic and military apparatus outside Algeria, 
supposedly living in luxury, and the ALN maquisards of the ‘interior’ who alone faced the French 
army, starved of arms and supplies. Mohand Akli Benyounès, who was to replace Zouaoui as Federal 
leader in November 1961, has criticised the Committee in his recent memoirs since FLN leaders were 
too often, ‘éloigné du terrain des opérations’. ‘Les insuffisances qui peuvent résulter de 
l’éloignement du responsable par rapport au champ d’action qu’il doit superviser’, appeared both at 
the level of relations between the capital and the provinces, as well as between Paris and the 
Federal Committee. While Benyounès understood the security reasons for locating the Committee in 
Germany, he argues that from the steady flow of reports and intelligence which it received it could 
have done better, ‘en matière d’analyse et d’observation....Il pouvait, par recoupements et 
réflexions, détecter les causes de certaines défaillances ou dysfonctionnements’.254 
     In the next chapter I go on to examine how and why pressures were building up in the Paris base 
for the resumption of armed action, and why the Federal Committee needed to respond quickly to 
this situation before things ran further out of control.   
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                                                                                  6 
     At the grass-roots: Mohammed Ghafir  and Amala 12 (13th Arrondissement) 
      This study is primarily concerned with the upper echelons of the FLN organisation in France, the 
decision makers who can be identified by the fact that they received a salary from the Federation as 
full-time cadres. However, how these leaders formulated policy during the 1961 crisis needs to be 
understood in relation to the state of opinion among the rank-and-file, the mass of ordinary 
workers, upon whom they depended for support.The FLN, like their counterparts in the French 
security services, was constantly pre-occupied with the gathering of human intelligence, an 
assessment of the state of mind among the Algerian population and the degree to which its support 
among them fluctuated through time and geographic space.255 As we have seen, the Federal 
Committee, was faced in mid-1961 with a deepening crisis of control over Paris militants  that 
endangered the negotiating position of the GPRA. French intelligence analysts began to note from 
early in 1961 that the growing likelihood of a negotiated settlement to the war was creating  hope 
among the Algerian masses that an imminent cease-fire would not only bring an end to police 
repression, but also to the burden of FLN tax collection and the severe regulation of their everyday 
lives. The prospect of approaching peace, far from producing a climate of calm, precipitated an 
atmosphere of deepening uncertainty and anxiety. For example, would final negotiations lead to a 
situation in which migrant workers, many long settled in France and dependent on the relatively 
higher wages and welfare rights of the metropole, be forced to return en masse to Algeria? 
According to French police reports the Federation, ‘a parfaitement conscience du danger que 
présente pour l’organisation l’effet dissolvant des espoirs de la masse’, and countered 
demobilisation by an even more pronounced control.256 At Argenteuil, for example, the FLN was in 
January 1961 seen to be hardening its disciplinary line against, ‘déserteurs’, and ‘voleurs’ and 
tracking down other miscreants.257 
       As 1961 progressed so the situation faced by the Algerian community in Paris, caught between 
deepening state violence and the disciplinary demands of the FLN,  became increasingly unstable. 
Very little is known about the mind-set, the mentalités, of ordinary Algerian workers and their 
families during the war and, in particular, what opinions they shared in the intimate social circles 
based on kin and village relations. The Algerian cafés, hotels and lodging houses of Paris provided 
the essential framework of FLN cellular formations since nationalist organisation had historically 
taken  root and expanded within the pre-existing social networks that had evolved in the migrant 
community since the First World War. The memoirs of Federation leaders like Ali Haroun, Omar 
Boudaoud and Mohammed Ghafir largely fail to address the issue of the complex social and political 
universe of the migrant workers, in part because they lived segregated from that existence, but also 
because they sustain a mythical image of the ‘people’, on a par with the communist idealisation of 
the ‘proletariat’, as an essentially pure and united force.258  In the social world of the Algerian café, 
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unguarded or loose talk  was highly dangerous, since there were considerable numbers of police 
informers at work,259 while any criticism of the FLN ‘line’, swearing, insults and other verbal 
indiscretions might invite immediate physical assault or disciplinary action by the local commissions 
de justices.260 Public spaces  became so dangerous, and the constant watching one’s words and 
actions so stressful, that many Algerians preferred to pull back into the security of the close kin or 
village networks of the café-hotel  where individuals could trust one another, speak more freely and 
afford minor indiscretions, such as alcohol consumption, without risking retribution.261  In January 
1958, when a Kabyle, Mohamed Amami, was interrogated at the central police station in the 13th 
arrondissement, he remarked that it was difficult to provide any information on the politics of the 
quartier since there existed, ‘un climat de méfiance réciproque et tous, même dans les cafés 
musulmans, évitent de parler “politique” et notamment du FLN et du MNA....[....]...même entre 
personnes de la même famille le silence serait de régle’. But,  he added, the FLN did not exhert a 
hegemonic control over all Algerians.262   
     In spite of the difficulty of penetrating into the political world of the mass of Algerian workers in 
Paris, to scrape away the patina of ‘official’ FLN discourse  to get at the reality of the complex 
tensions and contradictions that lay beneath, we can go some way to reconstructing the social life of 
the base and its reactions to the crisis that it faced in mid-1961. This is far too large a project to carry 
out for the entirety of Paris  so my approach in this chapter is to provide a case-study of one quite 
deliminated area, the FLN Région 1221 that corresponded to the 13th arrondissement. Previous 
histories of the FLN in Paris have used a city-wide approach, a large canvas, and this has tended to 
work against a finer-grained understanding of the spatial elements of the 1961 crisis and how 
Algerian mass mobilisation was rooted in quite particular quartiers.263 The choice of Region 1221, 
and Amala 12 within which it was  located, was determined by a number of factors. The arrest of 
Baba-Hamed, who as RC1 controlled Paris south of the river, led to the capture of numerous 
documents  relating to the area, including reports by militants of their experiences during the 
demonstrations of 17-20 October. Secondly, Montaner selected this  area as the first local base of 
the harkis units in March 1960, and consequently the archives are particularly rich in reports, 
photographs and other documents relating to the 13th arrondissement. The particularly intense 
forms of surveillance and pressure placed on the Algerian population in this quartier by the FPA also 
throw further light on the nature of rank-and-file tensions in   mid-1961 and the growing discontent 
with the informal Federal armed truce. Lastly,  the only account to date by a senior FLN cadre who 
was present in Paris during 1961 is that of Mohammed Ghafir, head of  Amala 12, which included 
1221 among the six Regions which he controlled. 
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     The 13th arrondissement, during and after the First World War, came to constitute one of the 
most significant enclaves of Algerian migrant workers in France, particularly in a quartier of  
                      
 
 
Map.2 
The shaded area indicates the insalubrious îlot 4, a slum zone that had been identified by 1918 as 
suitable for demolition and re-development. The Rue Nationale, Rue du Château des Rentiers, and 
the Rue Harvey, were lined with cheap lodging houses and cafés, places of intense FLN activity. 
..............................................................................................................................................................  
 
notorious slum housing demarcated by the Rue Nationale, Rue du Château du Rentiers and the Rue 
Harvey. During the First World War the Paris  municipal council used statistics of TB infection to 
identify the seventeen most derelict  ilôts insalubres in the central city, including Ilôt  4 on the Rue 
Nationale, as due for demolition and redevelopment.264 By 1954 Ilôts 4 was still standing, a zone of 
squalid garnis in which 46% of housing units had only one room, 50% were without water, 86% 
without a toilet and 98% had no shower or bath.265 Algerian workers were even more deprived than 
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the French working class inhabitants , and were subject to chronic overcrowding in miserable, dank 
and disease-ridden hotels.266 The hôtels meublés, of which there were 30 in the arrondissement, had 
by far the worst living conditions in 1954, and 740 of the total 1,200 people living in them, were 
Algerians.267 One of the few saving aspects was the intense shared social life and cohesion of this 
classic quartier populaire, one that centred on the street and the café, and this was especially true 
for Algerian migrants who found a crucial refuge and support network in the Algerian cafés: ‘Les 
Algériens disposent de 14 cafés où ils se retrouvent entre eux, jouent aux dames et aux dominos, et 
où les juke-boxes déversent une musique exclusivement arabe’.268 Most Algerians were employed in 
unskilled, heavy manual labour and, to economise on travel costs, a particularly high percentage 
(56%) worked in local factories, including Panhard, the sugar works of Say, and the Grands Moulins 
de Paris, that were within a short walking distance.269 The Say sugar refinery increased the number 
of Algerian workers between 1914 and 1923 from 250 to 500, and in 1931 a journalist described the 
scene as workers left the factory: 
     ‘....as night falls – the moment the sugar refineries spew their shifts onto the street – the Rue 
Henry fills with a swarm of swarthy men who in an instant are sucked into the small bars which are 
lined up in double file; there under the feable  lights, the North Africans crowd between the smoke-
stained walls and, while a gramaphone begins to squeak a native song, the dominos line up on the 
wooden tables, the cards fly between the fingers: the ronda, the bazya begin their devilish 
dance.....270 
      The café-hotels of the 13th arrondissement, in which migrants grouped themselves by kin and 
village of origin, provided an ideal location for the social networks through which the nationalist 
movement of Messali Haj  was diffused and found root between 1926 and 1954. After 1954 the FLN, 
from tiny and fragile beginnings, gradually displaced the Messalist networks of the MNA, and from 
1957-58 onwards accelerated the “quadrillage” of the émigré community. Omar Boudaoud has 
described how the FLN practised a tactic of penetration and colonisation of selected hotels: ‘Notre 
tactique consistait à loger nos militants, dont l’appartenance politique n’était pas connue des autres 
résidents, dans les hôtels occupés par les Algériens qui n’étaient pas encore encadrés....Arrivés à 
l’hôtel, nos militants réunissaient les locataires, leur expliquaient la situation en Algérie, puis leur 
faisaient comprendre que le moment était venu de participer effectivement à la révolution, de 
s’organiser et de collecter l’argent destiné au soutien de la lutte de libération’. A four or five man cell 
would then be created.271 The hotel owners or managers played a pivotal role in the FLN system: for 
decades they had served as the key point of contact for new arrivals from their home village, a 
source of short-term loans, advice on the job market, how to send remittance money, and a mass of 
other practical information so vital to the survival of the migrant worker. The ‘patron’, from his 
position behind the bar, overhearing the quotidien conversations and concerns of his clients, with 
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registers to hand of all lodgers, was in an ideal position to police the micro-community, to collect the 
monthly dues, and to provide security for group meetings or militants on the run. The café and 
lodging-house keeper was, as Mohand Benyounès remarks, ‘un élément fondamental de 
l’organisation. Etant toujours à son poste, il voyait tout et entendait tout. Il représentait, à son poste 
d’observation, une mine d’informations, et un agent du FLN irremplacables que la police avait le plus 
grand mal à débusquer.’272 In the event of a police raid the owner would often warn lodgers or 
meetings taking place by a switch that briefly cut the lights. The café-hotel also owned what was a 
scarce item in France of the early 1960s, a telephone, an important means of FLN communication 
that the police often tapped or closed down by administrative order.  
    In the 13th arrondissement a typical FLN manager was Belkacem Amrar, an elderly 71 year old 
militant who had once been active in the MTLD and who ran a nineteen-room hotel at 210 Rue du 
Château-des-Rentiers. FLN documents that were seized by the police  on 29 July 1959 revealed he 
was head of a Kasma, in charge of  63 militants, that were living there and in three adjacent hotels. 
In 1957 Amrar had been identified by the police as supplying guns and using his café as a ‘centre de 
ralliement’ for militants from the Nord region and Paris who needed false papers to get back into 
Algeria.273  
    Hotels and cafés  like this served such an important function in the FLN organisation that the 
Federation did everything it could to maintain control and continuity in their management. For 
example, if an owner was arrested and imprisoned, the FLN would try and ensure that he was rapidly 
replaced by another militant who could pick up the reins to keep existing networks in operation. The 
early nationalist movement in Paris, recognizing the great importance of restaurants and hotels, had 
attempted to organise commerçants during 1926 and 1934, and was prepared to use threats, 
including boycotts, to force owners to co-operate.274 After 1954 the FLN  used similar methods, 275 
and it seems likely that the Federation invested directly in commercial property or holding 
companies both to secure meeting places and to provide a business facade for collecting and 
banking money.276 Omar Boudaoud remarks that if an arrested militant, ‘exploitait un fonds de 
commerce, le FLN en était garant’.277 
   A good example of continuity of control over a typical  FLN bastion-hotel is provided by another 
establishmen, No.139  in the Rue-du-Château Rentiers, where the arrest of a succession of managers 
led to their replacement by militant patrons. The hotel, which had a uniquely Algerian clientèle of 90 
lodgers in 45 bedrooms and a small café, was well-known to the police who reported: ‘Les 
différentes gérants qui s’y sont succédés étaient des responsables frontistes. Des documents y ont 
été saisis à plusieurs reprises établissant l’activité intense du FLN dans cet hôtel (14 militants, 46 
sympathisants)’.278 The first of four managers during 1958  to 1959 was  Arezki Sersou, a Kabyle born 
in the douar Yaskren at Mizrana on 26 February 1926, who had first settled in the Nord region where 
he married a French woman in April 1951 and had experience of running a bar. In June 1957 he 
moved to Paris, almost certainly to escape MNA gunmen since within days of arrival he was attacked 
by a commando, and again  in November 1957. Sersou was made manager of the hotel, which was 
owned by French interests, on 1 February 1958, and moved in with his wife and four children. But 
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within weeks he was arrested on a magistrate’s warrant, issued in Constantine, for terrorist activities 
(atteinte à la sécurité exterieur de l’état). 
     His replacement, Mohamed Aoun, a  thirty year old Kabyle from Michelet, was in turn soon 
arrested and imprisoned in Bône. On 22 July 1958 the hotel passed into the hands of a third 
manager, a 32 year old welder called Boulanouar Katim, who originated from Saïda (Constantine), 
where his wife and four children still lived. He was in turn arrested and held in the detention camp at 
Larzac. On 1 August 1959  thirty-four year old Messaoud ben Amar Allache, like Aoun a Kabyle from 
Michelet, was appointed manager. Allache had been known to the police since 1954 as an MTLD 
militant who had gone over to the FLN and acted as assistant to a head of Secteur. 
     The police frequently raided the hotel at number 139 during 1958 and 1959 and identified it as a 
centre of terrorist activity. For example, when the municipal police were called there on 24 June 
1959 because of reports of a fight between women, they seized the opportunity to search the 
building and located various FLN documents at Group level, including a tract and a Bulletin Interieur 
d’Information.279 Although there is no information on the relationship between the small French 
company, the Société Hôtel Pyrénées, that owned the hotel and the FLN, the evidence points to a 
situation in which the Federation was in effect able to recommend or impose its choice of manager.  
       Police maps  of the various FLN cafés, hotels, lodgings and businesses in the 13th arrondissement 
give  a graphic sense of the dense spatial occupation of the quartier and the ability of  militants, with 
a thousand alert eyes in every metre of public and private space, to engage in a total surveillance 
and policing of everyday life. 
 
The counterstate. 
    Between 1957 and 1961 the FLN continuously refined an elaborate system of control in order to 
assert its hegemony over the entire Algerian population of Paris. The internal Federation regulations 
began with the claim, ‘Le front de libération nationale est l’expression suprême de toute autorité et 
est le seul dépositaire de la souveraineté populaire pendant la durée de la guerre’. This fundamental 
claim to sovereignty, that was reinforced by the declaration of a provisional government on 19 
September 1958, meant that the FLN laid claim to all the legitimate functions of a nation-state, 
including taxation, justice, police, welfare, and diplomatic functions. Western liberal democracies 
during periods of national emergency and war may, when the very survival of the body politic is  in 
jeopardy, constitutionally suspend normal liberties, for example suspending democratic elections, 
and imposing press controls and national conscription. Likewise the FLN, involved in a life-and-death 
struggle for survival, was prepared to assume totalitarian methods, a logic that extended down to 
the most banal features of everyday life in the quartier. From 1958 onwards, and in part in response 
to the psychological warfare strategy of the SAT bureaux that began to offer Algerian workers 
assistance with welfare, unemployment and pension concerns, the FLN constructed a local counter-
state. The lynch-pin of this operated at the level of the Région, an echelon of about 3,500 militants 
and sympathisers, through Comités de justice, Comités d’hygiène, and Comités de soutien aux 
détenus (CSD).280 The Comités de justice, in effect local Islamic courts, regulated everything from 
marriage and divorce, to commercial contracts, alcohol consumption and brawling, and fines 
constituted a significant amount to FLN coffers. The Comités d’hygiène carried out inspections of 
lodging houses and compelled landlords to carry out improvements, such as regular laundering of 
bed linen and charging fair rents. The Comités de soutien aux détenus, that paid fixed-rate 
allowances to the families of ‘martyrs’ and prisoners, whether in France or in Algeria, were of 
enormous importance to the hold of the FLN since they reassured all militants of a minimum of 
material security for their families, in the eventuality of their own death or arrest. A key objective of 
this welfare state was to create a firewall between the Algerian community and the French 
authorities that were intent on building bridges so as to ‘integrate’ migrants, win them away from 
the ‘terrorist’ FLN, and to collect intelligence. 
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     During 1961 the Paris police mobilised its resources to try and penetrate and dislocate this 
clandestine counter-state, and the crisis that ensued, including the organisation of 17 October and 
its repression, was directly linked to the tensions that arose as the FLN fought back to protect its  
structures. Historians, as well as ex-FLN leaders and the police,  have seen this conflict as primarily 
an armed struggle, a ‘Bataille de Paris’, but, I would argue, this has tended to obscure the extent to 
which the struggle was primarily about money and the financial organisations of the Federation. In 
order to understand why the Paris militants reacted in the way they did to the repression unleashed 
by the Prefecture of Police and resisted the orders of the Federal Committee to maintain an informal 
truce, we need to examine the way in which tax collection shaped the basic structure and culture of 
the FLN underground. 
     The enormous importance of money, the sinews of war, to the global functioning of the FLN will 
be examined more closely in Chapter 8, but here it is sufficient to note that the GPRA, like any 
government, was dependent on considerable and regular flows of cash to cover a budget that 
included weapons, clothing and material for the ALN maquis, the wages of fighters , doctors, nurses, 
lawyers and diplomats, propaganda and publications, various social welfare costs, including benefits 
to the families of deceased militants and prisoners, ministerial bureaucracies, and so on.281 Apart 
from money and materials provided to the FLN by foreign governments and international agencies, 
the French Federation contributed a huge and disproportionate amount to the global budget, 
compared to the taxation potential of the population in Algeria itself. The volume of money raised 
by the Federation was, in part, a reflection of the higher earning capacity of industrial workers in 
France, but was also linked to the fact that the FLN exercised a far higher degree of control and 
surveillance over the population than in Algeria. 
       What is astonishing is not that such a taxation system existed, but the extraordinary complexity 
of the bureaucracy that ensured its smooth running. The monthly ‘organic’ and financial reports that 
every full-time responsable from Région upwards had to submit to his superior, constituted 
remarkably lengthy and detailed documents, often twenty or thirty pages long, and followed a 
standardised format.282 Upper level leaders in Paris were essentially bureaucrats and every month 
they retreated for days on end into a quiet safe-house, often in the spare bedroom of an Algerian 
family living in an HLM, to write their meticulous and detailed reports.283 Like any efficient state 
taxation apparatus the FLN set out to locate and identify every potential tax-payer via  a census or 
fichier, to assess their resources, and to guarantee that dues were paid, the whole backed up by an 
effective policing system. As soon as a previously unknown Algerian moved into a locale like the 13th 
arrondissement, from Algeria or elsewhere, they were approached to check their ID papers and 
whether they had received FLN permission to move, or if they had tried to escape as a ‘déserteur’ 
from another region to avoid dues and FLN discipline. A young migrant recounted a typical 
experience on arriving in the Nord: ‘Ici en France, il faut payer le FLN, on payait 3,500 F obligatoires. 
Si tu ne payes pas ils te descendent. En Algérie, je n’avais pas vu ça et quand je suis arrivé au foyer, 
ils m’ont chopé. Tu paies 3,500 F par mois sinon ils te tabassent, ils t’avertissent deux ou trois fois et 
ils te tuent’.284 
     The financial organisation of the Federation was, however, far more than an apparatus 
concerned to maximize revenue. An individual’s monthly payment to the local collector was 
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ultimately a symbol of allegiance to the national cause, an instrument of compliance 
terrorism. As the DST noted in a detailed study of the Appareil Financier du FLN en 1961, 
the system of collection in France related not only to money, but also, ‘à la notion 
d’engagement de la masse dans la lutte pour l’indépendance, conception classique de toute 
guerre subversive depuis 1945’ and was thus an instrument by which the FLN aimed to, ‘faire 
participer tous les Algériens à son combat’ and also to ‘compromise’ them.285 The FLN agent 
may not have been able to read and control the inner thoughts of each Algerian, whether he 
was truly a patriot or not, but cash payment presented an inescapable material and observable 
marker that could be quickly put to the test and measured. The archives contain numerous 
instances of individuals resisting the collection, either because they politically opposed the 
FLN, as in the case of MNA supporters, or because they resented a tax that diminished their 
meagre earnings that were desperately needed to sustain family members in France and 
Algeria.
286
 A considerable amount of lower-level FLN activity was devoted to tracking down 
such miscreants and extracting accumulated dues or back-payments (retards).  
    A deep concern, even anxiety, about the collection was not restricted to rank-and-file 
workers, but permeated the leadership at Régional, Amala and Wilaya level. Members of the 
Federal Committee, Zouaoui, the three RCs ,Wilaya and Amala heads, could not easily 
exercise a routine control over the activities of lower level cadres through direct contact and 
regular tours of inspection. The bulk-heads of clandestine structures also intervened. Control 
and discipline thus became very much a bureaucratic, paper exercise, and the essential 
metrics or performance indicators were the monthly figures that indicated changes in the 
number of enrolled militants and the amounts of money collected by each geographical area. 
Monthly reports went to great lengths to explain and justify even short-term falls in militant 
numbers and revenues or even the smallest of accounting anomalies, while increases were 
enthusiastically flagged and added to the reputation and promotional chances of the cadre as 
efficient, energetic and vigilant.
287
 Even today former leaders refer to high levels of 
collection as an index of their personal achievement.
288
 Omar Boudaoud, seeking to confirm 
the revolutionary unity of the nationalists, remarks: ‘Sinon, comment comprendre que les 
cotisations collectées auprès de chaque militant de base parvenaient au sommet par centaines 
de millions, à un franc près, sans que rien ne disparaisse au cours des diverses manipulations 
réalisees à une dizaine d’échelons? Les fonds de la révolution étaient sacrés. Distraire 
l’argent du FLN, c’était voler l’argent de la nation’.289 A prime concern of cadres during 
1961 was how far deepening police repression might disrupt or damage the monthly 
collection. 
    To imagine the situation of the mass of ordinary workers in Paris during mid-1961, the 
enormous pressures and tensions to which they were subjected, we have to understand the 
extent to which they were caught between two relentless forces, that of the police and the 
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FLN. At the local level these forces came to bear in particular on the cafe-hotel which served 
as a key organisational base for the FLN.  
The Harki challenge 
 
       The Prefecture of Police was well aware of the fact that the 13th arrondissement, with its dense 
warren of FLN networks, constituted one of the most powerful bastions of insurrectionary 
nationalism in Paris. In March 1960 it became the first target in a particularly bold experiment in 
urban counter-insurgency when Raymond Montaner recruited and trained the harkis brigades that 
were then deliberately located in six café-hotels in the heart of the zone, a frontal challenge to the 
FLN on their own turf. 290 Montaner, who as a former SAS and SAU officer in Algeria had a wide 
experience of counter-insurgency theories and practices developed by the army, adapted this to the 
Paris context. In Algeria in order to ‘reconquer’ mountain areas under the control of the ALN, French 
intelligence officers carefully studied the socio-political characteristics  of local populations , and 
selected for preliminary action not those that were most “pourrie” or invested by the FLN, but the 
areas of weaker guerrilla penetration in which inhabitants would prove most amenable to 
psychological warfare. After an initial military action or ‘surge’ into the area had cleared out ALN 
cadres and protected the local population from terrorism, the inhabitants, it was thought, would be 
prepared to provide intelligence, to join auto-defense forces, and to rebuild schools, roads, and 
other infrastructures. Once an area had been secured and stabilised, the same process was gradually 
extended from a safe core area into adjoining communes in an oil-slick effect.  
      Montaner, modeling his tactics on such ‘pacification’ procedures, carried out a similar project in 
the 13th arrondissement, carefully selected as what he described as, ‘un champ expérimental de 
premier ordre’.291 The FPA chose not to initiate its assault on the redoubtable FLN ghetto of the 
Goutte d’Or (18th arrondissement), but selected the 13th arrondissement as a suitable target on the 
basis of a sociological study. This  indicated a high level of stable employment within the quartier, so 
that it would be possible, ‘de grouper une population faite beaucoup plus de travailleurs que de 
membres de la pègre’. The inhabitants seemed, ‘plus saine et davantage digne d’intérêt que dans 
des arrondissements, comme le 18e arrondissement par example’, an underworld zone of 
prostitution, drug dealing and small time gangsters. ‘D’autre part il [13th] apparait que des signes 
certains de lassitude existent et que la tendance politique y serait assez aisément reversible’.292 Once 
the FPA had established a firm base in Région 1221, the plan was to extent the actions of the harkis 
into the neighbouring 5th, 14th and 15th arrondissements. 
     The Prefecture estimated, on the eve of its intervention, that the FLN exerted a hegemonic 
control over Region 1221 since, of a total Algerian population of 3,700, including women and 
children, some 3,200, mainly single men, were organised into the three parallel groupings of 
militants, adherents and sympathisants. There were 170 commerçants, who constituted the spine of  
FLN networks, mainly running café-hotels (60), hotels (13), cafés or restaurants (21), grocery stores 
(17), or  working as  hairdressers (6), street traders, and taxi drivers. For the month of November 
1959 the collectors had raised about 20 million francs., a tenth of which (2,230,000) came from small 
businesses.293 Figure 3 below provides, for comparative purposes, a diagramme of a similar Région in 
the 18th arrondissement for which there is more precise data in the archive.294 
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     In our previous study,  ‘Paris 1961’, we argued that the French government deployed state terror 
as a policy of psychological destabilisation of the Algerian community, through the creation of  
endemic insecurity that would serve to weaken and demobilize popular support for the FLN.295 
Montaner’s plan, in creating the FPA, was to create among Algerians ‘une psychose’ by ‘semant la 
confusion’, ‘un climat de méfiance’ and a generalised state of instability and panic.296  It is not my 
intention to repeat here the analysis of all the diverse and complex methods  that were used to 
achieve this goal, from constant street stop-and-searches, to night-time invasion of lodgings and, 
most feared, mass refoulement to Algeria. However, I will illustrate the process through a brief 
examination of what was dubbed by the Prefecture as ‘Operation Osmose’, since this illustrates 
most clearly how and why the harkis presented such a major threat to the fabric of FLN organisation, 
and its financial system. It was the constant pressure of ‘Osmose’ and other techniques of daily 
harassment, first tested in Région 1221, that were to play a key role in the crisis of mid-1961, and 
which pushed militants towards a resumption of armed actions in late August.  
 
 
Figure 3. 
Region 1112 (18th arrondissement) in November 1960. Source H1B29.  
 
 
 
 
............................................................................................ 
 
      A café under the sign ‘Bouillon Restaurant’ at 162 Boulevard de la Gare was typical of the FLN 
centres in Region 1221 that were closed down by administrative order. The tenant of this small, 30 
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seat café, Méhanna Seridj, a Kabyle from Aït Khelili near Tizi-Ouzou, was well known to the police 
since he had installed himself there, with his family, in February 1957. Seridj was under FLN orders 
to, ‘centraliser le produit des collectes effectués sur cet arrondissement’, and was also head of a GA 
commando that had undertaken interrogations in the cellar of his café. His older brother Azouaou 
had lived with him there in early 1957, before returning to join the ALN maquis where he was later 
killed. Although Méhanne was detained at Mourmelon (Marne) in mid-1959, the café continued 
under Méziane Seridj, to act as a centre of FLN activism. On 9 October the police officer for the 
quartier, in making  an official request for closure, disclosed the financial implications of the 
procedure, ‘fermeture qui doit avoir pour résultats d’inciter les commerçants FMA du quartier et des 
quartiers vousins, à modérer leur soutien au FLN’.297 On 5 November the Prefect signed an 
application for a six month closure to the Ministry of the Interior, and on 24 November Méziane 
Seridj, who could neither read nor write, was summoned, along with his accountant, to the District 
police commissariat, where he was formally notified of closure of both the café and the telephone 
line, for ‘atteinte à l’ordre public’.298 The impact of such closures was  considerable: the tenant’s 
family would suddenly find themselves without income, while the Federation lost not only the 
commercial dues, but found itself deprived of a safe meeting place and the lower-echelon cell 
networks led by the Seridj family dislocated. 
   The ‘Osmose’ operations added a new twist to the closure procedure: the lodgers, most of them 
FLN militants, instead of being simply expelled, with the likelihood that  they would find 
accommodation with other activists in the same neighbourhood, were dramatically evicted by night-
time police operations and scattered through various lodging houses in distant parts  of Paris. The 
intention was to radically disrupt the kin, village and factory-based networks of the neighbourhood, 
to dump militants into potentially hostile Algerian environments in which suspicion reigned, and to 
add the punitive costs and disadvantages of having to make a long daily return trip to work .299 It was 
this method that Montaner applied as a shock tactic when at 4.am on Sunday 20 March he expelled 
the inhabitants of six FLN-controlled hotels in Région 1221 and installed his harkis sections and 
HQ.300 Among the hotels  was the militant centre at 139 Rue du Château-des-Rentiers , with its 90 
lodgers, that we looked at above. By 8.am of the 20 March the harkis were already going out on 
their first patrols of the neighbourhood.  
     The FPA investment of the 13th arrondissement was immediately recognised by the FLN to 
present a dangerous threat to the organisation, an experiment that needed to be blocked before 
such a model could be tested and applied to the Paris region as a whole. The OS and GA riposted to 
the FPA presence in Region 1221 by carrying out frequent armed attacks on the harki posts in the 
Rue Harvey and Rue Château-des-Rentiers, but without being able to dislodge them. Montaner had 
considerable success in severely damaging the FLN organisation, to the extent that many cadres 
were forced to find safety by moving out from the 13th into neighbouring arrondissements, or the 
suburbs. The FPA replied to this by extending its operations in a classic ‘tache d’huile’ effect into the 
adjoining 14th, 5th and 6th arrondissements. Informers claimed that Algerians were resisting the 
collectors and in the FLN bastion at 139 Rue des Chateau des Rentiers  only three lodgers had paid 
their dues.301 The SCAA reported that the collection in Region 1221 had been badly damaged by 
harkis activities, with the number of contributors falling from 3,200 in February 1960 to 2,268 in 
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January 1961.302 By November 1960 Montaner felt sufficiently confident in the methods deployed in 
Region 1221 to extend the same procedure to the notorious FLN bastion of the 18th arrondissement. 
In early 1961 the FLN, and the anti-war French left, was successful  in an energetic political and press 
campaign to expose the extreme brutality of the FPA and the widespread use of torture in the cellars 
of the 13th and 18th arrondissements.303 It was this, more than anything, that forced the French 
government  in June to withdraw the harkis from their city-centre bases back to their barracks at 
Fort Noisy.    
      Papon was deeply angered by the order to withdraw the FPA forces and on 27 June, since he 
shared a profound contempt for what he saw as  weak liberal laws and restraints, was quite 
prepared to engage in covert and illegal initiatives. Far from abiding by an informal truce, Montaner 
proposed that he be granted, ‘une grande latitude quant aux conditions d’engagement des 
compagnies de jour’, so that harkis could be sent by day or night and without prior warning, 
‘indistinctement en de nombreux points de Paris’. Arrested Algerians could be interrogated in the 
immediate vicinity, such as in, ‘l’arrière-salle d’un débit de boissons où il aurait décidé de s’installer 
pour plusieurs heures’, a sure-fire recipé for continuing torture.304 Montaner saw positive gains in 
the new arrangement since the previous fixed bases of the FPA in the 13th and 18th 
arrondissements had made them the static target  of FLN attacks, ‘des pôles d’attraction pour les 
actions spectaculaires du FLN’. The FPA would recapture the initiative through offensive mobile 
‘opérations-surprise’.305 Montaner was given a green light for  particularly aggressive FPA patrols 
immediately  to go onto the offensive, striking daily into the main areas of FLN activity.306 Contrary 
to statements made by the French government and its negotiators  at Evian, the FPA, far from 
reducing its activities in response to a Federal truce, accelerated its depredations into the FLN 
terrain.  
     The final repressive measure that drove the Federation to the wall and compelled it to consider 
some form of radical action to escape the relentless pressure was the night curfew imposed by the 
Prefect of Police on the 5 October 1961.  ‘Dans le cadre’, said Papon, ‘des mesures prises pour 
neutraliser le terrorisme algérien et accroître la protection des personnels de police, j’ai décidé de 
prononcer le couvre-feu, pour les Français musulmans d’Algérie, de 20 h 30 à 5 h 30 du matin’.307 
The Federal Committee, in organising the demonstrations of 17th to 20th October (see Chapter 7), 
placed a primary emphasis in its propaganda on opposition to a ‘couvre-feu raciste’, that 
discriminated against all Algerians, constitutionally French citizens who should not be subject to any 
exceptional laws. While this principled stand, which was to find strong support among French 
politicians and the left, was pushed to the fore, the FLN recognised all too well that such a curfew 
threatened to cripple the rank-and-file activities, and in particular the monthly collection. The sting 
in the tail of Papon’s order lay in the second sentence, ‘D’autre part, les débits de boissons tenus et 
fréquentés par les Français musulmans doivent être fermés à partir de 19 heures’.308 The FLN in Paris 
had already experienced the imposition of such a curfew in August 1958, following the ‘second front’ 
offensive, and were well aware of its potential to disrupt after-work meetings and collections. Ali 
Haroun remarks that the 1961 curfew, ‘c’est pratiquement arrêter toutes les activités organiques, les 
éléments du FLN étant pratiquement tous des travailleurs qui ne peuvent militer qu’après les heures 
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d’usine’, while the closure of cafés would disrupt ‘la plupart des contacts des échelons de base’.309 
Reports from the Wilayas informed the Federal Committee, ‘l’application de ce couvre-feu deviendra 
un handicap insurmontable et paralysera toute activité. Essayez donc d’organiser quelque chose 
pour riposter’.310  
     If we return now to how the FLN crisis of mid-1961 was experienced at the grass roots in the 13th 
arrondissement, as in other Algerian quartiers, there exists no information about the kinds of 
political debates that took place weekly within the local cell and Group meetings or, even more 
intriguing, in the everyday exchanges of news, rumour and opinion that took place in the cafés and 
lodging houses. We can deduce from the propaganda, newspapers and orders passed down from 
the centre to the base, that the FLN very carefully sought to control the political formation of the 
militants, even to the extent of concealing the fratricidal power-struggles that were tearing the 
central leadership apart. Mohammed Harbi has insisted that the Federation did not accept or 
facilitate a process of open political discussion, and that all key decisions were formulated at the top 
and imposed by an authoritarian organisation, thus creating an ambience that stiffled the 
emergence of a more mature and informed political culture, with tragic long-term consequences for 
the future post-independence state. However, what scraps of evidence we have, suggest that there 
was a very lively and intense exchange of information and opinion at the grass-roots, within the 
small circles of migrant workers who, bound together by strong kin and village ties, sufficiently 
trusted each other to express even dissident ideas or questions  without running the risk of 
disciplinary action from above. In a typical Paris Région of 3,000 to 3,500 members, the key opinion-
makers would be the heads of  each echelon, from cells of 5 upwards through Groups, Sections, 
Kasmas and Secteurs to Région, Zone and Amala. The monthly oral or written reports that were sent 
up the hierarchy were synthesised at each successive level of the pyramid, and in the case of Région 
1221 (13th arrondissement) eventually reached Mohammed Ghafir who, as head of Amala 12 (south-
east Paris ), amalgamated the intelligence for the six regions under his control. Each leader in the 
chain would, to varying degrees, select out or filter incoming information, according to his own bias, 
level of conformism, or ambition to please his superiors as to his own diligence and control over the 
rank-and-file. However, the higher echelon cadres from Régional upwards could not afford to remain 
totally deaf to any murmuring and discontent that might appear at the base: indeed, if he failed to 
respond to the kinds of intense pressures that were building up during 1961, he could face the 
catastrophic consequences of losing control altogether. Such a process can be dedected in the 
valuable reports of Mohammed Ghafir, reports that provide the clearest insight into what was 
happening at the local level in Paris. 
 
 Mohammed Ghafir and Amala 12 
 
     Mohammed Ghafir represents a typical example of the FLN leadership in Paris during the closing 
stages of the war, a militant who had worked his way up the hierarchy. Men from the mountainous 
Kabyle region had been dominant in the early labour migration to the Paris region during and after 
the First World War and by the 1950s many had succeeded in establishing small businesses, mainly 
cafés-hotels, restaurants and import-export companies, that were to play a key strategic role in the 
Messalist MTLD and subsequent clandestine FLN organisations. When Ghafir, born  on 19 January 
1934 at Iklidjene, first arrived in Paris in September 1955, it was to join his father and uncle, who had 
emigrated during the 1920s, in  Clichy-la-Garenne.311 Although we lack any systematic study of the 
role of familial networks in the development of nationalism in Paris,  mid-rank and higher level FLN  
cadres  were often recruited from among the Kabyle commercial clans since they had a higher level 
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of education and a point of entry into the social and political networks that had developed after 
1918.312 In 1951 Ghafir was among the small minority of Algerians to receive a lycée education, 
through the fact that his father was able to send money from France to pay for his schooling in 
Constantine. But unable to complete his schooling, he qualified as a lathe-turner, and avoided 
military service in August 1955 by escaping to Paris where he joined the FLN and was quickly 
appointed in 1956 head of a Secteur in Clichy, and then promoted in 1957 head of a Region in 
northern Paris. As a responsable at Regional level Ghafir received a salary from the FLN, which 
enabled him to leave his employment in an engineering works to become a full-time activist.313 On 8 
January 1958 Ghafir was arrested by the DST at 1 Rue des Blancs Manteaux in the 4th  
arrondissement, tortured, and finally condemned on appeal on 8 October 1958 to three years 
prison, one of which was added to the sentence for making a political statement during his trial.314    
      Freed from the detention camp of Larzac on 6 February 1961, Ghafir quickly returned to Paris, 
from which he was still banned, and through contact with Mohammedi Saddek, was reintegrated 
into the FLN network, supplied with a forged ID  as a Tunisian student, and appointed by Maâmar 
Kaci, head of Wilaya 1 (Paris centre), to replace Tayeb El Bachir as head of  Zone 121, corresponding 
to the 5th, 6th, 14th and 15th arrondissements on the Left bank, and 8,159 FLN members.315 Ghafir was 
thus plunged in June 1961 into the heart of an FLN fiefdom that was undergoing unprecedented 
levels of police operations, especially by the brutal harkis units that patrolled the sector and spread a 
climate of terror. This was brought home with force on 15 August when Ghafir’s immediate superior, 
Bachir Boudjemaa, head of Amala 12, was picked up by the harki in the 15th arrondissement, 
tortured, executed and thrown into the Seine.316 Immediately Ghafir was chosen by Kaci to replace 
Boudjemaa, and found his responsibilities extended to cover both his existing Zone 121, as well as 
Zone 122 which corresponded to the 12th and 13th arrondissements. Ghafir, as one of four Amala 
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heads in Paris, was in charge of 15,260 militants, about a quarter of the total Algerian population in 
the capital, during the critical events of  July to October 1961.317  
     Two reports of major importance, written by Ghafir during this period, have survived. The first, his 
monthly report for July for Zone 121, recounts in details the impact of the FPA squads that, while in 
principle relegated to barracks at Fort Noisy, were involved in violent daily incursions  into the 5th, 
13th, 14th, 15th and 18th arrondissements, the smashing down of hotel doors and the brutal 
assaults on Algerians, many of whom needed hospital treatment for wounds. This report shows the 
position before the resumption of armed group attacks on the police:- 
‘La répression a été intense sur l’ensemble de la Zone ces dernières semaines. Le XVe et le Ve en 
particulier ont été les plus touchés par les fouilles et les perquisitions multipliées jour et nuit. Cette 
répression est dirigée souvent par les traîtres harkis qui sont constamment dans les quartiers des 
deux régions citées. En effet, depuis la fameuse mise en scène du transfer des harkis à Noisy-le-Sec, 
l’activité de ces derniers est redoublée. Papon et son gouvernement, en déplaçant les harkis du 
X111e et du XV111e, ont laissé croire à l’opinion française que c’est un geste d’apaisement à la suite 
de la fameuse trêve unilatérale décidée le 20 mai dernier. Mais, pour nous, le déplacement des 
harkis n’a changé en rien leur activité qui a été au contraire intensifiée et étendue sur l’ensemble de 
Paris et la banlieue......Dans tous les cafés et hôtels du XVe, Ve et XIVe des frères ont été frappés, 
des portes des chambres cassées, sans parler des vols d’argent et d’autres objets ayant de la valeur 
faisant ainsi le travail de gangstérisme. Le vendredi 21, le samedi 22 et le dimanche 23 juillet, la 
répression s’est abbatue intensement sur toute la Zone par les harkis encadrés des policiers français, 
de 8 heures du matin à minuit, visant ainsi les jours de la perception’.318  
Ghafir’s report confirms what is known from other sources about the wave of violence, but he adds 
two further points that are of particular interest. Firstly, massive police intervention in Paris was 
focused each month on the period, usually lasting several days, during which the collection was 
organised at the local level. The FLN, from 1958 onwards, altered the collection dates each month, 
and a prime goal of the French intelligence services was to identify, through informers, telephone 
taps and captured documents, the precise days on which money was to be collected from the 
migrant workers in cafés and lodgings. In July 1961 the police had, evidently, discovered the dates 
and had set out to disrupt the system of collection, the moment each month when the organisation 
was most vulnerable. Secondly, and most significant of all, is the fact that a  high placed cadre like 
Ghafir could speak out so forcefully about the swelling discontent among the FLN rank-and-file and 
against the ‘truce’ policy enforced by the GPRA and Federal Committee:- 
‘Une réaction unanime est constatée chez tous les militants, c’est celle de reprendre les actions 
contre la police, principalement les harkis du moins en se défendant légitimement. Oui, nous savons 
que l’ordre donné par notre gouvernement d’arrêter les opérations offensives en France a une 
signification politique vis-à-vis de l’opinion française et internationale. Notre gouvernement en 
ordonnant l’arrêt de ces opérations a voulu déjouer les manoeuvres du gouvernement français et 
démentir par les faits la propagande que ne cesse de faire la presse française, selon laquelle la 
Fédération de France est extrémiste et échappe au contrôle du gouvernement algérien [....]. 
Cependant, l’arrêt des opérations en France ordonné par notre gouvernement est interpréte par le 
gouvernement français, en particulier Papon et ses harkis, comme faiblesse de notre organisation. 
C’est pourquoi la répression est redoublée ces dernières semaines afin de nous provoquer et voir 
notre réaction. Nous devons dire à l’organisation que l’arrêt des opérations offensives ordonné par 
notre gouvernement n’a pas satisfait nos militants et que leur réaction est unanime pour reprendre 
les actions afin de démontrer à Papon et ses valets que notre organisation n’est pas faible et ne 
s’affaiblira jamais quelle que soit la force de sa police’.   
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          Ghafir’s analysis of the dangerous consequences of a truce that was undermining and 
demobilising the FLN organisation, to the profit of the French security forces, was completely at one 
with the argument developed by the Federal Committee one year earlier in opposition to the GPRA 
plan for a cease-fire in France. In June 1960  the Federal Committee had predicted that a “trêve” 
would work to the advantage of the French who would not disarm: ‘La répression va redoubler de 
violence’ and the police would, ‘par une terreur qui ne connaîtra plus de bornes, essayer de 
reprendre les quartiers d’où il fut chassé’.319 This scenario now appeared to be unrolling. 
      Other sources confirm Gafir’s  account of a growing sense of anger and frustation at the grass 
roots. One report from Kasma level conveyed a sense of desperation: ‘La confiscation, le vol, n’en 
parlons pas. C’est rien à côté du reste. Ils [FPA] agissent n’importe comment. A déchirer même les 
vêtements. Quelle rage! Il faut que tout ceci s’arrête. Il faut trouver un moyen, une solution pour 
enrayer, au moins entraver ces répressions meutrières et destructives...[...]..S’indigner, protester 
seulement devant ces massacres, ne sera pas suffisant. Que pourrait-on faire? Il y a une solution! 
Elle doit être trouvé au plus tôt!’.320 Paulette Péju, who worked closely with the Paris FLN in October 
1961, was also aware of a deep malaise affecting the rank-and-file who, in face of a Federal policy of 
“des bras croisés”, were demanding an armed riposte. She had access to numerous FLN  reports that 
spelled out the same message:  for example, the police and harkis had, ‘créé une tension et une 
nervosité insupportable.....Je suggère que les frères des groupes armés procédent à une contre-
attaque, ce qui ne serait qu’une légitime défense’, and another wanted to move to, ‘des attaques 
massives et générales, à des protestations en masse...’.321 
      Ghafir concluded his July report by demanding on behalf of all militants, who were unanimous, 
that armed actions be resumed or, at the very least, that the FLN issue a press communiqué 
denouncing the duplicit actions of the French government. ‘Nous attendons avec courage et le 
maximum de sang-froid la réponse de l’organisation, soit pour la reprise, même provisoire, des 
actions contre les harkis ou nous expliquer d’une manière détaillé par voie de tracts la raison pour 
laquelle nous avons suspendu ces actions et que nous ne pouvons reprendre. C’est l’avis de tous les 
militants et responsables de la [Zone] 121’. 
    The Federal Committee seems to have responded too slowly or to have ignored the danger signals 
arriving from Paris. In part this was due to the problem of difficult and slow communication between 
Paris and Germany. Ghafir’s report for July would probably have been written in the first days of 
August but, on completion, would have had to pass up the chain of command to Wilaya and Paris 
Federal levels, before dispatch to Germany by the weekly courrier.However, even making allowance 
for such slow communication, the Committee seems to have failed to recognise the serious nature 
of the crisis that was developing in Paris. 
   Ghafir was compelled to write a second report, titled ‘Août 1961, le tournant?’, in which he 
detailed further violent incursions in the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, 18th and 20th arrondissements: ‘Policiers et 
Harkis, parfois accompagnés de chiens, descendent dans les hôtels à toute heure du jour et de nuit’. 
Lodging rooms were sacked and many Algerians taken away or hospitalised with wounds. Algerians 
were daily being assaulted in the street and, ‘les policiers ne demandent même plus leurs papiers à 
ceux qu’ils croient être Algériens. C’est la chasse aux faciès’. Ghafir felt compelled by the urgency of 
the situation to reiterate his July warning: ‘Cette offensive policière se produit alors que 
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l’organisation du FLN sur directives du Comité Fédéral, a décide de cesser les actions armées par nos 
FIDAINE (Groupe Armé) à PARIS et en banlieue depuis plusieurs semaines. Au sein des structures 
hiérarchiques de l’Organisation, militants et  responsables à tous les niveaux, des voix s’élèvent en 
faveur d’une reprise des opérations armées’.322   
    By mid-August the GA groups in Paris had lost patience with the Federation Committee and 
decided from 15 August to take unliteral action against the harkis, and then on 27-8 August against 
individual police officers. For many of the young and highly combattant militants that formed the 
armed groups it was intolerable to be forced to stand aside while the harki, traitors to the nation,  
had carte blanche to brutalise and murder. For them the need to engage in a riposte derived not 
only from concern at the indiscriminate violence experienced by the Algerian community and the 
damage to FLN networks, but also from the values of male honour that were so deep a part of 
Maghrebin culture. Typical was the sentiment expressed by the head of Secteur 21133 at Nanterre , 
‘On ne doit pas rester dans les circonstances pareilles d’humiliation....Nous demandons un ordre 
pour la contre-répression et d’armer tous les éléments des GA’.323 Other reports confirm the 
accumulative impact of daily ‘low intensity’ operations that included not only brutal assault, but also 
verbal insults, tearing up of identity papers, smashing watches, and other acts of humiliation.324  
     As we have seen in Chapter 5, although it is difficult to find exactly which leaders were involved in 
co-ordinating the resumption of attacks on the security forces, the evidence points to significant 
collusion at the highest level. Mohammedi Saddek, for example, gave uncompromising support for 
counter-violence. Georges Lepage, who provided Saddek with a safe-house in Vitry, remonstrated 
with him: ‘It’s not normal that you bring down some lad standing outside a police station....It’s badly 
received by the people and even by some of those who support you’.325 As we will see in Chapter 7 
Saddek’s support for the armed groups explains why he was called by the Federal Committee to 
Belgium, where he was disciplined and read the riot act by Boudaoud. Ghafir remembers the week 
between the imposition of a curfew on 5th October and the decision to organise a demonstration as 
one of mounting  tension that placed huge pressure on the lower level responsables to find some 
kind of riposte. He clearly believes, even today, that the Federation should have followed the 
demands of the firebrand Mohammedi Saddek, but, ‘Hélas, toutes ces opérations souhaitées par la 
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base et les responsables sont refusées par le Comité Fédéral pour des raisons politiques afin de ne 
pas gêner les contacts entre le GPRA et le Gouvernement français’.326 
     By 27th August the Federal Committee was beginning to realise that it was facing a crisis among 
the Paris FLN and demanded to know, ‘sur quel principe ou directives se base-t-on pour abattre des 
simples gardiens de la Paix?’. But by the first week of October it was still without response to its 
urgent request and, faced with a dangerous loss of control over the Paris militants, hit upon the idea 
of mass demonstrations as a means to reassert its authority, as will be seen in the next chapter.   
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                                                                     7 
                               Planning the demonstrations of 17-20 October 
 
     The Federal Committee responded quickly to the imposition of a curfew on 5th October, and by 
the 10th  of October had already drawn up detailed plans for a sequence of mass demonstrations in 
Paris and the French provinces. A week later the FLN, a considerable feat in the circumstances, 
succeeded in organising in secrecy a mobilisation of some 30,000 men, women, and children in the 
boulevards of the capital. The aim of this chapter is to examine closely how this planning process 
took place, and to answer three questions: why the Committee decided to oppose the curfew 
through a mass demonstration rather than any alternative form of opposition, despite the evident 
dangers involved; why it decided to exclude the French left and trade unions that might have 
provided a degree of protection from police violence; and whether action was taken with or without 
the agreement of the GPRA in Tunisia.    
   On the 7th October the Federal Committee sent by weekly courrier a directive in which, concerned 
for the negative impacts of the curfew on the organisation, it asked for a detailed report on the likely 
impact, ‘sur nos activités en général. Nous donner la réaction des commerçants dont les 
établissements sont fermés à la suite de ces mesures policières. Nous donner votre avis sur les 
actions éventuelles (ripostes) qu’il y aura d’entreprendre contre ces mesures racistes de la police’.327 
However, the Committee at this stage, only ten days prior to the 17th October, had not yet conceived  
the idea for a demonstration since it outlined proposals for the commemoration of 1 November, a 
standard date in the FLN calendar. Shortly after this directive was dispatched the Committee 
received a delayed ‘Express note’ dated Paris, 7 October, in which Zouaoui reported how he had 
responded to Papon’s announcement of the curfew on 5th October by calling an emergency meeting 
of the three RCs on the same day. Although they still lacked details, the Paris leaders urged the 
Federal Committee to agree to their proposals to disobey the ‘menaces du sieur Papon’ through 
mass civil disobedience in which small groups of three, four or more Algerians would walk through 
the streets of the city after 8.30 pm. in defiance of the ban. Significantly this was to be a peaceful 
demonstration and include women and children, a highly controversial recommendation in the light 
of the subsequent police violence.328 The protest would put the French public, who had up to now 
been indifferent to police brutality, on the spot (‘au pied du mur’)  and compel them to take 
supportive action. Zouaoui undoubtedly hoped that a French presence would provide some 
protection from extreme police violence, as it had done on many demonstrations in the past. ‘Les 
partis politiques et syndicats démocratiques “conseilleraient” à leurs militants français de sortir aussi 
nombreux que possible, à partir de 20 h 30, pour s’intégrer s’il le faut aux paisibles promeneurs 
algériens et s’opposer s’il y a lieu aux provocations de la police’.329  
    The Federal Committee met several times in an apartment on the Theodor Heus Ring in Cologne 
to consider what action to take and by the 10th October had arrived at the definitive order for a 
three-stage mass action:  phase one, a sequence of demonstrations in Paris; a phase two extension 
to the rest of France; and a phase three general strike by all Algerians.330 In effect the Committee 
discussed and arrived at its final decision for the demonstrations in the relatively brief period, at 
most some 72 hours, between late on 7th October and the dispatch by courrier of its order on 10th 
October. This narrow window of time is significant since the Committee had only three days within 
which to consult with Paris leaders and, in principle, to get a green light from Tunis. The difficulty 
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and slowness of clandestine communication between Germany and Paris also needs to be taken into 
account. 
    The Committee was meticulous in how it planned in advance the regular weekly dispatchs to and 
from Paris, the particular dates on which documents would arrive, and the courrier who was 
scheduled to deliver them. The usual pattern in October 1961 was for an agent to leave Paris for 
Brussels, often on the evening train at 17 h 36, and to deliver documents to Anne Boddaert, a 26 
year old physiotherapist who, in turn, transmitted them to the members of the Federal Committee 
who lived under conditions of ultra-tight security in different urban locations in Germany. Such 
precautions were necessary, not only to ensure that crucial intelligence did not fall into the hands of 
the French, but also to prevent location by special forces that, if given the opportunity, had no 
hesitation in assassinating FLN cadres and arms dealers abroad. Courriers, after spending the night in 
Brussels, then made the return journey with Committee documents for Paris.  
   The planning of 17 October was so important that Mingasson was sent in person. The DST agents 
trailing Mingasson saw her going at 10.40 am on 7 October to Zouaoui’s home in the Impasse des 
Deux Anges, before her departure to Mons in Belgium on 9 October. The next day Mingasson 
returned to Paris, almost certainly carrying the vital instructions dated 10 October.331 By noon on the 
10th October DST agents tailed Mingasson back in Paris as she made contact with members of the 
Zouaoui network, including Nicole Grumbach, liaison agent for Saïd Amroun (RC3) and Genéviève 
François, liaison agent for Younès Aberkane (RC2). Mingasson was particularly busy on 12 October as 
she met Anne Boddaert, who had arrived from Brussels as a courrier, in the Café François Coppée 
and again in a café-tabac in the Rue Jacob. Two hours later, at 4.50 pm Mingasson and Zouaoui met 
to convey the latest news from Germany to Abderrahmane Farès. The three walked deep in 
conversation from Trocadéro towards Passy and Farès, who appeared to DST agents to be highly 
nervous, wrote down notes of what Mingasson had to say before returning to his car, ‘en s’assurant 
que Mingasson n’est pas “filée” ‘.332 A document found in Farès home on 4 November suggests that 
he too was summoned by Boudaoud to a meeting in Brussels on the evening of 15 October, 
presumably for the Federal Committee to receive a final account of preparations and to pass on any 
last instructions for Paris.333 
 
Why a demonstration? 
 
          Few historians or commentators have asked the question as to why the Federal Committee 
took the decision to respond to the crisis through the organisation of a demonstration, rather than 
opting for alternative forms of action. It should be kept in mind that in the context of late 1961 a 
mass demonstration in the capital did not represent an obvious choice, especially as the special 
powers acts and brutal police repression had brought a virtual halt to street protest in Paris since 
1957. However, the Committee realised that mass demonstrations could provide a neat solution to 
the dilemma which it faced, caught between the demand from the GPRA that armed action be 
contained so as not to endanger the ongoing negotiations, and the pressure from the Paris militants 
to make some form of strong response to police violence. A peaceful demonstration would satisfy 
the former, while a mass action could serve to channel and release the deep frustration building up 
among the militants.334  
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     In reality it is possible to detect two, contradictory currents within the Algerian community: that 
formed by a more pliant mass that simply wanted to see a rapid end to the war, and to the pressures 
being exherted by both the police and the FLN, and a more vocal group of activists or lesser cadres, 
who were prepared to make every sacrifice to continue an insurrectionary agenda to the bitter end.  
The Federal Committee was well aware of the treacherous difficulties and tensions that the FLN 
would face at the very moment that negotiations with France were under way and an imminent 
peace became a real prospect. The post-1945 nationalist movement  had developed authoritarian 
mechanisms to retain control over the emigrant community and to retain constant pressure to 
maximise tax contributions, to attend meetings, and provide other forms of support that were 
exceedingly burdensome. The FLN leaders were aware of the need to retain a constant psychological 
pressure on the Algerian population to extract the maximum personal sacrifice from each militant 
and they feared that any relaxing of external discipline would lead to a rapid demobilisation, loss of 
momentum and even mass defection. The SCAA intelligence service, in a report of 23 August, 
commented on a marked ‘changement de l’état d’esprit’ of Algerians, ‘une très nette lassitude, 
doublée d’une certaine inquétude. Les contrôles de police et la tutelle frontiste pèsent très 
lourdement sur la vie quotidienne des FMA. Ils pensent que la partie est gagnée pour le FLN, que la 
France ne conteste pas l’indépendance de l’Algérie, donc que leur participation active n’a plus de 
raison d’être...Leur lassitude vient d’un certain sentiment de victoires acquise..’.335 Pulling in an 
opposite direction, but equally threatening to the Committee, were the activists, including the GA 
groups, who were itching to accelerate the attacks on the security forces.  
      The post-war nationalist movement, first under the MTLD-PPA and then the FLN, had built up a 
number of techniques for enforcing discipline and unity, among them a range of proscriptions, such 
as the ban on alcohol and smoking, that had the advantage of being eminently public and visible acts 
so that resistance could be quickly exposed and sanctioned.336 Mohammed Harbi has remarked that 
the FLN ban on alcohol had less to do with respect for Islam, than to ‘fidéliser les militants’.337 But 
perhaps the most potent traditional instrument of psychological coercion for enforcing discipline 
and unity was the mass action, whether in the form of a general strike or street demonstration, since 
anybody refusing or trying to avoid the party call to action could be quickly identified and, if 
necessary, punished.338 However, the dramatic failure of the general strike in Algiers in January 1957 
led to the collapse of the FLN organisations in the city and discredited urban mass action in general 
for four years, while mountain guerilla warfare moved to the forefront. This was to change 
dramatically as a result of spontaneous mass demonstrations in Algiers on 10-12 December 1960 
during a tour by General de Gaulle. Thousands poured down from the Casbah and popular quarters 
waving green-and-white nationalist flags and chanting ‘Abbas au pouvoir’, ‘Libérez Ben Bella’ and 
‘Algérie musulmane’. The violent clashes that ensued, in which over 120 Algerians died, marked a 
decisive turning-point in the war, since de Gaulle realised that the FLN constituted a legitimate 
expression of the popular will of the Algerian people, with whom he would now have to negotiate.339 
     A first reaction of some FLN leaders to the street insurrection was one of deep suspicion and 
hostility since, owing to the authoritarian culture that had become predominant, they disliked any 
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popular initiative that arose outside the control of the party hierarchy. The EMG and Wilaya 4 issued 
instruction during 1961 which showed anxiety that further mass actions, like those of December, 
would become uncontrollable. In July 1961 the commander of Wilaya 4, that included Algiers, 
ordered, ‘Il faut que les masses ne manifestent que sur ordre du GPRA. Il y a certaines formes 
d’action qu’il faut interdire aux masses. Grèves: c’est une forme d’action à exclure pour le moment, 
l’encadrement des masses n’étant pas réalisé’.340 However, following the successful demonstrations 
of 5 July, the FLN was becoming more confident about its ability to harness popular action and, more 
important, was beginning to recognise the political importance of street protests in placing pressure 
on de Gaulle to accelerate the peace process. By 1961 the entire strategic thinking of the FLN was 
beginning to swing away from the ALN maquis and the peasantry, that was barely surviving after the 
crushing impact of the Challe offensive, back to the potential of urban protest. Zouaoui, in making 
his proposal on 7 October for a street demonstration, knew that this was in line with the new radical 
position taken by the CNRA of late August, ‘qui tiennent compte dans le combat actuel de la 
participation de la masse à la lutte révolutionnaire’.341  
    It is clear that the Federal Committee was searching for means to retain discipline over the Paris 
rank-and-file: for example, when on 5 July it sent out the contentious order to stop further attacks 
on the police, it added, ‘D’autre part, de manière à tenir solidement en main les cadres, des réunions 
doivent rassembler ceux-ci tous les deux jours et ce jusqu’à nouvel ordre’.342 In calling for a 
demonstration on the 17 October the Federation was playing for high stakes, since the level of 
mobilisation would provide incontrovertible proof of the strength or weakness of its support among 
the Algerians and its claim to represent the popular will. While the majority of Algerians 
spontaneously and enthusiatically supported the demonstration, there was also a significant 
minority that was reluctant to participate after a long days work or because of the evident dangers 
involved. The militants and leaders of cells and Groups scoured the lodging houses or sectors which 
they controlled to make sure that every man and woman, no matter how reluctant, would attend. 
       A mass action would, in addition to reasserting FLN discipline over immigrants weary of seven 
years of war, also serve to hold in check the activists who advocated armed action. As Ali Haroun 
notes the Committee was unanimous about the need to act: ‘la population algérienne était en train 
d’étouffer. Tous nos responsables, qu’ils soient chef de cellule ou de wilaya, nous disaient que ça ne 
pouvait pas continuer, qu’on ne pouvait pas accepter de se faire massacrer, qu’il fallait réagir contre 
le couvre-feu’.343 Omar Boudaoud agrees that ‘nous avions été contraints de réagir’ and that a 
failure to act might even have led to the explosion of, ‘des manifestations spontanées, 
inorganisées’.344 The Committee, confronted with the danger of losing control over the strategically 
important Paris region, saw the demonstration as the best way of providing a psychological pressure 
valve while simultaneously remaining compliant with GPRA demands to respect a truce while peace 
negotiations hung in the balance. As SCAA intelligence reported early on 17 October, from 
information received from informers, the action would, ‘revêtir la forme d’une démonstration 
pacifique tendant à extérioriseer le mécontentement des FMA devant les mesures de rigeur prises à 
leur encontre ces jours derniers’.345 The panic that seized the Federal Committee, and its extreme 
urgency, can be gauged by the pressure that it placed on Zouaoui to organise a demonstration by 14 
October, an almost impossible time scale in the circumstances. The Committee was not even 
prepared to wait, like Algerians across the Maghreb and Europe, to join the global commemoration 
of the seventh anniversary of the revolutionary war on 1 November.  
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Why was the French left and trade union movement excluded? 
      
    The single most important and fateful decision that the Federal Committee made between 7 and 
10 October in deciding on the form of the demonstrations, concerned the issue of whether to 
associate the French left, and in particular the French Communist Party and the trade union 
movement, with the mass action. After the massacre of 17 October there was some criticism in FLN 
ranks of the Federation for exposing ordinary workers and their families to the police onslaught. For 
the French right, including Maurice Papon, the Federation, while claiming to act peacefully, was fully 
prepared to place gunmen in the crowds who, by firing on the police, planned to precipitate a blood-
bath that would politically damage the Prefect.346 While the evidence does not support this 
interpretation, others, including many Algerians, argued that the FLN made a serious mistake in 
failing to understand the highly dangerous and volatile situation among the police force which had 
been on the receiving end of FLN assassinations and was rearing to seize the opportunity to exact a 
violent revenge. Omar Boudaoud goes some way towards admitting an error of judgement: ‘Nous 
nous attendions certes à une vague d’arrestations; mais nous étions tellement sûrs du caractère 
pacifique de la manifestation, que la sauvagerie et l’atrocité de la répression qui s’ensuivit nous prit 
au dépourvu’.347 The Paris leaders, who were closer to the ground and should have recognised the 
dangerous tensions, were the first to suggest a mass street action, but had also recommended that 
some protection be provided by associating the French left with the demonstration by mixing them 
with the, ‘paisibles promeneurs algériens et s’opposer s’il y a lieu aux provocations de la police’.348  
        Boudaoud, as an older and experienced militant active in the MTLD since 1945, would have 
known that Algerians had in the past frequently received protection during mass demonstrations 
from police violence by marching alongside Europeans or flanked by French trade unionists. 
Whenever Algerian nationalists had decided to constitute quite separate columns or large groups, 
and presented a ready and visible target for the police, there had invariably been extreme brutality 
and killings, as during the 14 July demonstration in Paris in 1953 when six Algerians were shot 
dead.349 Such a tactic in October 1961 would not have guaranteed security, as the French fatalities at 
Charonne on 8 February 1962 were soon to demonstrate. But if Europeans had been involved in the 
17 October events it seems inconceivable that the Prefecture of Police would have unleashed the 
levels of murderous violence that were used against Algerians. Such a blood bath would have 
precipitated a major political crisis, and almost certainly led to the downfall of both Papon and the 
Minister of the Interior, Frey. 
    There has been very little discussion by historians as to why the FLN decided to exclude the French 
left on 17 October. Behind this seemingly minor issue lies one of the most important and 
controversial matters of the Algerian War: in addition to the protective aspect of a combined street 
action, lay the question of what exactly the Federation hoped to achieve by the demonstration and 
how it would impact on the French working class and public opinion. Mohammed Harbi, perhaps the 
single most astute and fearless critic of the Federation, has provided throughout his oeuvre a 
detailed analysis of the Federal Committee, of which he was a member between June 1957 and 
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September 1958, and of the authoritarian regime imposed by Omar Boudaoud and Ladlani.350 Harbi, 
as a socialist and self-proclaimed ‘Marxist militant’, believed strongly that a truly revolutionary party 
should be open to debate on the key decisions and the political objectives of the broader struggle, 
but in reality Boudaoud ran the Federation as a police or military apparatus in which cadres at all 
levels were required to obey orders from above in an unquestioning way. Harbi, a highly educated 
intellectual from a renowned and cultured family background, was perceived as a personal threat by 
Boudaoud who betrayed the unease of a relatively untutored Kabyle peasant when confronted by 
the sophisticated and urbane intellectual. When Harbi began to raise a number of crucial political 
issues, the ‘appparatchik’, as Harbi referred to Boudaoud, interpreted these as a disguised bid for 
personal power: ‘Toute contestation lui apparaissait comme une conspiration organisée contre 
lui’.351 Boudaoud’s response was to use his influence with Krim Belkacem of the CCE to ruthlessly 
isolate and remove the three Committee members, Moundji, Guedroudj and Harbi, who had the 
courage to display some independence of mind on important matters of policy. Guedroudj was sent 
to Morocco with a ‘lettre de cachet’ that threw him into a prison camp, and, since ‘Boudaoud m’a 
menacé de me faire liquider’, Harbi left for Switzerland.352  
     Mohammed Harbi, in addition to raising the issue of democratic debate within the Federation and 
challenging ‘le vide politique ambiant’, introduced three questions onto the agenda of the 
Committee: the counter-productive and bloody civil war with the MNA, the decision whether to 
open a ‘second front’ into metropolitan France, and the relationship of the FLN to the French left 
and  anticolonialist movement.353 
    It is the last of these that is of interest here, since it links directly to the issue of the 
demonstration. The long history of the relationship between the Algerian nationalist movement and 
the Communist Party was extremely complex and often deeply conflictual and, even after the 
Algerian Communist Party negotiated in June 1956 individual integration into the FLN, many 
nationalists remained deeply hostile to communism. Marxist intellectuals like Harbi remained 
exposed to ill-founded, but dangerous rumours of collusion with communism, a charge that 
Boudaoud used to remove him from the Committee. However, this failed to unnerve Harbi who 
opposed an embedded and unthinking anti-communism, and argued in the Committee, ‘que des 
convergences avec le PCF étaient possibles et souhaitables’.354 The French left was in general 
indifferent to the Algerian War, but the FLN, argued Harbi, instead of painting the PCF into a corner 
by depicting it as an inherently diabolic force, should seek allies in the French working class and, 
‘disais-je à mes collègues du comité fédéral, instaurer des rapports de confiance avec nos 
partenaires français...’. The aim was to bring about ‘une régénérescence de la gauche française sur la 
base de la formation d’un mouvement consacré à la cause de l’anticolonialisme’.355 Already, in 1958, 
Harbi recognised that the European support networks were significantly isolated from the 
mainstream PCF-CGT movement: ‘ceux-ci [networks] ne sont pas enracinés dans la masse française’, 
and this isolationism was proving counterproductive since it threatened to leave the FLN isolated 
and unprotected by the powerful French working-class movement.356 By 1961, the Federation, far 
from building strong bridges to the French masses, was even more isolated and had pulled back into 
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a kind of bunker in which liaison agents were only to be tolerated on an individual basis as technical 
agents, courriers, and drivers. 
     In August 1961 French intelligence had picked up on this deepening trend: ‘La méfiance à l’égard 
des métropolitaines semble être devenue une règle nouvelle. Après avoir demandé aux militants de 
prendre contact avec les Français pour leur expliquer la position du Front, il apparaît que maintenant 
l’organisation opère un repli sur soi. Le FLN semble prendre ombrage des syndicats, du parti 
communiste et aussi des oeuvres sociales officielles ou officieuses qui s’intéressent aux FMA. Cette 
méfiance n’est pas une nouveauté en soi mais elle semble s’accuser comme si le Front voulait plus 
que jamais maintenir les Algériens dans une unité totale, politique, syndicale et sociale. Evidement, 
les métropolitains seront toujours utilisées comme agents de liaison, transporteurs de fonds, 
founisseurs d’armes, mais individuellement et non en groupes homogènes déjà organisés’.357  
  Returning to the way in which the Federal Commitee, between the 7th and 10th of October, planned 
the Paris demonstration, it is clear that it wished, in the short time available, to assess the likely 
degree of support from the French left, and few were in a better position to provide such advice 
than Omar Ouhadj. Ouhadj had belonged to a PCF cell until March 1956 and was the key organiser of 
the AGTA at Renault, as well as nationally. He had his finger on the pulse of PCF, CGT and CFDT 
attitudes towards Algerian workers and the FLN. Ouhadj was called by Abdelkrim Souici to a meeting 
in Brussels on about the 9 October 1961 and, after crossing the border on foot, was asked by Souici, 
‘si les organisations françaises réagiraient en cas d’initiative de grande envergue. Il lui a répondu 
qu’il ne le pensait pas’.358 Ouhadj, in a long interview with Laure Pitti, noted that relations between 
French and Algerian workers had been quite normal before the Algerian War, and had then 
deteriorated as the conflict progressed, and since the PCF had reneged on its avant-garde role to 
support the anti-colonial struggle, the majority of French workers felt a muted hostility and that 
what happened to Algerians outside the plant did not concern them. Ouhadj, in an anonymous 
interview with the journalist Jean Cau on 16 November 1961, expressed his bitter anger that the 
French public had remained indifferent on 17 October, or had actively assisted the police. He was 
not surprised, ‘Cette passivité, ce racisme latent, cette indifférence n’est que la concrétisation 
politique de ce que nous vivons et subissons depuis des années’.359 
   In the light of such consultation it is not perhaps surprising that the Federal Committee made the 
risky decision to reject Zouaoui’s initial report of 7 October which had suggested that, ‘Les partis 
politiques et syndicats démocratiques “conseilleraient” à leurs militants français de sortir aussi 
nombreux que possible, à partir de 20 h 30, pour s’intégrer s’il faut aux paisibles promeneurs 
algériens et s’opposer s’il y a lieu aux provocations de la police’.360 The point being made by 
Mohammed Harbi, however, is that the political failure of FLN/French relations cannot be uniquely 
blamed on the PCF or the latent racism of French workers, since the FLN Federation had also failed 
in its fundamental political analysis and had not developed a long-term strategy of rapprochement 
that would not have left the FLN standing isolated and vulnerable in 1961.   
   There is confused or contradictory evidence that the Federal Committee may have tried to 
negotiate with the PCF directly on the very eve of the demonstration. Omar Ouhadj, after his 
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meeting with Souici on about the 9 October, received next day a message from Boudaoud asking 
him to make contact with the PCF and to arrange a meeting, which he did on his return to Paris by 
phoning André Merlot who was a member of the Conseil fédéral of the CGT and the PCF Comité 
central.361 This contact, argues Einaudi, led to a meeting in the Hotel Métropole in Brussels on 15 or 
16 October, between Boudaoud and Léon Feix, the PCF expert on Algerian affairs, and Etienne Fajon.    
     Boudaoud, in a 1992 interview, gave much detail on this meeting which does not tally with 
Ouhadj’s account since it followed from contacts between Communists and representatives of the 
GPRA meeting in East Germany, not Paris. In Brussels the PCF request that communist women be 
allowed to participate in the demonstration of Algerian women  on the ‘18 October’ [sic], was tersely 
rejected by Boudaoud since the Communists had a long history of opposition to the FLN and it would 
take more than this to, ‘effacer tout la rupture qu’il y a eu’. If Communist women participated, even 
in small numbers, this would be used by the PCF for its own propaganda purposes and the front-
page of L’Humanité, predicted Boudaoud, would carry the heading “Jeannine et Malika”. Finally, the 
PCF asked what other assistance it could provide, which was accepted by the FLN in the form of help 
in transmitting 200 millions to Switzerland, a sum that was not handed back to the FLN until after 
Independence, minus 20 millions for ‘costs’. In sum, concluded Boudaoud in his memoirs, the PCF 
had brought no assistance whatsoever to the FLN throughout the entire war.362  
     In 2007 Boudaoud gave an entirely different version of this event: the meeting had not taken 
place just before the 17 October, but in early January 1962 when he and Ali Haroun met in Brussels 
with Léon Feix and, from memory, the editor of L’Humanité, who had requested a meeting to 
discuss PCF aid to the Federation. ‘Nous ne pouvions pas le refuser’, but it was regrettable that the 
Communist Party had only decided, noted Boudaoud with irony, to offer the solidarity of the 
international proletariat when the war was virtually over.363 Here the historian is confronted with 
the kind of contradictions that may arise from a combination of failing memory and parti pris, but it 
does seem implausible that high-level discussions should have been taking place for PCF 
participation in the women’s demonstration of 20 October on the very eve of 17 October and after 
detailed planning instructions had already been dispatched to Paris on 10 October. But what can be 
detected in all this is Boudaoud’s visceral antipathy for the PCF and communism in general, a dislike 
that reflected, according to Mohammed Harbi, a deeper failure of the FLN leadership, an anti-
intellectualism allied to conservative and religious forms of nationalism that was to have long-term 
catastrophic consequences for post-Independence Algeria. The Federation decision to go-it-alone on 
17 October was thus not only a tactical mistake that carried considerable, even fatal, consequences, 
but one which was symptomatic of a wider refusal to engage in a common front. The Federation 
released the important ‘Appel Aux Français’ immediately after the 17 October with the intention 
that the dramatic demonstration would precipitate French support as a consequence of, rather than 
prior to, the event.  
 
Did the GPRA agree to the demonstration? 
    
 Did the Federal Committee consult with the highest level of the FLN, the provisional government 
(GPRA) in Tunis? It seems highly unlikely that such an important decision would have been made 
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without receiving approval at the top level. In Paris 1961 Jim House and I argued, especially in the 
light of later GPRA distancing from the 17 October demonstration, that the Committee had planned 
the event unilaterally.364 Since then, however, both Haroun and Boudaoud have insisted that Tunis 
was indeed consulted on the matter. ‘De plus’, notes Boudaoud, ’le GPRA avait été informé de notre 
initiative. A Tunis, Bentobbal – le ministre de l’Intérieur dont dépendait alors la Fédération – m’avait 
dit en substance: “Cela est votre affaire. Si vous réussissez, c’est la révolution qui réussit. Si vous 
échouez, vous paierez votre décision.” Réponse: “J’ai bien compris. Alors nous allons agir”. En fin de 
compte, le GPPRA nous a félicités, car l’impact international des manifestations du 17 octobre 1961 
a été positif, au-delà de nos espérances’.365 There is some confirmation of this in the DST files: Baba-
Hamed (RC1) was interrogated as follows: 
Q[uestion]. D’ou venait l’ordre de la manifestation du 17 octobre? 
  -   Moi je le tenais de Zouaoui qui le tenait lui-même de la Fédération. 
Q. Venait-il d’ailleurs? 
   -  Moi je suis convaincu qu’il venait du GPRA’.366 
However, since the Federal Committee, meeting at Cologne, made its decision to organise a 
demonstration in the short period between late on 7 October and 10 October, it remains unclear 
how Boudaoud would have been able to make the return trip to Tunis in such a brief window of 
time. Perhaps Boudaoud, rather than meeting in person with Bentobbal [ a mistake for Krim?], was 
able to talk with the Minister of the Interior by a secure telephone line via the Tunisian embassy in 
Bonn or some other means, although usually the FLN avoided such communication because of the 
well known ability of the French to intercept such telecommunications. Mohammed Harbi remains 
in doubt as to whether Belkacem Krim would have informed the President, Ben Khedda, about the 
demonstrattion, while Saâd Dahlab, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, reacted strongly to news 
of the plans for 17 October: ‘Ils nous emmerdent!’.367     
 
Implementation of the plan in Paris, 10-20 October   
      
     This final section examines the process by which the Paris leaders, after the delivery by the 
courrier Rolande Mingasson on 10 October of the detailed orders, set about the concrete 
organisation of the demonstrations between then and the 20 October. Historians and other 
commentators have, given the preoccupation with the events of 17 October, often failed to remark 
that the detailed Federal plan dispatched to Paris on 10 October was for a complex sequence of 
mass actions that were to take place in three phases, first in the capital, and then across the main 
towns of Algerian settlement in France. 
Phase 1 was to unfold over four days in Paris, starting on Saturday 14 October or, at the latest, by 
Tuesday 17 October, with a boycott of the curfew by workers, ‘en compagnie de leurs femmes et de 
leurs enfants, en masse’, who were to circulate in the evening, ‘dans les grandes artères de Paris’. 
The following day all Algerian shopkeepers, café owners and restaurateurs were to close down for 
24 hours. On the third day Algerians were to continue to ignore the curfew.  
Since it was expected that there would be numerous arrests and internment, a fourth day of action 
was to be led by women alone on 20 October. They were called to demonstrate in front of the 
Prefecture of Police using the following slogans: 
A BAS LE COUVRE-FEU RACISTE 
LIBERATION DE NOS EPOUX ET DE NOS ENFANTS 
NEGOCIER AVEC LE GPRA 
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INDEPENDANCE TOTALE DE L’ALGERIE, etc. 
All  demonstrations were to be stewarded by experienced militants, and any provocation of the 
police was to be avoided at all costs. It was proposed that a large number of tracts, which in reality 
never appeared, were to be handed out to the public to explain the action. 
  Phase 2. The start of the second phase would depend on how things worked out in Paris. The 
provincial FLN networks were instructed to wait for clearance from the central Federation before 
organiisng similar mass actions, especially women’s demonstrations, ‘devant les préfectures des 
grands centres de province’.  
Phase 3. In a final phase all Algerians, whether workers or shopkeepers, commerçants and students, 
were to participate in a general, 24 hour-strike in the whole of France, while prisoners would go on 
hunger strike.  
    The final planning and execution of the demonstration of 17 October, carried out by Zouaoui and 
his lieutenants in less than one week, under conditions of secrecy that would not give prior warning 
to the police, represented a remarkable feat of mobilisation that was only made possible through 
the well-oiled machinery of the FLN network. The need to maintain frequent communication 
between Paris and Germany during final preparations saw the putting in place of special 
arrangements, including a doubling of the courrier’s that traveled by train to and from Brussels, and 
the identification of secure telephone links in Paris ‘chez Nicole’ in the morning, and ‘chez le barbu’ 
in the evenings.368 Zouaoui planned an emergency meeting with the three contrôleurs, Saïd Amroun, 
Younès Aberkane and Mustapha Baba-Hamed that was delayed, because of liaison problems, until 8 
pm on the evening of Friday 13 November, a delay that meant the demonstration could not begin 
until 17 October.  
     Following this meeting Zouaoui was able to write the next day, Saturday 14 October, to the 
Committee in a letter that was taken by the courrier Roger Fligitter to Brussels on the evening train. 
In this  Zouaoui was able to spell out the detailed planning that had been agreed on by him and his 
RC advisers. Instructions for a mass action, that was to start at 20 h 30 and finish by 21 h 30, were 
not to reach the lower levels of the local networks until the very last moment to prevent the police 
gaining prior warning. Algerians from particular suburbs or arrondissements would be ordered to 
travel to four starting points, at the Champs-Elysées (then to march towards Concorde), République 
(towards  the Opéra), the Gare Saint-Lazare and Opéra (moving towards République), and from the 
Place d’Italie (in the direction of Saint-Michel). As ordered, noted Zouaoui, everything would be 
totally pacific: ‘Nous ne pouvons pas prévoir la réaction des sbires de Papon, mais les directives sont 
formelles. Nous ne cherchons pas la bagarre’. But, rather interestingly, Zouaoui indicated that the 
armed groups were being held in reserve if necessary. The stewardship would be mainly in the hands 
of militants from the District level, while the sixty-three District leaders were to act as observers in 
order to draw up precise reports for the Committee, a task that was eventually delegated to 
Europeans.   
    How were the orders transmitted from the Paris Federal level to the two Wilaya heads in the 
capital as well as the five Wilayas that were to implement phases two and three by extending  
actions to the rest of France? Among the documents seized by the DST during Operation Flore is a 
five page, handwritten instruction, dated 14 October which was almost certainly a copy of the order 
sent to Wilaya heads on the basis of the decisions reached by Zouaoui and the controleurs the 
previous evening.369 This stated that the aim of the actions was, ‘pour demontrer à l’opinion 
française et internationale notre détermination de nous défendre contre ces 
mesures...racistes’.’Avant “l’opération” les mitants doivent être instruite sur tous les plans et aurant 
comme mission à l’intérieur de la “maniféstation” de faire respecter toutes les instructions...’, 
including the orders of the service d’ordre. These were to make sure that, ‘le port d’armes a feu ou 
d’armes blanches est rigoureusement interdit’, that marchers should behave in a dignified and 
disciplined fashion, and not respond to police provocations. Zouaoui was particularly concerned to 
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ensure that every participant was controlled within the framework of his or her cell: ‘Observations. 
Ne jamais laisser le militant accomplir tout seul sa mission. Il doit être suivi de près par les membres 
de sa cellule – 2 – par mesures de sécurité et pour renforcer son autorité. Evites l’isolement 
individuel....’. It detailed how all hotels were to be cleared of their lodgers, and insisted on the 
presence of all women and children. Severe sanctions would be taken against anyone failing to carry 
out their duty (‘devoir’), including, significantly men of the armed groups or toughs (“spéciaux et 
truands”).  
      We have evidence from Mohammed Ghafir as to how these internal instructions were received 
by Wilaya 1 (Paris south) by a three man committee attended by himself for Amala 12, Mohamed 
Tahar Labane for Amala 11 , and Kaci Maamar, otherwise known as “Kaddour” or ‘Moustache”, 
leader of Wilaya 1. The Wilaya meeting, as usual, took place  in the Château of the Parc de Sceaux 
where a militant Mohamed Oussayef, who was a park-keeper, lived with his family.370 The meeting 
started at 10 am on the 12 October to undertake, ‘une analyse approfondie de la directive [ie. 
probably the above order from Zouaoui] et tous les aspects disciplinaires et sécuritaires entourant 
cette action, l’engagement a été pris pour la transmission à la base et surtout dans une discrétion 
totale toujours avec la même rigeur et une discipline exemplaire’. Ghafir makes no mention of Baba-
Hamed in his memoirs, perhaps because the practices of clandestinity prevented identification of 
other cadres, but it is likely that he would have had contact with him.  Baba-Hamed, during his 
interrogation stated, in reply to the question, ‘Quand vous alliez contrôler la [Wilaya] 1, cela se 
passait où?’, replied, ‘Chez Savatier – la dernière fois le 5 novembre (dimanche) réunion à laquelle 
j’assistais avec “Kadour” [Maamar] et les deux super-zonaux Ahmed [Labane] et Rachid [Ghafir]’.371  
    It seems likely that Wilaya and Amala leaders from the rest of France were also called to Paris just 
before the 17 October to receive and discuss the orders concerning the planning of stages 2 and 3 
that were to begin, but only after orders received from Zouaoui, after the women’s demonstration 
on 20 October. Rabah Athmaniou, Amala head in Reims, remarks that he came to Paris for a meeting 
at which his own leader, head of Wilaya 2B, and Mohammedi Saddek, described as ‘coordinateur’ or 
‘super-wilaya’, were present. He returned to Reims on 16 October where, in breach of Zouaoui’s 
instructions, preparations for phase 2 were begun immediately, ‘Toute la nuit on a confectionné des 
drapeaux. Le lendemain, on les a distribués à tous les responsables’.372 The calling of provincial 
Wilaya heads to Paris was also confirmed, although in a rather confused account, during a studio 
debate broadcast by Vérités on Algerian TV on 17 October 2001 when Mohand Akli Benyounès, who 
was at the time temporary head ‘en mutation’ of Wilaya 3 (Lyons), was called to a meeting in Paris, 
‘j’ai assisté à la réunion le 17 [sic] octobre à Paris’, where a contrôleur [RC2, Saïd Amroun?] was 
present. The task of the meeting was purely ‘technical’, how to implement the plan drawn up by the 
Federal Committee, and the same evening he returned to Wilaya 3 where, also in breach of 
instructions, he organised a women’s demonstration in Bourg-en-Bresse before returning next day 
to Lyons.373  
    From these accounts, despite possible confusions about precise dates, we begin to gain a sense of 
the extent to which the planning of the October demonstrations was a much more complex 
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operation than usually recounted, and that the detailed execution or preparation involved all leaders 
at Amala level and above, perhaps as many as thirty individuals or more. However, at no stage was 
the top FLN echelon in metropolitan France ever asked to discuss the key ideas or objectives of the 
demonstrations: this was all in the hands of the Federal Committee, and their task was limited 
strictly to the implementation of the order sent to Paris on 10 October. 
    Further evidence of the planning process can be found in various documents discovered by the 
police and by the DST during Operation Flore, and which reveal that all did not go to plan. The higher 
level cadres in Paris did not pass on the instructions for the demonstration of 17th October to the 
rank-and-file until very late, either on the evening of 16 October or, in some instances, the next 
morning. For example, in the industrial suburb of Aubervilliers the local cadres only received orders 
to prepare the mass action on the evening of Monday 16 October.374 On the morning of 17 October 
a large number of workers, because of a rail strike at the Gare Saint-Lazare, were unable to catch 
trains to their workplaces in the industrial suburbs, and by noon they had started to demonstrate 
many hours before the planned time which, unfortunately, gave the Prefecture of Police prior 
warning. The police found on one of the demonstrators who was arrested, Ahmed Alla, in what was 
a major breach in security, a two page document which gave the instructions of Zouaoui’s 
committee for lower level cadres.375 
         This order, which has never been published, is worth quoting at length:- 
Recommendations: 
1) Interdiction de prendre une arme avec soi, quelle qu’elle soit (arme, couteau, etc.....) 
2) Ne répondre à aucune provocation d’où qu’elle vienne (conserver le calme en toutes 
circonstances). 
3) Le boycottage du couvre feu raciste doit se dérouler pacifiquement, avec dignité et tout le 
calme absolu. 
4) Tous militants et cadres sont chargées de respecter les consignes ci-dessous et de veiller à ce 
que le calme règne. 
5) Etat d’alerte: contact permanent et compte rendu quotidien que doit fournir chaque 
responsable. 
6) Des tracts seront distribués au public français et étranger par nos militants; préparation en 
pratique du boycottage contre le couvre feu: 
1) Mobilisation de tous les militants et responsables pendant les trois jours qui viennent 
2) Tous les Algériens doivent être présents aux quartiers qui leur sont désignés à partir de 
20 h 30. 
3) Ceux des frères qui habitent en banlieue doivent partir à l’avance pour être présents 
dans les lieux indiqué à 20 h 30. 
4) Toutes les habitations algériennes, hôtels meublés, logements HLM et foyers doivent 
être désertés en direction des lieux prévus. Les quartiers à forte densité doivent être 
déssertés. 
5) Le boycottage doit s’appliquer à l’ensemble de l’émigration Algérie H.F.E.V [hommes, 
femmes, enfants, vieillards]. 
6) Les responsables et militants doivent mener un travail d’explications auprès de la base, 
pour leur démontrer l’importance de cette riposte, pour mettre en échec les mesures 
racistes, arbitraires, sauvages, aveugles et barbares. 
7) Les mêmes responsables et militants doivent s’assurer que tous les Algériens ont 
participé au boycott et doivent veiller à ce que notre riposte s’effectue dans le calme et 
l’ordre absolu. 
8) Les craintifs et les hésitants doivent être convaincus que leur participation est primordial 
(solidarité). 
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9) En cas d’arrestation, répondre n’avoir été obligé par personne. Seulement que nous 
sommes sortis de notre propre gré, que nous sommes contre le couvre-feu raciste, 
contre l’arbitraire, contre la sauvagerie et la barbarie et que nous sommes Algériens. 
10) De la discrétion absolue de la diffusion de ces consignes contre le couvre-feu raciste 
dépendra le succès de notre riposte. 
Nota – Abstentions: 
Toute abstention à la participation au boycottage du couvre-feu raciste et le 
dépassement des consignes données ci-dessus seront considérés comme un 
manquement au devoir et seront par conséquent l’objet de très graves sanctions allant 
jusqu’à.......[sic. blank].376  
 
       During the events of 17 October the senior FLN cadres, from the level of Wilaya, Amala, Zone 
and Region, were under strict orders not to participate in the demonstration to avoid the arrest and 
elimination of key leaders.377 The leaders collected in various safe-houses where, in an atmosphere 
of increasing tension, they listened to the radio reports. Claude Vinci who, after deserting from the 
army in Algeria, had become an FLN driver and liaison agent in Paris, recounts: ‘Début 1960, j’étais 
en relation avec un groupe composé d’Abderrahmane Farès, Saïd Amroune et Mohamed Zwaoui 
[sic] (je n’ai connu leurs noms qu’après leur arrestation). Tous les mois, pendant une nuit entière, 
nous étions réunis pour compter les billets et répartir les livraisons des 500 million’. Vinci saw this 
triumvirate as forming the key inner circle of the Paris FLN, and as their driver, ‘Mes seules relations 
autorisées étaient le trio qui était responsable du nerf de la guerre  et avec lequel il fallait prendre 
toutes les précautions’.378 ‘Le 17 octobre 1961, en début d’après-midi, j’ai emmené, un par un, 
Abderrahmane Farès (Mustapha), Saïd Amroune (André), et Mohammed Zouaoui (Omar le Noir), 
chez un copain, à Villejuif, Jacques Elsair, un pied-noir.....Tout l’après-midi du 17, toute la nuit du 17 
au 18 et le début de la matinée du 18, nous les avons passés à Villejuif à écouter la radio, Europe 1, 
Radio Luxembourg et Paris Inter’.379 Amroune became so agitated as he heard the radio reports that 
he wanted to join the demonstration, but the others dissuaded him: ‘Il se demandait s’ils avaient 
bien fait d’organiser cette manifestation’, that Vinci went on to describe as a ‘catastrophe’.  
    From Villejuif Zouaoui wrote a letter, that was taken by the courrier Solange Lander on the usual 
17 h 36 evening train to Brussels: ‘J’ai le regret de vous annoncer que je viens d’apprendre sur 
Europe No.1 que les Algériens ont commencé à manifester ce mardi 17.10.61 et ce à partir de 12 
heures dans les quartiers de la Madeleine et de l’Opéra....Au moment où j’écris ces mots, je n’ai pas 
d’autres renseignements...Nous espérons néanmoins que tout se déroulera normalement ce soir 
mardi à parti de 20 h 30’.380 Zouaoui must have felt mortified that an FLN cadre had been so careless 
as to be arrested with a copy of the order, thus in part losing the initiative to Maurice Papon’s police. 
At this moment, in Germany, the Federal Committee was also glued to the radio, as it reported in an 
order to Paris dated 17 October: ‘La radio annonce ce soir plusieurs morts et blessés ainsi que 7,500 
arrestations’.  
 
Phase Two. 
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As we have seen above, the Federal Committee had ordered that Phase 2, the extension of mass 
actions to provincial France, was not to be commenced until it had digested the impact of the Paris 
events and sent a coded order by telephone to Zouaoui. ‘Avertir toutes les autres wilayas de tenir 
l’organisation en état d’alerte permanente et tenir compte de l’expérience de Paris pour ne pas 
refaire les mêmes erreurs, si erreurs il y a, dans les méthodes d’action’.381 But before the Committee 
could give a green light, Zouaoui was further embarrassed by the fact that Wilaya 2 and Wilaya 2B 
had already jumped the gun. Among the documents found by the DST in the archives of Younès 
Aberkane (RC2), was a one page undated note, signed ‘Maurice’, in which Zouaoui reminded 
Aberkane that , ‘la 2e phase et la 3e phase ne sont à declencher qu’après directives express 
correspondants de ma part. Il est evidemment entendu que la W2A et W2B ne doivent rien 
entreprendre sans que tu leur ais communiqué tes directives’.382 But demonstrations, especially of 
women, had kicked off without any Federal authorisation in Nancy, Metz, Thionville, Mulhouse, 
Longwy, Forbach, Reims, Charleville and elsewhere.  
    Zouaoui wrote to the Federal Committee on 21 October in which he tried to explain this 
embarassing ‘dépassement’. Local cadres in the provinces, hearing of the police repression in Paris, 
thought that this must have prevented the transmission of the orders to start phase 2 and used their 
initiative, ‘de déclencher la 2e phase sans qu’ils aient reçu pour cela les instructions 
correspondantes’.383 Zouaoui added, in his defense, that this explanation was not an attempt at self-
justification for what was clearly a gross breach of orders (‘dépassement’), ‘mais pratiquement nous 
sommes devant un fait accompli’. Zoauoui added, ‘Nous avons néanmoins renouvélé aux RC [Younès 
Aberkane] de ne rien entreprendre au-delà du vendredi 20.10.61, sans avoir reçu des directives 
expresses de la Fédération’.384 Three days later Zouaoui wrote to the Committee that it was 
Aberkane who had triggered the demonstrations in W2A and W2B, ‘par suite d’une mauvaise 
interprétation de la différenciation entre les trois phases bien distinctes prévues par le boycott du 
couvre-feu’, but Zouaoui said that he did not understand how this confusion by RC2 could have 
arisen since the orders were ‘prises en commun et prévues pour la période du 17 au 20.10.61’, ie. 
fully discussed in the meeting of the three controleurs on the evening of 13 October. 
    Such a breakdown in communication is not surprising given the extraordinarily difficult conditions 
of clandestinity under which such complex operations had to be planned. However, Younès 
Aberkane’s singular failure to convey these instructions correctly to the Wilaya leaders under his 
control may be indicative of a degree of incompetence or negligence. As we have seen in Chapter 5 
Zouaoui faced the greatest difficulty in gaining information and reports from Wilaya 2 as to why 
police assassinations were taking place, and archive sources show that it was the armed groups in 
Wilaya 2 that led the way in unleashing the cycle of attacks on the security forces.          
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                                                                 8  
                            Abderrahmane Farès and the financial network 
       On the 10 October, the same day that the Federal Committee drew up plans for 17 October, the 
Brigade des agressions et violences (BAV) received  intelligence that led to the identification and 
surveillance of three key members of the FLN financial organisation, Abderrahmane Farès, a senior 
Algerian politician close to the Gaullists, and two businessmen, Jean-Marie Leuti and François-Xavier 
Baudrillart.385  As we have see in Chapter 4, Farès, ex-President of the Algerian Assembly, had come 
to play an important role through the ‘Aboulker’ network that he established, cultivating links to 
Senators and high level civil servants to gather intelligence from within the French administration 
and police. The DST agents who were tracking Rolande Mingasson saw her, on the afternoon of 12 
October, deep in conversation with Zouaoui and Farès at Trocadero, while throughout the day and 
night of 17 October Farès had followed events on Radio 1, Radio Luxembourg and Paris Inter, along 
with Zouaoui and Saïd Amroune, at a flat in Villejuif. Farès was thus at the centre of the planning and 
implementation of 17 October, but his most crucial role within the FLN was as the organiser of the 
system for the collection, banking and transferral from France of the monthly collection. The arrest 
of Farès, just as the negotiations at Evian was entering the final phase, was potentially explosive 
since rumours were already rife in the press that he was being supported by the French government 
for the possible role of provisional head of government in the transition to full independence. 
However, nobody, including the police and intelligence services, had any inkling of the extraordinary 
role that Farès was playing, not only in the banking and transfer abroad of Federation revenues, but 
also through the direct links that he had developed with the Wilaya commanders in Algeria and the 
large funds that he was passing to them.   
    At 11.30 am on 3 November the police agents that had been tracking Leuti and Baudrillart saw 
them leaving the home of Abderrahmane Farès at 269 Avenue Dausmesnil, the latter carrying a 
suitcase. Baudrillart was arrested at 3.45 pm. at a branch of the Crédit Lyonnais Bank just as he was  
depositing 13 millions in cash and, during a sequence of three interrogations on the 3rd and 4th of 
November, he provided a comprehensive account of his involvement in the FLN network. Both Leuti 
and Farès were subsequently arrested and a search of their homes located considerable sums of 
money, accounts, and a mass of correspondence and important FLN documents. During his 
interrogation on 4 November Farès claimed that the money and documents related to his 
professional activities as a notary, and that his involvement with Leuti was only through shared 
business interests, as shown in various company documents and accounts, in property and 
construction projects. He admitted that many documents did relate to the FLN, but refused to say 
more: ‘Je suis en effet lié par le secret d’Etat, et ne pourrais m’expliquer ou en discuter qu’en 
présence de personnalité politiques’. Despite his silence, the police became quickly aware of Farès 
role through the location, ‘de très importants documents à l’échelon le plus élévé de l’Organisation 
rebelle, notamment des comptes et des rapports relatifs à des mouvements de fonds destinés aux 
Wilayya opérationnelles en Algérie’. A specialist police officer, Marcel Wagner, was quickly brought 
in to analyse the extraordinarily complex and bulky accounts, and soon a detailed picture began to 
emerge. A few days later on 9-10 November  Operation Flore led to the capture of a further mass of 
financial reports and documents, and eventually DST analysts were able to use this, in conjunction 
with the Farès papers, to write a detailed synthesis and report on the global Federation financial 
apparatus.386   
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     In October 1960 the police arrested Henri Curiel, the son of an Egyptian banker, who had 
masterminded the system for the centralisation of the monthly collection in Paris and its safe 
transfer abroad through the international banking system. The DST report (L’Appareil Financier) 
noted that Farès had taken over the control of the entire FLN financial apparatus in France after the 
mass arrests of the Jeanson network in the Spring of 1960, but the archive documents suggest that 
he put his network in place from about January 1961, coinciding with the moment that Zouaoui 
arrived to head the Paris organisation.387 Farès chief aid was Jean-Marie Leuti, an Algiers  property 
developer, born at Roanne in January 1928, whom he had known for fifteen years in relation to HLM 
construction and other developments, but had moved to the Rue Des Colonels Renard (17th) Paris in  
late 1960, while keeping his home and business address in Algiers  at 7 Rue Colonna-D’Oranano. 
Leuti and Farès, in effect engaged in what today would be known as international money laundering 
operations, set this up by establishing a number of front companies and accounts in different names 
and banks, so that FLN funds could be disguised as  legitimate property and business transactions. 
The main front company was the Société Civile Immobilière Franco-Afrique (SCIFA) that was legally 
registered in Algiers on 1 March 1961 by Leuti and Farès nephew, Mohammed Imendassen (or 
Abdallah Imabacene), who continued to run his uncle’s notarial practice in the suburb of Koléa.388 An 
urgent circular was issued by the Renseignement Géneraux in Algiers on 17 November for the arrest 
of Imendassen, also known as “Abdallah”, who was born at Seddouk  near Sétif on 10 December 
1931, and was living in Algiers at 54 Rue d’Isly. Abdallah also had his own room in the Farès 
household in Paris at 269 Avenue Dausmesnil.389 
    At the Paris end of the SCIFA operation, François-Xavier Baudrillard, who travelled frequently to 
Algiers on business, was approached by Leuti and introduced by him to Farès in January 1961, and 
was eventually employed to run the new company from an office at 72 Rue de Richelieu. Baudrillard 
was asked to deposit large sums of money into the bank accounts of Farès or SCIFA but, he claimed, 
was only told later that the sums, ‘ainsi manipulées provenaient de collecte faites en France, au 
profit du FLN et ces sommes étaient destinées à aider les familles de musulmans arrêtés....Je me 
trouvais donc pris dans une engrenage, et je ne pouvais pas faire marche arrière, d’une part sur le 
plan matériel, d’autre part sur le plan securité physique’.390 When the collection arrived in suitcases  
in central Paris each month the hundreds of thousands of small denomination notes collected from  
immigrant workers were extremely bulky and could not be easily banked without arousing suspicion. 
Baudrillard’s took on the task of depositing bundles of small notes in his personal account held at the 
Evreux branch of Crédit Lyonnais where he was friends with the manager and the bank, he said, 
seemed happy to ‘voir leur chiffre d’affaires augmenter’! This was what he was doing when arrested 
by BAV officers in a Paris branch of the  bank on 3 November, and the money being deposited was to 
be returned a week later in larger, New Franc notes, to Farès.391 Baudrillard also served as a courrier 
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to transport money to Algiers, which he could do easily, ‘comme je possédais un laissez passer en 
règle m’autorisant à me rendre en Algérie pour mes affaires’. He had made six such trips to Algiers 
on 9-10, 20-21, 30-31 July, 11-12 September, and 3 and 13-14 October, each time with about 25-30 
millions , which he took on arrival either to Leuti’s office or to Imendassen. Baudrillard also travelled 
to Geneva in August to make contact with another company, Tetralco, in which Farès had interests. 
    Police investigation revealed further elements of the Farès network, including the likely 
involvement of his wife, Yamina, who held an account with the BNCI, and his son, Chérif Farès, a 
student who had recently moved to Switzerland. Farès frequently visited Geneva, Brussels and the 
Maghreb, and had close ties with a journalist, Philippe Bernier, of the Union Africaine de Presse, who 
had also travelled to Geneva on 4-5 November.392 Abdelkrim Souici was in overall charge of finances 
on the Federal Committee and, since he exercised the audit of the central accounts, all money 
transferred to Switzerland was eventually transmitted to him. It would seem that the French were 
able to locate on 15 October what must have been a central FLN bank account held in Brussels that 
held 456 millions.  
  In the remaining part of this chapter I consider the enormous importance of the Federation 
collection of money, both in terms of the relatively huge amounts that were raised, its global 
significance in sustaining both the essentual activities of the FLN government, as well as the hard-
pressed guerillas that continued to pin down the French army, and the political implications of this 
cash-flow for the status and position of the Federation in the internal struggle for power. It is only 
through an understanding of the importance of the revenues raised in the factories and lodging 
houses of France, that we can begin to appreciate why the dislocation of the Farès network 
represented a catastrophe for the FLN.    
   In Chapter 6 we have already seen the importance of the monthly collection at the local level, 
through a case-study of the 13th arrondissement: here I want to look more closely at how the money 
was transmitted from the Région upwards, the amounts involved and what it was spent on. Ali 
Haroun has noted that the very long-drawn out process of undertaking the collection, since the 
money had to be laboriously transmitted by hand up thirteen echelons and counted and verified at 
various stages, meant that the police were able to readily intercept the chain.393  The FLN 
accelerated the collection by ensuring that it was completed at the local level within three days, but 
it still took a fortnight or more for the money to reach Farès at the top. For example, in the case of 
Wilaya 2 the ‘October’ collection took place at the base between 20-23 September 1961; the 
suitcases of cash reached the deposit of the Wilaya on 2 October, and from there was transmitted to 
the counting-house under the contrôleur RC2 in Courbevoi on 6 October.394 After the collection had 
been counted in each of the seven Wilayas, it was transported, usually by European agents, by car 
and train to the central dépôts of the three regions in Paris. There were five ‘dépôts des contrôleurs’ 
in the Paris suburbs at Alfortville, Sartrouville (RC1), Courbevoie (RC2), Neuilly, and Vanves (RC3).395 
Each month the Wilaya heads would travel to Paris and meet with their respective contrôleur (RC) to 
verify the accounts and to report on and debate the various issues affecting their areas. For 
example, the Farès accounts show that a meeting had taken place  in the Courbevoie depository for 
RC2 on 5 August 1961 and verified the following: 
 
Wilaya 2 (Paris north)              236,333,000  
Wilaya 2B (Nord)                         32,460,000 
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Wilaya 2B (Est)                             22,505,000 
                                                      ....................... 
Total RC2                                     291,298,000396                    
 
Finally,on about the 14th of each month, the money from each of the French regions would be 
centralised in one location, and verified by the 3 RCs and the ‘Fédéral’, Zouaoui                                        
    Statistics relating to the global finances of the French Federation are fragmentary and scattered, 
which is hardly surprising given the clandestine nature of the organisation. However, the accounts 
and correspondence captured by the police from the Farès network, as well as during Operation 
Flore, provide a detailed picture, especially for 1961, that significantly adds to  what has been known 
to date about FLN finances.397 The DST analysts were able to establish the following monthly 
collection figures for metropolitan France in 1961:- 
 
June                506,537,500 
July                  544,570,000 
August            534,902,500 
September     465,509,000 
October          550,947,000* 
November      480,000,000* 
[* estimate based on partial material]. 398   
 
The 1961 monthly average for France was close to 500 millions, and this was made up of receipts 
from the different Wilayas as follows:- 
 
Figure 4. 399 
 
Wilaya                         Number of contributors          Revenue in millions        Contribution per capita  
 
W1 (Paris Sud)                      33,000                                        120                                       3,636 
W1B (Atlantique)                    3,000                                            6                                       2,000 
W2 (Paris Nord)                    57,500                                        203                                       3,530 
 W2A (Nord)                            8,900                                           27                                       3,033 
W2B (Est)                               17,200                                          52                                        3,023 
W3 (Lyon)                               21,400   )           
W3B (Marseille)                     13,500   )   [combined]             91                                       2,607 
                                                 ............                                 ............................... 
Total                                     154,500 400                                      499 millions 
        
The figures confirm the overwhelming importance of Paris to FLN finances, with 90,500 contributors, 
58.6% of the total in France, who provided 64.7% of the income. The Parisian contribution did not 
only reflect the big population of the city, but also the fact that per capita earnings were higher than 
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in provincial France and included many commerçants and professionals. Secondly, the extent to 
which the FLN exercised efficient control over the population (‘quadrillage’) varied from one area to 
another in France, and Paris undoubtedly represented a super-organised territory unlike, for 
example, Wilaya 1B , which during 1961 was suffering from major problems of disorganisation as 
was, to a certain extent, W3B (Marseille).401 
    From such data it can be seen why the Federation leadership was so concerned during 1961 about 
the financial impacts of police repression on the capital, the golden goose of FLN income. Moreover, 
the collecton data provided FLN leaders with a ready tool or index to constantly police lower rung 
cadres and how effectively they were managing local populations under their control. One such 
index was provided by the number of contributors as a percentage of the total Algerian population 
in a geographical area: for example, since in 1961 there were 154,500 contributors in a total Algerian 
population of about 330,000, or 47%, areas like Wilaya 1B (Atlantique) immediately stood out for a 
dismal failure of Amala, Kasma and Group leaders to make contact with the, admittedly, widely 
dispersed Algerian population of South-West France. Higher level cadres would study closely the 
monthly reports which they received from below, and demand to know, often in very fine detail, 
why revenues may have declined, changes in the number of registered members, and any anomalies 
in accounting.402 Given that at Amala and Wilaya level at least two weeks in every month was 
devoted to the mechanisms of collecting and auditing cash, while the monthly Financial reports were 
far more detailed and lengthy than those of the ‘Organic’ or political reports, the FLN structure in 
France was shaped over time more as a revenue producing bureaucracy than as a military or political 
organisation.         
     Of the gross federal income during 1961, about 13% was spent in Europe, to pay for rent of 
buildings, full-time cadre wages, transport, materials (paper, typewriters...), lawyers fees, and, most 
important of all, the social and welfare costs that were processed via the Comité de soutien aux 
détenus (CSD) to support the families, orphans and widows of imprisoned or dead militants.403  From 
the Spring of 1958 the Federation created a standardised system of payments to support all militants 
held in detention and their families. In 1961 widows and wives of prisoners living in France received 
25,000 per month and 2,000 per child, while wives in Algeria received 5,000 in towns, 3,000 in rural 
areas, and 2,000 per child.404 Detainees received, regardless of status, 3,000 per month. In Wilaya 
2B, for example, in September 1961, the CSD supported 60 families in France, 94 in Algeria, with a 
total of 356 children, and 829 prisoners.405 Such a welfare system was of critical importance to the 
FLN to reassure the many thousands of militants that were risking all in joining the struggle that their 
family and close relatives would be properly cared for in the eventually of their being seriously 
wounded, killed or executed or placed in detention. Protection of the collection in Paris during 1961 
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was thus also a crucial element in the ability of the Federal Committee to retain the morale and 
support of the rank-and-file. 
    As the crisis of repression deepened through 1961, and as huge numbers of men in Paris were 
subjected to ‘rafles’, mass incarceration, serious injury, and deportation to Algeria, so it became of 
increasing importance to the Federation to buttress the morale of the rank-and-file by ensuring that 
an efficient safety-net was in operation. The sudden and dramatic expulsion of 1,781 Algerian men 
from Paris after 19 October was deliberately designed to create deep insecurity and panic in the 
émigré community by damaging the long-term economic future of migrants. A large number of 
women and children were suddenly stranded in Paris without any income or protection, and French 
intelligence reported that the Federation was seeking to locate and support such families, a 
psychological agenda intended to reassure the base that the FLN had not abandoned them.406 The 
considerable political importance to the FLN of the welfare system is indicated by the fact that the 
CSD  by 1961 was taking up between 70% and 80% of the total budget spend in France.407 As we will 
see in the next Chapter, the disruption of the Farès financial system on 3-4 November, followed a 
few days later, on the 9-10 November, by the mass arrests of Operation Flore and the seizure of 
most of the collection, posed a major threat not only to the flow of money to support the armed 
struggle in North Africa, but also to the welfare net that helped ensure Federal control over the 
militant base.    
 
The sinews  of war : the political  importance of Federation revenues.  
 
    The FLN globally depended, like any significant insurrectionary movement and government –in-
formation, on access to money and materials.408 Apart from the cash and materials provided to the 
FLN by foreign governments and international agencies, the French Federation contributed a huge 
and disproportionate amount to the global budget, compared to the taxation potential of the 
population in Algeria itself. About 63% of the total Algerian population of just under nine million 
consisted of a desperately poor, rural peasantry that was facing the dual crisis of underdevelopment 
and radical dislocation by the war in the mountains and mass displacement into camps. The 
peasantry still made a costly sacrifice to the ALN in the form of their contribution in manpower and 
provision in kind (grain, livestock, fuel...), but this was largely a population without money and 
virtually untaxable, so that the maquis, often itself facing desperate hardship, was forced to seek 
money from both Algerian and European contributors in the towns. However, the FLN taxation 
capacity in the main towns, because of a huge French military presence, was also fragile. In Algiers, 
for example, the brutal crushing and eradication of the FLN networks during the 1957 “Bataille 
d’Algers”, destroyed the capacity to sustain the grass-roots system of collection, so that by 1958 the 
whole city contributed a derisory 17 millions, or 0.8% of the global budget.409  
    By contrast, the 330,000 Algerian migrants in France, although mainly in low-skilled industrial 
occupations, had a high level of employment and relatively high wages compared to the endemic 
underemployment and poverty of the masses in Algeria, a level of regular income that enabled the 
FLN to impose an almost universal system of taxation. Colin-Jeanvoine and Derozier argue that  the 
FLN in Algeria was facing a deepening financial crisis after 1958 as revenue declined while costs were 
mounting. In contrast, the French Federation from late 1957 onwards showed a remarkable ability 
to impose a taxation system on a growing percentage of the total migrant population, and to 
efficiently enforce and collect monthly dues.The total number of ‘côtisants’ in France increased, for 
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example, from 135,202 in March 1961 to 163,069 in February 1962.410 The extension of the system 
of ‘quadrillage’ from 1958 onwards ensured that the extraction of wealth was ever more efficient, 
and was reflected in the increase in monthly revenue from about 350 millions in mid-1958 to 664 
millions  in February 1962.411 In addition,  the Federation exercised an extremely tight control over 
its own ‘internal’  expenditure which it pegged at about 13% in 1961, so that its net contribution to 
the GPRA was both considerable and growing in real terms.412 The FLN Minister of Finance Ahmed 
Francis stated  in 1961 that the Federation supplied 80% of the global financial requirements of the 
GPRA.413 The significance of the cash-flows from the Federation cannot be measured, however, 
simply in monetary terms. Politically, the FLN  was forced to accept aid, both in terms of material 
such as weapons as well as money, from states, especially in the Communist bloc, that it would have 
preferred to hold at arms length. The Federation funding was important in providing a major source 
of cash that allowed the GPRA to make the strategic decisions as to how it was to be spent, and to 
retain a modicum of autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre from external powers like Egypt that 
often had their own agendas.414 
      In brief, the overall political importance of the French Federation within the global nationalist 
movement rested primarily on its financial, rather than military capacity. This fact has been 
concealed or downplayed by ex-militants and leaders of the Federation itself, since the dominant 
discourse of struggle and sacrifice has deployed a language of heroic combat, rather than the 
mundane and less spiritual processes of money collection and banking. FLN memoirs invariably play 
considerable attention to armed struggle, in particular the dramatic opening of the synchronised  
‘second front’ offensive of  27-28 August 1958 , but despite the destruction of the Mourepiane oil 
refinery, the Federation commandos failed to inflict serious damage on the French economy or 
security forces. On the contrary, armed conflict, by enormously increasing the counter-weight of 
French repression, served to disrupt the valuable collection system and let to the incarceration of a 
high percentage of the most able and experienced cadres. 
     The symbolic prioritisation of armed struggle, however, carried an undoubted mobilising power 
that should not be underestimated. Throughout the war there were many migrant workers in France 
who felt vaguely guilty that they had escaped the horrors of the ‘real’ war in Algeria, the daily round 
of bombing and torture suffered by kin and villagers, and also aspired to join, as many did, the ranks 
of the freedom fighters in the free air of the djebel. Boudaoud, emphasising the dangers faced by   
militants in France, shows disdain for those who talked of the, ‘militants en cravate des Champs 
Elysées’.415This criticism of the near-cowardly émigré, enjoying the delights of Paris, was one that 
was often voiced sotto voce in Algeria, but was also internalised by Federation militants.416 Paulette 
Péju remarked, ‘Pendant longtemps, l’émigration algérienne avait souffert d’une sorte de complexe: 
loin des combattants, des maquis, elle avait le sentiment de ne pas participer au combat de ses 
frères, d’être composée d’Algériens de seconde zone’.417  An obvious counter to this, among a 
predominantly young male population, was to take up arms in France through enrolment in the GA 
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and OS, and the Federal Committee’s own use of the term ‘Bataille de Paris’  in 1961 encouraged a 
comparison with Yacef Saadi’s heroic fidayine in Algiers. 
     One of the most surprising, and little-understood aspects of the Farès network, is the extent to 
which the police arrests and seizure of documents revealed a close and direct link between Paris and 
the guerilla forces inside Algeria. In the early stages of the War of Independence migrant workers in 
France often sent money directly to their relatives  and friends to finance the maquis, but gradually 
the Federation brought this anarchic situation under control, in part to bring an end to regional or 
clan factions that worked against national unity.418 The centralisation of the collection meant that 
Federal revenues were channeled to external bank accounts through which the GPRA controlled and 
audited how money was spent. However, the construction of the high-tension electric barrier and 
mine-fields along the Moroccan and Tunisian borders proved so effective in blocking the movement 
of arms, men and materials, that the internal Wilayas became practically isolated from the GPRA and 
external supplies. This, in turn, played a large part in precipitating deep and lasting political tensions 
between the ‘interior’ and the ‘exterior’, the former claiming that the corrupt and easy-living 
colonels and leaders were deliberately starving them, the true revolutionary fighters, of resources. 
Ali Haroun remarks that the GPRA, in about November 1960, eventually asked the French Federation 
to renew direct contact with the Wilaya, a process that was controlled after January 1961 by 
Farès.419  
     When the police searched Farès home on 4 November they located a cache of 36 letters between 
France or Germany and the ALN commanders of Wilayas 1,2,3, 4 and 5 in relation to the 
transmission of money and materials. On 15th January Rabah Bouaziz of the Federal Committee 
wrote a  letter to the heads of Wilaya 2 (Oranie), Wilaya 3 (Kabylie), and Wilaya 4 (Algerois) in which, 
following GPRA orders, he was trying to establish a network for the monthly transmission of 50 
millions per Wilaya, about 50% of the gross Federal collection. Bouaziz also requested assistance in 
making contact with Wilaya 1 (Aurès) and Wilaya 2 (Constantine).420 Colonel Si Mohammed-Oulhadj 
of Wilaya 3 and Colonel Si Mohammed of Wilaya 4 both replied enthusiastically on 4-5 February, and 
the latter asked if the Federation could also supply, ‘quelques munitions, détonateurs ou pistolets, 
et plastic’.421  In the complex network that was put in place during 1961, Souici of the Federal 
Committee exercised overall control over the accounts, but it was the Farès team that directly 
transmitted the funds from the centralised monthly collection through SCIFA, the front company set 
up by Leuti, Baudrillard and Imendassen in Paris and Algiers. 
      All three travelled frequently between the two capitals, and with the assistance of Farès, began 
to build up an extensive network of agents and contacts, including deputies, to transfer funds from 
the urban centres into the distant maquis zones. The network linked most smoothly with Wilaya 4, 
but after the French army located, surrounded and killed Colonel “Si Mohammed” (Djilali 
Bounaama) at Blida on 8 August 1961, Farès wrote on 15 September to his replacement to re-
establish contact by sending “Paul” ( his nephew) so that new agents could be set up. The 
replacement commander “Si Hassan” wrote back on 17 September, ‘à titre d’essai’, keen for the 
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transfer of funds, and giving the ultimate accolade from the heroic djebel to his brothers in Paris: 
‘nous vous adressons toutes nos vives félicitations pour vos belles actions de fida et nous vous 
souhaitons d’autres succès sur les colonialistes’. Abdallah Imendessen also received instructions 
dated 14 September to make contact with Salhi, a friend of Farès and a big commerçant of Tizi-
Ouzou living in Algiers, using the pass-word “Robespierre”. Imendessen was to transfer 100 millions 
every month, via Salhi, to Oudhadj, the Commander of Wilaya 3 (Kabylie), and to make sure that he 
retained a receipt of payments. The Farès network found it much more difficult to make links to 
Wilayas 1, 2 and 3, but Leuti travelled on 15-16 October to Sétif and Constantine with funds for 
Wilaya 2, while links were being extended to Batna (Wilaya 1) in the south.422 When Leuti was 
arrested on 4 November he was preparing to depart on a further trip, under the code-name 
“Jugurtha No.5”, with 100 millions to be transferred via Imendessen to Sétif and Constantine.  
      Farès was able to use his extensive personal links to high placed Algerian deputies, prefects and 
businessmen to extend his financial and political network. Farès recounts in his memoirs how in 
early 1961 he had suggested to Omar Boudaoud that he should invite selected Algerian senators and 
deputies to Brussels. At a meeting in the cellar of a brasserie, Boudaoud made a speech, ‘Le moment 
est venu pour vous de prendre position publiquement en faveur de la négociation avec le FLN. 
L’Algérie a besoin de tous ses enfants’.423 On their return they formed the parliamentary group, the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Algérien (RDA) and on 8 March issued a declaration demanding 
‘officielles et directes [négociations], sans préalable ni conditions, entre le gouvernement français et 
le GPRA’, while attacking any interests attempting to put a ‘third force’ in place.424 The captured 
Farès documents showed that a number of these deputies, and other notables, among them Slimane 
Belabed (deputy for Tlemcen), Makhlouf Gahlam (Médéa), Ali Guettaf (Blida), and Mohamed 
Belhaddad, Prefect of Batna, were helping with the financial network. The external intelligence 
service (SDECE) reported to Papon that a further meeting of Algerian parliamentarians had been 
organised by Farès in the Hotel Metropole in Brussels on 25-26 October, shortly after the Paris 
massacre.425 A number of Senators were also organised by the Farès network for the transport of 
arms, especially Keirat who owned a bus company in the Mostaganem region. The FLN acquired 
three buses in Germany for Keirat that carried secret compartments containing machine guns, 
pistols and ammunition, and were shipped out via Rouen.426 
      The financial assistance provided by the Federation directly to the isolated Wilayas of the 
“interior” was considerable and increasing during later 1961 and early 1962. Police accountants 
worked out from the Farès documents that by 15 October 1961 some 1,634 millions had gone to 
Algeria, while the FLN Brussels bank account had a reserve of 457 millions.427 The 1961 
reconfigeration of the FLN financial network carried significant political implications. Before 1961 the 
communication axis of the FLN in the Maghreb, the flow of manpower, materials and intelligence, 
had been in an east-west direction across the Moroccan and Tunisian borders. This horizontal 
movement had played into the hands of Boumediene and the EMG commanders, who were able to 
control and police the links between the interior and the outside world, and even to divert funds 
intended for the Wilayas into their own coffers.428 Although the politics of the internal power 
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struggle within the FLN remain obscure, it seems likely that the GPRA order to the Federation in late 
1961 to supply the Wilayas directly with cash, was an attempt to build up the power base of the 
‘interior’ to counter the formidable weight of the EMG armed forces. By 1961 it had become so 
difficult and slow for the Wilaya commanders to remain in overland contact with the external 
government, that they seized on the opportunity provided by the Farès network to communicate 
with the GPRA via Paris and Germany.429 As Farès wrote on 15 September of Si Mohammed, ‘avec 
lequel nous étions en contact permanent pour la transmission du courrier venant du GPRA et du 
Ministère de l’Intérieur’, while Mintaka 5 of Wilaya 2 wrote on 3 October to the Federation: ‘Ci-joint 
une lettre pour le frère Président du GPRA, ainsi que les reçus’.430  
    The development and consolidation of a close North-South alliance between the Federation, 
based on the considerable financial resources centralised in Paris, was to carry major political 
implications and eventually provided a key factor in the Federation-GPRA-Wilaya grouping that 
confronted Ben-Bella, Boumediene and the EMG in the struggle for power in the summer of 1962. 
French intelligence analysts, including in the Prefecture de Police, had long predicted that the 
revolutionary agenda of the FLN was to accelerate an armed offensive (the ‘coup de boutoir’ theory) 
as the prospect of an end to the war approached in order to strengthen its position at the 
negotiating table. The Farès documents showed that the Federation, under instructions from the 
GPRA, did indeed push hard in late 1961 to maximise the delivery of money and materials to the 
maquis. In September 1961 the Federation was trying to increase the monthly flow of  500 millions 
to Algeria by an ‘effort supplémentaire’ that would raise it to 750 millions . Ben Khedda, on assuming 
the Presidency of the GPRA on 27 August, had made clear his intention to prioritise the ‘interior’ 
over the ‘exterior’, a policy that Boumediene would have interpreted as a threat to the EMG. On 24 
June 1962 Omar Boudaoud and Kaddour Ladlani, representing the Federation, joined a council of the 
‘internal’ heads of the ALN Wilayas at Zemmorah, where they formed an opposition to the ‘external’ 
Etat-major général led by Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene. The latter quickly responded to 
the Federation challenge by sending emissaries into France and creating a Comité de vigilance that  
ordered Algerians to stop paying the monthly collection.431 
     In this context, the centralisation of the collection in Paris by the Zouaoui-Farès networks 
assumed a particular political importance in the course of 1961, at the very moment that the 
cranking up of police repression offered a grave danger to the both the organisation and the flow of 
money. Never had the connection between the Algerian factory worker, his pay packet, and the ALN 
guerrilla forces appeared so direct and stark as in late 1961. The question that I address in the final 
chapter is the extent to which the crisis of 1961, the combined impacts of the 17 October repression, 
the arrest of members of the Farès network, and Operation Flore, all coming within a period of just 
over two weeks, combined to damage the Federation on the eve of Evian. Did the offensive of the 
armed groups in Paris, starting in late August, by provoking deeper police repression prove counter-
productive in destabilisng the collection system that was so vital to the overall FLN struggle?           
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                                                                 9 
                     After the massacre: the impact of the crisis on the FLN 
   To date historians and other commentators have debated the events in Paris in late 1961 by 
focusing on the genesis and impacts of a single event, the ‘17 October’. However, as we can now 
see, the French Federation of the FLN was, within a very short period of time, hit by a rapid 
sequence of blows that had a dramatic, accumulative impact and threatened to paralyse the 
organisation at a crucial moment in the transition towards final peace negotiations.This final chapter 
examines the impacts of the police dislocation, during the five month period between 17 October 
and the Evian Accords of 18 March 1962, caused by the combined brutal repression of 17-20 
October, the dismantling of the Farès financial network, and the virtual decapitation of the Federal 
leadership for metropolitan France. It makes sense to treat these three events together, since they 
were closely interconnected and the leaders at the heart of the planning of the demonstration 
(Zououi, Farès, Benzerfa, Amroun....) were the same decision-makers that were identified and 
arrested two weeks later, along with a mass of documents relating to the 17 October and the 
context in which it was planned and implemented.  
    In Paris 1961 the immediate impacts of the brutal repression of 17-20th October on the FLN in 
Paris has already been discussed, and I will not go over this ground again in any detail, but 
emphasise a few points that are important to the theme of this chapter.432 Although the violent 
repression had an enduring physical and psychic effect on the thousands of men who were savagely 
beaten and herded into sports arena and police cells, the overall disruptive impact on the FLN 
networks was relatively brief and did not have the enduring crushing impacts that Papon and his 
associates liked to claim. One reason for this is that the Federal Committee had given firm 
instructions that leaders, defined mainly as those receiving FLN wages as full-time cadres, from the 
level of Secteur and Région upwards, were not to be present on the march. The  order was precisely 
aimed to prevent the arrest of  experienced and skilled leaders  who held the organisation together 
and who could not be readily replaced.  
     The SCAA reported that of the 14,000 Algerians arrested during the three days 17-19 October and 
then sent to the Centre d’identification de Vincennes (CIV) to be individually checked against the 
intelligence files (fichiers), 2,338 were identified as ‘meneurs’, and of these, 1,515 ‘cadres moyens’ 
were sent back to Algeria.433 Such data needs to be treated with great caution. Papon and his 
commanders, carefully gathered and  produced a constant stream of statistics aimed at 
demonstrating to the media, politicians and public opinion the great success of the Prefecture in 
fighting ‘terrorism’. The detailed Prefecture figures of  the number of FLN militants arrested, their 
seniority within the organisation, the number and type of weapons, ammunition and explosives 
seized, sums of money captured, and weight of documents, appear convincing because of their 
apparent factual precision . However, most of the 2,338 ‘meneurs’ which the police claimed to 
identify were minor rank-and-file militants, local collectors and heads of Cells or Groups, men who 
could be almost immediately replaced without any major interruption to the smooth working of the 
organisation. Within a week of 17 October, 11,294 Algerians of the 14,000 arrested, had been 
released, and the remaining screened out suspects peaked at 2,277 on 26 October, before declining 
to 217 ‘dangerous’ men who were still in the CIV on 20 November.434 The great majority of Algerian 
men were back at work within days of the 17-20th October, with the exception of those who were 
seriously wounded and could not return for some while because of broken bones, contusions and 
shock, about 100 who were killed during the three days, and 1,515 who were expelled to Algeria. 
Despite the huge trauma inflicted by the police on the Algerian community, the impact of the  brutal 
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repression on the normal functioning of the organisation, and its ability to carry on with business as 
usual, was relatively minor. The human costs were enormous, but the main functional impacts of the 
loss to the FLN of about three thousand workers, most of them adhérents and sympathisants, or 
about 1.6%  of the Algerian population in Paris, was economic. One of the extraordinary aspects of 
the hundreds of militant reports on the 17 October demonstration  is the high level of optimism, and 
the enthusiatic demands for further mass action, including support for a further demonstration on 1 
November which was eventually called off by the leadership.   
     A major difficulty in trying to isolate or separate out the global impacts of 17th October on the FLN 
stems from the fact that  police at the time, as well as historians subsequently, have often confused 
the effects of the demonstration with the concurrent drive against the armed groups, and the 
outcome of the Farès arrests (3-4 November) and Operation Flore (9-10 November).435 I contributed 
to this confusion in Paris 1961 by misreading the reports of an OS leader who wrote, ‘A notre retour 
[à Paris], nous avons trouvé la situation vraiment détériorée à cause de la répression, qui a vraiment 
été terrible – avec cela plusieurs de nos éléments responsables ont été arrêtés, et c’est pourquoi il 
n’y avait aucun contact [entre] groupes et même entre éléments’. In a further note of 3 November 
to the Federal Committee he said that he had been unable to make contact: ‘malheureusement ils se 
sont fait arrêter, actuellement nous ne connaissons plus personne’, and only 90 militants 
remained.436 On reflection, the desperate situation described by the OS had less to do with the 
dislocation of the  overall FLN organisation as a consequence of 17 October  than with the quite 
specific crisis affecting the OS armed groups, which, as we saw in Chapter 5, had been stood down 
by the FLN and largely destroyed by Montaner, especially through what he called a ‘vaste opération’ 
between  29 October and 1 November during which 29 GA leaders were arrested and eleven arms 
dépôts located.437  
    The October report from the head of Amala 21 (north Paris) gives a more sanguine view: in 
general, ‘dans nos activités interne, malgré la dense activité policière, malgré de nombreux 
arrestations de cadres et éléments nos réunions se sont tenue aussi bien chez les éléments que chez 
les commerçants, elle se deroulent normalement dans l’ensemble mais elles sont purturbée parfois 
par le presence de le police, ce qui provoque l’interruption par moments’. But the impacts of 
repression on the normal activities of the base varied considerably within the Amala, as in Zones 212 
and 213 where activity had been more severely affected by the curfew and ‘durement touché par la 
répression’ and the arrest of leaders, including a Regional. He expected the coming collection for 
November to be affected and, ‘en plus de tortures et de tabassage, nous avons des executions, des 
noyades et des déplacement et des transferts en Algérie’.438 As was quite standard in such reports, 
the prime concern of the Amala head was to gauge the degree to which disruption might affect 
future revenue collection, and to reassure his superiors that he was doing everything possible to 
redress the situation, including reinforcing the Regions that had been most severely affected. The 
overall sense given by Amala 21 was that some disruption had taken place, but this was temporary. 
Most crucially, as another report from Wilaya 2 noted, repression had only effected lower level 
cadres, such as Kasmas, and most of those arrested on 17 October were not militants, but ‘only’ 
sympathisants, the category of those who did little more in the FLN than pay the monthly dues.439  
     The negative impacts of the November arrests was somewhat different, however, since this 
involved a large number of the top level personnel in Paris who had largely escaped the repressive 
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effects of 17 October. The arrest of Farès and his associates on 3-4 November crippled the FLN 
finances, since in one blow this dislocated the system for the centralisation, banking and transfer of 
the monthly collection for the whole of France. The monthly collection for November at the local 
level, despite the intense activity of the police, went ahead as usual, but as the funds began to move 
up the chain towards Paris those responsable for transmitting the cash suddenly found that they 
could no longer make contact. French intelligence (SCINA) reported that the monthly collection had 
started at the base on 17 November without any problems, but ‘dans de nombreux secteurs du 
département de la Seine, la collecte a été différés’. In many Regions the leaders had received no 
instructions for the transfer of funds to the centre and, not knowing what to do with the money 
collected and, unable to guarantee its security from the police, had sent  it back.440 Later  the police 
discovered, after the arrest of a Regional head at Nancy on 19 February 1962, that the centralisation 
of the collection in Paris had been abandoned several months earlier after the arrest of Farès. 
Money from Wilaya 2B (Est) was now audited locally at the Wilaya level and then sent directly to 
Germany.441 After Operation Flore Mohamd Akli Benyounes, then head of Wilaya 3 (Lyon), was 
ordered by the Federal Committee to go to Paris to investigate the chaotic situation and paralysis 
and to restore the networks. The most urgent matter facing him was to ensure the safety of 
accumulated funds that had built up in various dépôts after the Farès, ‘filière avait été brisée’: ‘Je me 
suis donc retrouvé dans les dépôts de l’organisation, avec plusieurs valises qui contenaient les 
côtisations de nos compatriotes en France pour les mois d’octobre, novembre et décembre 1961. Il y 
en avait pour plus de trois milliards d’anciens francs...’.442  
     The interruption of the direct flow of money from Paris  must have made life difficult for the 
maquis. Benyounès remarks that, under his guidance, ‘Cette filière “finances” a été totalement 
rétablie au cours du premier trimestre 1962’.443 However, what Benyounès did not know, or fails to 
say, is that the replacement network was also quickly located and tracked by the French intelligence 
services. On 21 November 1961 the Algiers DOP and DST reported that a major company called El 
Amal, owned by a rich and powerful businessman, Tiar Hadj-Mohamed-Ben Larbi, was suspected to 
be, ‘un organisme financier du FLN, semblable à la société “France-Afrique” [SCIFA] de l’affaire Farès. 
Il n’est pas exclu que l’une et l’autre soient liées’.444  
     Ben-Larbi, born at Oued Amizour near Bougie in 1888, had been a municipal councillor in Bougie 
(1919-1925) and Algiers (1929-1937), and by the Second World War was an active nationalist. He 
built up a huge and expanding business empire, including the importation and distribution of Arab 
films in French North Africa. The El Amal company, which he founded on 25 February 1954, with 
Paris headquarters at 20 Avenue de l’Opera, had subsidiaries in the main Algerian urban centres 
(Algiers, Constantine, Oran, Bône, Bougie, Biskra, Tlemcen, Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Relizane, Tizi-Ouzou), 
important trading links to West Germany, the UK, USA, Tunisia, and Egypt, and had a controlling 
interest in major Algerian companies, including Lesieur Afrique, Chimique Agricole and Fruits 
Sahariens. ‘Elle [El Amal] se serait assigné pour objectifs de contrôler le marché algérien au profit de 
négociants et commerçants musulmans, réalisant ainsi le boycottage du commerce européen et 
sous ce couvert alimentant la rébellion en matériel diverse’. The Paris director of El Amal, Boularès 
Harizi was sentenced to prison (Fresnes) in March 1957 for importing canvas army boots (pataugas) 
into Algeria, while Ben-Larbi also had links to Ben Abderrhamane, an important Constantine 
businessman who travelled frequently to France and had imported arms and munitions through the 
port of Philippeville.445 
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     It was a standard feature of FLN networks to establish stand-by cadres, so that in the event of an 
arrest the deputy could stand in, without a hiatus in the running of operations. It is possible that El 
Amal served as a backup for the SCIFA/Farès network.  However, the new central collection network 
established in Paris by Benyounès was tracked by the DST and SCAA and located in late January 1962 
and some 20 to 25 European agents were identified. On 14 March a student, Danielle Barret, was 
arrested while delivering 100 millions to the home of a lawyer, Anne-Marie Blanchet-Parodi at 129 
Boulevard Masséna, and that night the DST raided twenty-one adresses in Paris.446 The police were 
perfectly aware of the identity and role of Benyounès, since he had walked twice into a contact 
address while it was under surveillance, and even his address at the Cité HLM Pierre Semard in Saint-
Denis was known. But by 14 March the signing of the Evian Accords and a cease-fire was only four 
days away, and it may have seemed pointless to the authorities to cause political reverberations by 
arresting him at this delicate moment. Overall, it can be said that the arrest of Farès and his 
associates  did seriously disrupt the crucial financial system for over two months, and that even 
when it was reconstructed in late January, the police services were always in a position to destroy it 
at will. That the police did not always push home this advantage during February and March 1962 
was probably due to the fact that the French government had no wish to antagonise the Algerian 
negotiators. 
    Finally, the damage to the financial system can be estimated in relation to the very large sums that 
were seized during the various raids in early November. The police seized 103 millions from Farès, 
Leuti and Baudrillard in Paris, and 77 millions from bank accounts in Algeria, and during Operation 
Flore another 302,611,000. These were considerable sums, the largest recovered in France during 
the Algerian War, and added up to about one months collection for the whole of France.447 There is 
also a report of a seizure of 294,800,000 on 9 January 1962 from the home of André Coquet.448 One 
of the major anxieties of the Federation about such losses was that, if known to the rank-and-file 
militants, this could cause demoralisation and discontent, especially given the huge sacrifices made 
by poor workers in handing over part of their small monthly income. The Federal leaders responded 
by simply not revealing the losses, along with other uncomfortable truths, in the weekly meetings, 
but local cadres inevitably picked up snippets of information that served to fuel a climate of rumour 
and suspicion that undermined the authority of the Federation .    
        The damage to the FLN caused by the arrest of Farès (4 November) was compounded five days 
later by Operation Flore that, quite literally, decapitated the top tier of the Federal organisation in 
France, along with its European support networks and safe-houses. The nationalist movement knew, 
from long experience, that the police arrest of cadres could seriously disable clandestine networks, 
especially as the militant might be the only person to know the codes, rendez-vous and contacts that 
linked one echelon to another. To counter this the Federation deployed what Boudaoud called a 
standard, ‘systéme de permutation. Chaque responsable était secondé par un adjoint qui prenait 
tout de suite la relève en cas d’arrestation....Ainsi l’organisation put-elle poursuivre sa mission sans 
interruption’.449 Benyounès also remarks how an arrest and interrogation could lead rapidly to the, 
‘démantèlement d’une structure de l’organisation que nous avions minutieusement constituée. Il 
fallait, dès lors, agir rapidement pour combler ce vide et mettre en place une nouvelle filière’.450  
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    The evidence points to the fact that no such system could function after Operation Flore, perhaps 
because replacements could not be found for so many high-placed and experienced leaders, and 
that the highly centralised organisation in Paris was, for a while, so incapacitated as to paralyse the 
whole network. The Director of SCAA, in his annual report for the year 1961, claimed that the police 
had, ‘briser l’élan des formations d’assaut de l’Organisation, puis à les détruire’, uprooted, ‘le 
mécanisme de la transmission des fonds’, and arrived at, ‘une connaissance parfaite des structures 
du FLN’, so that  after Flore the police could relax its offensive and, ‘ces succès remarquables 
devaient pratiquement mettre fin aux grandes opérations menées en métropole contre le FLN’.451 
The intelligence services claimed that the Federal Committee had sent an agent to Paris, ‘à l’effet 
d’enquêter sur les imprudences, pour ne pas dire les fautes, qui avaient abouti, pour le Front, aux 
désastreuses opérations de Novembre’.452 That the police were not simply exaggerating their own 
achievements is confirmed by the important evidence of Mohand Akli Benyounès who was sent 
from Lyon to Paris after 10 of November to pick up the pieces and restore a functioning network. 
Benyounès describes the situation that he found in Paris as a ‘hécatombe’, ‘le haut commandement 
du FLN en France s’est trouvé très largement dégarni....Une telle situation était inédite. Elle ne 
pouvait perdurer sans conséquences désastreuses pour l’organisation’.453   
     On his arrival in Paris Benyounès was able to make contact with Mohamed Attaba, head of Wilaya 
2, in the café Le Palmier in the 9th arrondissement, and at a second meeting Attaba was able to pass 
on a written order from Ladlani that stated: ‘Le comité fédéral désigne Daniel [Benyounès] 
coordinateur pour la France. Demandons à tous les responsables de se tenir à sa disposition; signe 
Kr/Kaddour’. Attaba, anxious that his cover was blown, was given permission to depart for Germany, 
and this left Benyounès with the need to find at least three new Wilaya heads, somebody to replace 
himself at Lyon (W3), Yahia Achab (W3B) who was arrested during Operation Flore, and Mohamed 
Attaba (W2). 
   
Figure 5. Changes in the Wilaya leaders after Operation Flore. 
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
                                   Wilaya 1          1B                  2                2A                    2B                   3                  3B 
Before 9th 
November 1961      Kaci             Belgacem    Mohamed  Lakhdar          Ahmed        Mohand           Yahia 
                                   MAAMAR   MELLAH       ATTABA      HAMADENE  BOUDRAA  BENYOUNES  ACHAB 
................................................................................................................................................................. 
After 9th 
November 1961      Kaci             Ahmed       Ahmed         Boussad          Amar     Mohamed   Abdallah      
                                   MAAMAR   ASKRI        BOUDRAA     OUYED          MAZARI     SEGHIR      YOUNSI 
 
Only one Wilaya head, Kaci Maamar (W1), remained in the same post, while Boudraa (2B) was 
transferred to Wilaya  2.454 
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     Benyounès claims that after several weeks, with the assistance of Danielle Barret as liaison agent, 
‘la machinerie était reconstituée et tout le dispositif mis en place’, but the financial network took 
longer, until the first part of 1962, to reconstruct.455 However, Benyounès confidence was ill-
founded, since the security forces remained absolutely certain of their sound intelligence and ability 
to intervene at will to destroy any re-emerging FLN organisation. For example, by late December the 
Director of SCAA noted how the Federation had, after Flore, energetically set out to rebuild its 
networks and control of the population (quadrillage), and judged on 20 December the moment right 
to put the clock back: ‘Il m’est donc apparu nécessaire de perturber une nouvelle fois l’appareil que 
le FLN s’efforce de mettre en place et de paralyser ainsi les moyens d’action dont il espérait disposer 
dans un avenir très prochaine’. Instead of the older type of crude ‘rafles’, like that of 17 October, 
that involved random mass trawls of Algerians with the hope that activists could be identified among 
them, the police resorted more often to huge night-time operations like that of Operation Flore that 
targetted named suspects. Thus the operation ‘Confiseur’ of 20-22 December involved raids on the 
adresses of 281 individuals, with the aim, ‘de neutraliser en quelques heures des éléments 
dangereux afin de casser une nouvelle fois l’effort de reconstitution’.456  Unknown to Benyounès at 
the time was the fact that Aballah Younsi or ‘Mourad’, who he had placed at the head of Wilaya 3B, 
was a police informer, and probably provided the information that led to the arrest of his liaison 
agent Danielle Barret on 14 March, and to the location of Benyounès himself.457  
      The general weakening of the FLN in France, and its inability to fully recover from the crisis of 
October-November 1961, was  demonstrated in a number of ways. First, the FLN showed an 
extraordinary capacity, throughout the War of Independence, to recover rapidly from wave after 
wave of  mass arrests . In part this resilience can be attributed to the large reserve of young men 
who were eager to step into the shoes of ‘martyrs’ and detainees. But, in the long term, the 
repeated loss of middle and higher level cadres, who embodied many years of hard-won clandestine 
skills, reached a point at which the organisation became diluted by inexperienced, illiterate and 
unsuitable men.458 The Federal Committee tried to counter this by creating an école de cadres at 
Hagen in Germany, but the Federation was also under strong pressure during 1961 to send trained 
and skilled men to assist in the rebuilding of  post-Evian Algeria.  
    Secondly, the French police remarked on a singular absence of offensive actions  by FLN armed 
groups between late October and early 1962. In late November the SCAA intercepted documents 
sent by the Federal Committee to the head of OS in Paris which showed detailed plans, including 
maps and sketches, for the sabotage of oil installations in the Seine valley, Shell and Purfina at 
Nanterre, the Compagnie d’éxploitation des Pétrolles at Chailly-en-Bière, the Société Pétroret at 
Melun, and Shell-Saint-Gobin in a complex at Bonneul. The FLN was also planning the assassination 
of various political figures, including the deputy Ahmed Djebbour and the junior minister Nafissa Sid 
Cara.459 The Federal Committee had succeeeded in stopping the uncontrolled assassination of police 
officers and harkis, but was now seeking to reproduce the success of the 1958 attack on the 
Mourepiane refinery, and to maximise media impacts through spectacular blows against strategic 
economic targets and various personalities. However, the intelligence services reported that the OS 
had been unable to recover from the earlier phase of dislocation. ‘Durement éprouvé au cours des 
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derniers mois’, the OS was trying to recruit replacements from among ‘sympathisants’. Teams of 
men trained in the use of explosives were being formed, but were unable to implement the attack 
on refineries because of a lack of plastic explosive and because police operations had broken, ‘de 
multiples liaisons, en détruisant des boîtes à lettres, en raréfinant les lieux de refuge, ont enfermé 
l’OS dans sa clandestinité’.460     
 
The impact of the crisis on the FLN rank-and-file 
 
     To date historians, myself included in Paris 1961, have examined the impact of the repression of 
17-20 October on the Algerian community in isolation from the concurrent crises affecting the FLN in 
early November. But, as  we can now see, militants who began to draw up reports on their individual 
experience during the demonstrations did so during a period of ongoing and deepening chaos. Many 
of these local reports were still filtering up the organisational ladder to Wilaya and RC  level when 
the leadership was captured, along with these documents. Before Zouaoui and his lieutenants could 
properly synthesise these accounts and reflect on the lessons of 17 October they were whisked away 
to the prison of Fresnes where they were instantly plunged into an ongoing  FLN hunger strike. How 
did the mass of Algerian migrant workers respond, not only to 17th October, but to the overall crisis 
that, within two weeks, had so seriously damaged the leadership? If the defiant demonstrations had 
been planned by the Federal Committee as a morale-boosting response to police repression and the 
night curfew, were such goals achieved or were they quickly negated by the arrest of the Paris 
leadership? 
          The reports of participating militants provide one important source of information as to how 
the FLN rank-and-file reacted to, or made sense of, the traumatic events. My aim here is not to 
examine all these reports, which run into the hundreds, and require more extended examination, 
but in line with the case-study approach of Chapter 6, to illustrate these events by focusing again on 
Amala 12, Ghafir and the 13th Arrondissement. One of the most detailed reports in the archive can 
be identified as the work of Mohamed Ghafir, the only high level FLN leader in Paris during this 
period to have written his memoirs, and this is of considerable interest since it illustrates how, as the 
eye-witness statements were passed up the hierachy, they were synthesised by higher level cadres 
who provided their own gloss or interpretation on the events.  As we have seen, all the leaders from 
the level of Régional upwards were barred from the demonstration, to avoid exposing them to 
police arrest, so Ghafir had no direct experience of police brutality, and analysed events from 
reading the reports of others or from their oral testimony. Already, within days of 17 October, the 
FLN hierarchy was involved in the production of a certain kind of truth, a quasi-official rendering of 
events. 
        In the preparation for 17 October, Zouaoui had given precise instructions as to how militants 
from particular arrondissements or suburbs were to travel into the city to join one of three separate 
columns. In the case of Ghafir’s Amala 12, all the Left Bank arrondissements and adjacent suburban 
communes (Montrouge, Sceaux, L’Hay-les-Roses, Ivry and Vitry) were to travel in small groups, to 
avoid police interception,  to the Place d’Italie and Boulevard Montparnasse. From there they were 
to march along the axis of the Boulevard Saint-Michel, past the Café Luxembourg where, unknown 
to the militants, Zouaoui held his daily meetings, and on to Saint-Germain.461 The Federation had 
decided in advance that it wished to place its own observers in various locations so as to gather 
evidence for a subsequent propaganda offensive, and this task was eventually allocated to various 
French journalists and trusted porteurs de valise. In the case of the Saint-Michel column, composed 
of militants from Amala 12, the FLN recruited Marie-Lucie Lanfranchi to act as a witness, although 
others present, such as the editor François Maspero and the journalist René Dazy of Libération, were 
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subsequently able to provide detailed accounts of police violence. 462 The Federal Committee, 
shocked by the level of violence unleashed by the police, also dispatched an order to Zouaoui to 
collect as many reports as possible from militants at every level of the hierarchy and a large number 
of these accounts, from semi-literate notes written in biro on paper from school exercise books, to 
elaborate and detailed narratives, were seized during Operation Flore.463 Since Baba-Hamed (RC1) 
was among those arrested, the archives contain a large number of such eye-witness accounts from 
Wilaya 1 and Amalas 11 and 12.464 For the purposes of analysis I have selected reports at two levels: 
that of the militants below Régional level, who participated directly in the demonstration, and next 
the more synthesised report prepared by Ghafir as head of Amala 12. 
    Most of the rank-and-file reports in Amala 12 provide a direct eye-witness account, often with 
quite precise and concrete detail of police brutality. Bouzid Abouab, who lived at 11 Quai d’Ivry, a 
poor industrial area between the River Seine and the train yards in the 13th Arrondissement, 
recounts briefly how he was arrested on 17th October near the Metro Quai de la Gare (close to the 
present Bibliothèque nationale), and was then taken by car to the police station in the Place d’Italie: 
‘je fus malmené, insulté de race de cochon, de bicaut, de tous les noms, ils m’ont cassé mes lunettes 
de vue’.465 Mohammed Luala, who lived close to Abouab, at 17 Quai d’Ivry, recounts how, after his 
arrest he was taken to the Palais des Sports, ‘les Algériens les frères, la cervelle sur la peau 
mourraient constamment, il y en avait des morts toutes les 30 minuits, d’autres sont abbatus dans 
les W.C  par balles, ils s’en vent à quatre, un seul revient, une jambe cassée ou un bras’. Mohammed 
Saïd Salat (?), also from the 13th   arrondissement, recounts how he was in the Saint-Michel area on 
the 17 October when police in a Peugeot 403 drew alongside him and five or six other Algerians  and 
ordered them to raise their hands, ‘Et nous on a vu l’un des inspecteurs à rabattres le chargeur de 
son P.M  [pistolet- mitrailleur] et les autres ont leurs pistolet à la main. Et ils ont commencé à tiré sur 
nous’. Wounded in the shoulder, he took a taxi home and that night saw a doctor who gave him an 
injection and then took him to the Bicêtre hospital, where he was, ‘surveillé par la police’. An 
unidentified militant from Amala 12 (Kasma 122142), after demonstrating on the 18th October, was 
arrested at the metro Mairie d’Ivry and held with nineteen others in the toilets of the police station 
until three in the morning when they were made to run a gauntlet into a bus, ‘à coup de matraque 
et à coup de crosse’ . The same reception waited them on arriving at the Palais des Sports and, ‘La 
nous firent de macabre découverte. Des frères se trouvaient par terre la tête fendues et les 
membres disloqués. Toutes ces horreurs étaient comparables a celle qu’enduraient les juifs dans les 
camps de concentration des nazis’.466  
    There are many dozens of factual reports of this nature. When they do offer an opinion, it is 
generally in a formulaic heroic style, like that of a militant from Amala 12 (Section 1213333) who 
notes that while, ‘le sacrifice de cette journée à était énorme’, all those who had been killed  ‘au 
champ d’honneur’ would not have died in vain. ‘A cette occasion le succès de ce jour et loin d’être 
oubliée dans l’histoire de la révolution algérienne’ and had, ‘porter un coup très dur à la politique 
gaulliste sur tous les plans...’.   
        From the archives we can follow the trajectory of the numerous reports from lower Section, 
Kasma or Group level as they were transmitted up through the higher échelons to reach Ghafir who 
                                                          
462
 J.-L. Einaudi, Bataille, 139, 144-147. None of these original observer accounts appear to have survived, 
although several of them, often years later, provided written or oral testimony. 
463
  H1B35, an order was received in Paris on 22 October to collect evidence of dead, wounded and 
disappeared. H1B16, Baba-Hamed (RC1), during an interrogation by Montaner, was shown a report on the 17 
October demonstration by the head of Kasma 121221, and that was forwarded to him by Amala 12 (Ghafir), 
and replied, ‘nous voulons nous en servir pour faire un bilan d’après les temoignages et les précisions sur les 
éléments blessés ou frappés’. 
464
 Other reports, which consist of those that eventually reached the Federal Committee in Germany, are to be 
found in the Harbi FLN archives. 
465
 H1B35, Abouab gives his organisational code 12214 (ie. Wilaya 1, Amala 2, Zone 2, Région 1, Secteur 4). 
466
 H1B35. 
116 
 
then synthesised them into a long and detailed, ‘Rapport sur la riposte du 17 au 20 Octobre au 
couvre-feu rasciste’. 467 Ghafir had been among those who had given the direst warnings to the 
Federal Committee of the dangerous pressures building up among Paris activists as a consequence 
of enforced demobilisation in the face of police repression. He reiterated this position in his memoirs 
when he agreed with Mohammedi Saddek who was demanding a spectacular resumption of armed 
actions, declaring, ‘L’Algérie est incendiée, pourquoi ne brulerais-je pas la France?’. But, lamented 
Ghafir, ‘Hélas, toutes ces opérations souhaités par la base et les responsables sont refusées par le 
Comité Fédéral pour des raisons politiques afin de ne pas gêner les contacts entre le GPRA et le 
Gouvernement français’.468  
     Since, as I have argued, the Federal Committee planned the demonstrations to channel this 
explosive tension, was Ghafir happy with the outcome of 17 October? ‘La décision de l’organisation’, 
he stated in his report, ‘concernait la riposte au couvre feu raciste décreté par Papon et son 
gouvernement, a répondu au voeux de tous les militants’. Given the wave of police atrocities, 
‘l’organisation a choisi le moment opportun pour déclancher une riposte vigoreuse et efficace....Des 
que nos militants ont appris la décision de l’organisation de riposte au couvre feu raciste, leur joie 
était indiscriptible, car les voeux qu’ils ont formulé depuis toujours ont reçu une suite favorable’.469 
What Ghafir failed to mention was that there existed a minority of men and women who remained 
refractory to the orders to take to the  streets , or who only took part because of fear of FLN 
retribution in the form of fines or beatings. 
    Ghafir, fully aware from the earlier orders of the Federal Committee that the march must be 
totally pacific, went to some lengths to emphasise the highly disciplined nature of the column as it 
proceeded from the Place d’Italie and Montparnasse along the Boulevard Saint-Michel. Orders were 
respected, ‘à la lettre, à savoir: le sang froid de nos éléments devant les provocations de la police et 
la circulation dans l’ordre, le calme et la dignité – Quelques éléments cependant qui n’ont pas tenir 
leur sang froid devant les agissements de la police ont été cahués et raisonnés par les frères qui les 
entourent’. One Algerian who had seized a big stone to attack a policeman was disarmed, and a 
brigadier de police was impressed, stating, ‘Je m’incline devant votre discipline’.470 Ghafir’s account 
is corroborated by the journalist René Dazy who witnessed the crowd, including many women, 
children, and elderly, dressed in their Sunday best, as they approached the Pont Saint-Michel: ‘They 
marched in good order, the leaders at the front, with an inexpressible dignity’.471 The pacific and 
self-controlled nature of the demonstration throws into even more dramatic relief the terrible shock 
produced by the police charges into the crowd, brutal clubbing with the bidules, heavy gunfire and 
the throwing of Algerians into the Seine. 
   A second goal of the demonstration was to make an impact on French and international public 
opinion which, until then, had been singularly uninterested in the extreme levels of police repression 
in Paris. The Federal Committee, although excluding the French left and trade unions from the 
march, was hoping to make a big impact immediately afterwards, as was disclosed in the widely 
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diffused Appel aux Français of 18th October. This tract emphasised the extent to which the racist 
attack on Algerians, like that against the Jews, also threatened French workers and democrats by 
posing a danger to the fundamental principles of human rights, justice and liberty. The FLN called on 
workers, students, intellectuals and trade unionists to fraternise with Algerians ‘dans les usines, les 
chantiers, les quartiers, les universités’, to defend them against discriminatory measures in the 
street and public spaces, to organise demonstrations, meetings and stoppages, and to demand 
negotiations to find,’une solution pacifique et urgente à ce conflit, pour mettre fin au cauchemar 
que vivent nos deux peuple’.472 Ghafir, in his report, claimed that the demonstrations had been a 
remarkable success:-  
      Dans l’ensemble de cette riposte, nous pouvons nous rejoier du résultat obtenu, car le succès est 
total. C’est une victoire et un prestige en plus pour le gouvernement algérien et la révolution – Cette 
démonstration des algeriens et algeriénnes dans la capitale française à démontré à l’opinion 
française et internationale les vrais visage des colonialists avec le racisme et la haine que nourrissent 
les forces de répression française sous les ordres de PAPON en complicité avec les criminels DEBRE 
et DE GAULLE. 
   L’opinion française reste amorphe jusqu’à ce jour, elle commence à prendre conscience de la juste 
revendications du peuple algérien, étant complice indirecte et même directe des crimes de la police 
et de son armée......L’audience du gouvernement algérien s’accroît de plus en plus dans tous les pays 
du monde y compris les alliés de la France....Cette démonstration héroïque du 17 au 20 octobre sera 
peut-être le prélude de la fin de la guerre’.473  
    The public responses to the 17th October were extremely complex, but in overall terms Ghafir was 
correct in detecting a marked impact, but one which, on closer inspection, proves to have been  
fragmented and quite rapidly marginalised.474 Omar Boudaoud, like other ex-Federation cadres, has 
likewise emphasised the importance of 17 October as marking a watershed in the War of 
Independence. The GPRA, which had been so sceptical about the plan, ‘nous a félicités, car l’impact 
international des manifestations du 17 octobre 1961 a été positif, au-delà de nos espérances. On 
peut même soutenir qu’il s’est révélé plus important que celui des actions armées d’août 1958 en 
France’.475 However, what Boudaoud, Haroun and Ghafir fail to acknowlege is that the GPRA, shortly 
after the demonstrations , was actively, working to terminate a Federation propaganda drive to 
capitalise on the political gains to be made from the massacre.  
      On 22 October the FLN Minister of Information, M’Hammed Yazid, issued a press communiqué in 
Tunis in which he excoriated the transfer of a ‘Battle of Algiers’ to Paris, the mass arrests and the 
death of over fifty demonstrators. At the moment that the GPRA was, ‘en train d’oeuvrer 
sincèrement et patiemment pour que soient créées les conditions d’une solution pacifique et 
négociée du problème algérien, nous assistons à une aggravation de la réprssion colonialiste’.476  On 
the 24 October Ben Khedda, the President of the GPRA, made a similar statement: ‘La répression 
militaire et policière qui s’abat sur le peuple algérien constitue un génocide caractérisé et s’aggrave 
chaque jour....Cette répression se déchaîne, avec une ampleur sans précédent, en territoire 
français...’. But, he claimed, all sides now accepted that independence was at hand. Are we going to 
allow the war now in its eighth year to drag on indefinitely, when, ‘les conditions d’une paix rapide 
sont à portée de la main?’.477  
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     The key instrumental use that the GPRA made of the 17 October was to bring further pressure on 
the French government to move rapidly to the negotiating table, but once that goal had been 
achieved the subject was marginalised.478  Behind the scenes, and at the very moment that the 
demonstrations of 17-20 October were ending, de Gaulle was secretly opening the door to a further 
round of  negotiations at Bâle on 28 October. One sign of this was that de Gaulle on 20 October 
ordered termination of a clandestine ‘Third Force’  operation to establish the Front algérien d’action 
démocratique (FAAD) as a potential party to negotiations.479 At about the same time de Gaulle 
agreed to the reopening of preparatory talks, and on 26-27 October the Algerian representatives 
Redha Malek and Mohammed Benyahia were en route via Geneva to Bâle for what turned out to be 
the opening stages of the definitive round of negotiations that began on 28 October. Malek notes 
that the French delegation ,‘avait exprimé l’inquiétude de son gouvernement face aux “mouvements 
de foule” déclenchés par le FLN – allusion aux journées du 5 juillet et du 17 octobre’.480  
    It would seem that the French were, at this final stage, less concerned about ongoing pressure 
from the ALN, which they could readily contain, than by the potential threat offered by mass urban 
street protest. Such an anxiety was undoubtedly shared by de Gaulle, since it was the more 
spontaneous and insurrectionary demonstrations in Algiers on 10-12 December 1960 that had first 
shattered his illusions about holding on to Algeria. In addition, although de Gaulle was never going 
to admit it openly, the mass demonstrations of 17-20 October in the imperial capital must have 
dented his self-estime and image as a global leader. However, once the French had agreed to re-
open discussions, Ben Khedda reciprocated by rapidly dropping further reference to the Paris 
massacre, a subject that was now seen as counter-productive in producing a more positive and 
conciliatory climate for negotiations. From 1 November onwards FLN propaganda centred almost 
exclusively on a mass hunger strike by Algerian prisoners throughout France and Algeria, and this 
served to overlay and bury the events of 17 October. In his memoirs  Omar Boudaoud criticised the 
five ministers, and in particular Ben Bella, for distorting media coverage of this political strike so as 
to promote their personnal agendas in the struggle for influence and power.481 Paulette Péju was 
commissioned to prepare a glossy brochure, with photographs by Elie Kagan and others, Les 
Manifestations algériennes d’octobre 1961 et la répression colonialiste en France, that was published 
in December 1961 by the ‘République algérienne, ministère de l’information’. However, this was 
ordered to be withdrawn, as was a further booklet by Marcel and Paulette Péju, Le 17 octobre des 
Algériens that was to be published by François Maspero in the summer of 1962.482 At the same time, 
as will be seen below, the Federation appears to have abandoned attempts to collate all the 
information being centralised so as to provide an estimate of Algerian fatalities. Boudaoud has 
insisted that he and the Federal Committee, throughout 1961 and early 1962 retained a careful 
distance and neutrality so as not to be drawn into any of the emerging cliques engaged in the 
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struggle for power, but clearly a lot more needs to be known about the position of the Federation 
during this murky period to explain how or why the memory of 17 October was occluded.483        
      Finally, to what extent was it the case that, despite the widescale violence and trauma 
experienced by the October demonstrators, morale remained as strong as the FLN leaders claimed? 
After 17 October the position of both Papon and Frey, the Minister of the Interior, was seriously 
threatened by the growing volume of evidence of a massacre, but a standard element in the 
propaganda diffused to the media was the claim that the great mass of innocent Algerians had been 
forced by a tiny minority of violent terrorists to attend the march. Consequently, police reports  
emphasised the evidence of men and women being threatened or beaten for resisting the 
mobilisation, while after 17 October informers  picked up rumours of Algerian workers criticising the 
FLN for exposing them to deadly force, or attacking collectors and other low level cadres. There 
were, beyond doubt, instances of Algerians who disliked or resisted being compelled to attend, but 
this involved a relatively small minority. The intelligence services reported that few fines had been 
imposed later for non-attendance, ‘for the simple reason that the reluctant were few in 
number....The Muslims are proud to have demonstrated. They are proud to have given proof of their 
cohesion and strength and to have protested against measures that they judge to be discrimiatory 
and humiliating’.484  
    The Federation was, however, still concerned at the possibility that such massive violence might 
fracture or demoralise the migrant community in Paris. On 23 October the FLN issued a tract 
Algeriennes et Algériens Emigrés en France  to rally the militants , one that was penned in the 
standard discourse of heroic struggle and sacrifice: ‘En pleine coeur de Paris, nous venons d’infliger 
au gouvernement français une défaite spectaculaire. Nous n’avons jamais reculé et nous ne 
reculerons jamais devant aucun sacrifice pour arracher l’indépendance.’ It made a significant 
connection to the recent ground-breaking mass demonstrations in Algeria: ‘A l’exemple de notre 
peuple héroique, descendu dans la rue lors des mémorables journées de décembre 1960, 
l’émigration algérienne vient, une fois de plus, de démontrer avec éclat’, a similar level of power and 
unity. The tract concluded by emphasising the sacrificial nature of the ongoing struggle: ‘La lutte 
pour la liberté est une lutte âpre. Il n’y a ni réplit, ni compromis entre l’oppresseur et l’opprimé’, but 
‘nous sommes une force invincible’. In conclusion, ‘Nos pensées vont vers nos martyrs des 17 et 18 
octobre...Gloire a NOS MORTS!. Leur sacrifice ne sera pas vain’. At the same time, the Federation 
was fully aware of the fact that it needed to provide material support for those women and children 
that had suddenly lost the sole breadwinner who may have been killed, hospitalised, imprisoned , 
‘disappeared’ or expelled to Algeria. French intelligence reported that orders had gone out to the 
Comités de soutien (CSD) to locate and support all the families  so affected to show they had not 
been abandoned by the FLN, part of a campaign to ‘rassurer les troupes’.485 
     I would emphasise, however, that the police repression, while leaving deep psychological scars on 
many Algerians, had a quite minimal impact on the smooth operation of the FLN organisation in 
Paris, an impact which, as usual, was measured by the statistics of collection. In addition to the 
monthly collection, the FLN also imposed an additional ‘gift’ on symbolic dates, in particular the 5 
July and 1 November, and these had by 1961 become obligatory. Returning to the situation in Amala 
12, Ghafir has published a copy of his financial report on the special collection for the ‘journée 
nationale’, of 1 November. Situated shortly after the Paris demonstrations, but before the arrests of 
the Farès and Zouaoui networks, this provides an excellent summary of the impacts of 17 October 
on the local organisation, but before the disruption of early November. Out of the 15,260 elements 
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that were registered in Amala 12, 14,366 (94.14%)  had made a payment; while among the 744 
registered commerçants, 696 (93.54%) had participated.486 While the number of ‘retards’ (none-
payers who would be compelled to pay later)  was high among the elements, Ghafir said this was 
justified since, ‘la moitié presque de notre effectif se trouvait dans les camps et les soi-disant centres 
de triages après le manifestation du 17 octobre – Plusieurs frères ont été hospitalisés....Des 
centaines de frères licenciés de leur travail, n’ayant même pas droit aux assurances sociale’. Also 
contact had been lost with dozens of militants after the arrest of several cadres. Perhaps about 1-2 
millions francs  had been lost through the reduced collection, ‘mais la coup d’éclat de la victoire 
politique emportée pendant le manifestation du 17 octobre a ses valeurs incalculable’. Overall the 
usual system had operated almost as normal: local weekly meetings had commemorated 1 
November ‘dans une dignité absolue’, and the collection, centralisation and audit of money had 
been impeccable, with the exception of only one Section head arrested with 15,000 francs. Again it 
can be seen from Ghafir’s report how the crucial organising principle of the Federation was financial, 
and cadres were driven above all else to assure their superiors that they were efficiently performing 
their duty as measured by the counting of money and attendance.     
   The arrests of 3-4 and 9-10 November inflicted, however, far greater damage to the upper levels of 
the political and financial networks, virtually paralysing the organisation. In particular, the halt in the 
flow of money, especially towards the ALN in North Africa, presented a serious threat to the entire 
FLN apparatus. The Paris police and the DST were quite confident in their analysis that the FLN in 
Paris had, to all intents and purposes, been so severely damaged that it was still unable to recover by 
early 1962. The SCINA reported in December that a ‘calme relatif’ reigned in Paris because the 
armed groups had been neutralised by, ‘deux opérations d’envergue qui ont démantéle l’Etat Major 
Fédéral’, and broken, ‘de multiples liaisons, en détruisant des boites à lettres, en raréfinant les lieux 
de refuge’. The arrest of Benzerfa and his clandestine printer, had damaged the propaganda 
network, so that the Paris FLN had had to fall back on the assistance of the AGTA and Ouhadj.487 In 
short, ‘La Fédération doit remonter son appareil de propagande, rétablir ses filières d’acheminement 
de fonds, remplacer ses Etats majors de Wilaya et les cadres arrêtés et envoyés en Algérie...’.488 The 
police remarked that the joint impacts of 17 October and the arrests of early November  had created 
a certain ‘malaise’ among the rank-and-file, and disorganisation that had rendered them, ‘méfiants, 
timorée et indociles. Certaines mettaient en doute l’utilité des “mouvements de masse”, d’autres 
affirmaient carrément que la lutte était devenue inutile, puisque le droit à l’autodétermination était 
acquis et que le principe de la souveraineté algérienne sur le Sahara était admis’.489 
      While the police saw clear evidence of the Federation still struggling hard to enforce discipline 
and unity on the migrant community of Paris, especially during the dangerous and demobilising 
phase of transition to independence, they also remarked on the fact that the arrests of the Farès and 
Zouaoui networks had made little overall impact on the Algerian masses. A number of factors 
worked in this direction. Firstly, the centralised and authoritarian structure of the French Federation, 
meant that the Committee only transmitted the forms of information and propaganda to the base 
that it viewed as suitable for debate, a process that included filtering out any reference to the top-
level battles for power, divisions over policy, or any other ‘negative’ events that might ‘demoralise’ 
the rank-and-file. Mohammed Harbi is correct in his assessment of the Federation as a single-party 
apparatus that dictated to the rank-and-file, but did not engage in a democratic exchange with local 
militants, who were thus kept in the dark about many developments.490 After the 10 November the 
Federation certainly did not inform local cells of the arrests, and seizure of documents and money, 
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and its implications. At the same time, since peace talks  had reopened, the French government had 
little interest in making political capital, as it would have done previously, from such major blows 
against the FLN in France.491 The press did report on the arrest of Farès and of the Zouaoui network, 
but overall editors, well aware of the dynamics of the negotiation, remained relatively silent or  
discrete about the events. After 10 November we hear very little indeed about Farès, Zouaoui, Saïd 
Amroun and others who were held in the Fresnes prison, apart from their involvement in an 
attempted mass escape through a tunnel in January 1962.492  The French security forces continued 
to pursue the FLN right down to the cease-fire of 19 March, but there is a sense in which both sides 
knew that they were now simply going through the motions, since a settlement was to hand, and 
this explains why the police did not bother to arrest Benyounès, although they were fully aware of 
his role and location. At the same time the FLN and French government were now preoccupied by 
the danger presented to both of them by the OAS bombing campaign in Paris. 
    Finally, in the historiography of the French Federation it can be noted that the crisis surrounding 
the November arrrests has been even more marginalised than the memory of 17 October. Maurice 
Papon, in his memoirs that were published in 1988, provided what to date was one of the most 
detailed accounts of the 17 October. Through a carefully constructed narrative that distorted  the 
evidence, Papon developed the thesis that the demonstration was organised by the FLN with the 
intention of provoking police violence, the killings of innocent Algerian men and women, so as to 
trigger an insurrectionary situation in which the security of the capital would be endangered and 
Papon himself toppled.493 Papon was engaged in a dramatic ‘Bataille de Paris’ that he claimed to 
have conclusively won by firmly containing the demonstrations, and virtually crushing the FLN at this 
point in time. Through this disciplined defense of the capital he had, ‘assuré la liberté d’action et 
décision au gouvernement en pleins pourparlers’, and, ultimate accolade, in pages of saccarine 
obseqiousness, recounts how he received the personal thanks of his hero, de Gaulle. 
    However, in order to inflate the importance of his achievement, Papon is compelled to distort the 
evidence in order to show that his defeat of 17 October marked the key watershed, the point of 
rupture, in FLN power, and not the November operations.494 This moment, he claims, was achieved 
by the location of leaders among the thousands arrested, by the consequential suspension of armed 
actions, the rupture of contacts between the base and the leadership, and the dramatic collapse of 
the collection by 50%, all of which were untrue.495 Papon, in his self-serving glorification, makes 
absolutely no mention of the Farès and Zouaoui arrests, apart from a vague allusion to the DST 
seizure of documents in the home of, ‘un haut responsable [Farès?]  de l’Organisation en France’.496 
Despite his co-operation with the DST during 1961, Papon was not prepared to give any significant 
credit to the role of the other ‘maison’ in bringing about the most severe blow to the Federation.  
    In a strange way Papon’s convenient silence on the events of November, and the preoccupation 
with 17 October, has been mirrored in the memoirs of the veterans of the French Federation. In 
reading these memoirs, the historian is confronted with the difficult task of attempting to assess 
how far memory reflects accurately past events in Paris and Germany, and how far it may have been 
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influenced and distorted by more recent debates and reading the work of other militants or 
historians. If we try and imagine the day-to-day experience of the Federation leaders in 1961, having 
to react quickly and decisively to the challenge of rapidly changing events and crises, it seems quite 
likely that the 17 October did not have quite the weight, the kinds of meaning , that have been 
attached to it more recently by memorial activists. The Federal Committee probably did not spend 
much time after 20 October contemplating the wider significance of the moment, in part because 
the GPRA signalled a rapid closure, but also because it had to contend with a hurricane of events, 
from the organisation of the 1 November, the start of the prison hunger strike, and a surge in OAS 
violence, to reorganising political and financial networks after 10 November. 
      Ex-Federation cadres turned to the recovery of the memory of 17 October, first with the 
publication of Ali Haroun’s  La 7e Wilaya in 1986, and more widely from 1990 onwards. After 
Independence in 1962 the Federation was politically marginalised by Ben Bella and remained so until 
the crisis of 1988 opened the way to a more open, democratic system that allowed new parties and 
associations to be established. Boudaoud and other ex-Federation leaders established the 
Association des anciens moudjahidine de la Fédération de France du FLN,(AAM) and gained for the 
first time the right to send delegates to the 8th Congress of the Organisation nationale des 
moudjahidine (ONM) in 1990.497  
    It is within AAM circles, reactivated in 2004, that a kind of quasi-official consensus on the past has 
been reached. In particular the AAM and other ex-Federation militants have watched with interest 
the appearance of a growing debate in France and elsewhere on the 17 October, marked by the 
appearance of Jean-Luc Einaudi’s La Bataille de Paris (1991), the trial of Maurice Papon (October 
1997  - April 1998), and the publication of Jean-Paul Brunet’s Police contre FLN (1999). It is hardly 
surprising that the memoirs of ex-Federation leaders, Omar Boudaoud (2007), Mohammed Ghafir 
(2011), and Mohand Akli Benyounès (2012) have, in the light of the huge public interest, paid 
particular attention to the 17 October. But, in doing so, it is possible to detect signs of the extent to 
which memory has become inextricably confused with, or tainted by, the individuals reading of 
contemporary sources, and in particular of Jean-Luc Einaudi. The most extreme example of this is 
Mohammed Ghafir’s Cinquantenaire du 17 Octobre that consists of a compendium of extracts and 
fragments from Einaudi and elsewhere in which it  becomes difficult to separate out which passages 
or interpretations derive from Ghafir and which from other sources.498   
      Boudaoud and Ghafir, in a mirror inversion of Papon, place the heroic achievements of 17 
October at the centre of their picture but, perhaps not surprisingly, have little to say about the 
meanings of the defeat suffered two weeks later. Mohand Akli Benyounès provides a refreshing 
counter to this silence since he recounts how he was sent to Paris after 10 November with the 
specific task of rebuilding the networks that had been destroyed. However, in a curious way, he too 
reflects the idea that 17 October represented the point at which the FLN Wilaya network was 
fractured.499 But as we have seen, the watershed that he refers to resulted from the mass arrests of  
Operation Flore.         
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                                                                     Conclusion 
   The FLN French Federation during the War of Independence was confronted by two key dilemmas 
that came to a head during the October crisis of 1961. One tension arose from the contradiction 
between the need to create a form of clandestine organisation that would effectively prevent the 
penetration of the intelligence services and which, at the same time, could retain an ‘open’ 
democratic consultation between the base and the leadership. The second problem arose from 
disagreement as to whether the best strategy was to engage in armed actions in metropolitan 
France, a line that inevitably deepened the cycle of police repression, or whether to contain violence 
towards both MNA and police and to create stronger links to the French left for a broad united 
political movement. Broadly speaking these are the two opposed positions that can be associated 
with Omar Boudaoud and Mohammed Harbi.  
   Omar Boudaoud denies that the ‘Bataille d’Alger’ and the ‘Second front’ attacks of August 1958 in 
Paris can be compared, as some have done: ‘Le peuple, dans son ensemble, a participé à la grêve des 
“huit jours” et en a subi les conséquences que nous connaissons. Rien de semblable à Paris. Dans la 
Casbah d’Alger, le FLN évoluait en milieu acquis, alors qu’en France la faible communauté algérienne 
ne pouvait constituer le bouclier protecteur indispensable dans le domaine de la guérilla urbaine.’500 
This important admission can be equally applied to October 1961 when  both the FLN and Maurice 
Papon referred to a ‘Bataille de Paris’, by analogy with the events in Algiers in 1957. Contrary to the 
usual historical perception, a case can be made for the argument that the FLN migrant population in 
Paris faced a more difficult situation than that in Algiers, since in the latter case the clandestine 
networks found a base in a population that was ‘at home’ and in which the guerrillas could find 
support like the proverbial Maoist fish in water.  
      After the ‘decapitation’ of the leadership of the first and second Federations in 1956-57, Omar 
Boudaoud was brought in to increase the security of the organisation, a goal that he achieved by 
moving the Federal Committee to Germany and by a more radical compartmentalisation 
(cloissonement) of the clandestine structure and total control (quadrillage) of the population. From 
late 1958, as Papon created new and aggressive neo-colonial forms of penetrating the Algerian 
community, including through social welfare programmes, the FLN responded by retreating  into an 
institutional  ghettoisation that would isolate it from the surrounding French society, including the 
political left and trade unions. This change did enable the Federation, under extremely adverse 
conditions, to survive through to independence.  
    However, there was a downside to this. Firstly, on the face of things it seems to be bizarre that a 
clandestine network like that of the Federation should have produced such an enormous volume of 
internal documents, information that was regularly intercepted by the police, as during Operation 
Flore, and enabled the intelligence services to build up a detailed  picture of networks. But there was 
a logic to this. As security bulkheads were improved and the chain of command from the Federal 
Committe in Germany down to the local cells lengthened, so order was increasingly sustained by 
anonymous and bureaucratic means. A report of the Renseignements généraux noted, ‘le contrôle 
et l’apport d’argent et celui de l’activité de la base se font pour chaque responsable par l’étude des 
rapports organiques et financiers. Les paragraphes de ces rapports deviennent de plus en plus 
nombreux (activité intérieure, moral des militants, discipline, propagande suggestion....) au fur et à 
mesure que le cloisonnement supprime les contacts directs. La connaissance personnelle est 
remplacé par une connaissance adminstrative très détaillé. Certes l’augmentation de la paperasse 
donne des armes à la police’.501  The Federation was, especially in the later stages of the war, a 
supremely bureaucratic as well as authoritarian organisation as the Committee  in Germany sought 
to impose control on a turbulent base of young male workers through central diktat, rather than by 
direct contact and debate. Mohammed Harbi summarises the position:  ‘A mesure que la Fédération 
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de France progressait dans le “quadrillage”, elle devenait de moins en moins une organisation 
politique pour s’assimiler à la ramification d’un parti-Etat qui, comme toute. institution de ce type, 
combine des moyens bureaucractiques, policiers et militaires et se constitue à la fois avec le peuple 
et contre lui’.502  In other words, the defenses worked, but at a cost. To a certain extent the Federal 
Committee attempted to correct  what, borrowing from communist practice, might be termed 
Stalinist forms of ‘democratic centralism’, by going on mission into France, which defeated the 
object in locating to Germany. Mohand Akli Benyounès, on taking up the position of Federal after 
November 1961, insisted, late in the day, that controlers and Wilaya heads should relocate to the 
provinces or go out on tours of inspection, rather than seeking to hide up in Paris.  
    In general, the FLN authoritarian structure ran the risk of the centre losing touch with the base, as 
was to happen in mid-1961. Those local leaders who did have a close, day-to-day knowledge of 
Algerians in the Paris quartiers, were the heads of the Regions and below (Secteur, Kasma, Section, 
Groupe), and it is at this level that we can see evidence of FLN militants resisting central orders over 
the question of a truce and armed action. However, the relationship between local cadres and the 
FLN population in their area remains largely unknown or difficult, from lack of evidence, to interpret. 
It would be a mistake to assume that the monthly reports sent by Region and Secteur leaders 
accurately reflected the opinion of the rank-and-file under their control. The local leaders were in an 
ambiguous position: on the one hand they had been selected as cadres precisely because they were 
effective in carrying out the disciplined orders of the organisation. These were militants who 
belonged heart and soul to the apparatus, and to an extent they reported to their superiors what 
they wanted to hear. Within each Region it can be estimated that the ratio between local leaders 
and the rest, was about one to fourteen,or 7%. It would be of great interest to take a ‘subaltern 
studies’ approach to the history of the 93% of Algerian immigrants in Paris during 1961 who were, 
and continue to remain, largely voiceless. 
    The impression that I have, from what little evidence is available, is that the FLN control over its 
own history, has deeply obscured or hidden the enormously rich and complex life of Algerians in 
Paris, an official anodyne history that leaves everybody the poorer. Most FLN internal documents 
provide little insight into the mentalité of the majority, while most post-independence accounts by 
ex-Federation leaders present a monochrome interpretation of heroic unity. The Renseignements 
généraux noted that the Federation, in order to block police informers, decided to separate out 
militants, the trusted activists, from adhérents and sympathisants who only progressed up the 
hierarchy after careful testing. This new structure, ‘doive entraîner un certain abandon de la masse 
des adhérents et des sympathisants, privée de l’exemple et du stimulant des fanatiques’.503   
       Sometimes FLN internal documents, especially those of the commissions de justice,  give a hint 
of an alternative, hidden world in which workers were caught up in the daily problems of the 
migrant and could prove quite rebellious to the petty regulations of the frères. For example, in 
February 1962 the controleur RC2, in reporting on fines imposed during the month, listed 186 cases 
of lateness or absence from meetings, 616 fines for drunken behaviour, 212 for fighting, and 68 for 
gambling. In 1959-60 cases were reported of, ‘Un élément ayant refusé sa chambre a un comité qui 
voulait faire une réunion a éte amendé de 5000 F.’, ‘Diffamation envers un responsable: L’auteur est 
condamné a 7,000 F d’amende’, ‘Un membre conteste les Barêmes des cotisations. Simple 
incomprehension. Tout est remis dans l’ordre’, ‘Nous avons vu un frère qui à provoqué son 
supérieure. Nous lui avons fait une amende de deux mille francs’, and ‘sommés de payer leur cotis, 
certains elements ont voulu faire preuve d’insubordination et que leur refus était de nature à 
entraver la marche de l’organisation en abaissant l’autorité des responsables’.504  In March 1962 
Mohammed Attaba (“Gilbert”), newly appointed controleur RC3 in Marseille, reported a situation of 
absolute chaos in which even leaders at Zone, Region, and Secteur level were described as armed 
hooligans who were terrorising other militants, broke the elementary regulations of the FLN, and 
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refused to obey any orders.505 The gap between the official memory of the Federation and the lived 
reality at the grass roots is fascinating, but raises more questions than can be answered. The 
impression that I am left with is that the call to break the truce on armed actions in Paris from 
August 1961 was coming mainly from the level of the activist local leaders and the GA, rather than 
from the rank-and-file. The workers knew from bitter experience that any increase in GA or OS 
activity inevitably resulted in massive police conter-violence and actions that were aimed to 
humiliate and to disrupt their normal economic and social life. However, the Federal decision to 
organise demonstrations as a means to satisfy the minority of activists, while also appealing to the 
‘silent majority’, was undoubtedly successful. Ordinary Algerians, men and women, were – with a 
few exceptions – pleased to be able to express themselves by marching through the streets of the 
capital, many dressed up in their ‘Sunday’ best for the occasion, and photographs taken just prior to 
the police attacks show happy and smiling crowds.   
    But was the Federation decision to engage in a ‘truce’ and to organise mass peaceful 
demonstrations a wise one, given the circumstances? Until 1958 the FLN had, in general, opposed 
the idea of opening an armed ‘second front’ in mainland France, since it was thought that this would 
invite state repression against a weak and vulnerable émigré community: as the imprisoned leaders, 
including Ben Bella, stated in opposing the CCE decision of 10 June 1957 to ‘déclencher le 
terrorisme’, this took no heed of ‘des conditions économiques, morales et humaines dans lesquelles 
vivent les émigrés algériens. Ces conditions déjà précaires sont rendues particulièrement graves par 
l’hostilité chauvine de toute une nation’.506 Although a counter-factual history is to be avoided, it can 
be argued that undertaking armed action was, globally, not in the interests of the FLN. Most 
historians and commentators on the Federation have focused on the primacy of the armed struggle, 
but in many ways the taxation capacity of the migrant community contributed more to the final 
victory than the armed struggle, especially when the latter proved counterproductive in inviting 
further repression that disrupted the financial and bureaucratic networks, as it did in November 
1961. Moreover police repression, that accelerated further during 1961, led to the arrest and 
incarceration in camps and prisons of growing numbers of  valuable cadres and, as these were 
replaced in wave after wave of operations, so the FLN began to find it more and more difficult to 
recruit from the ranks men with the kinds of skills required to manage the bureaucratic apparatus. 
By 1961 this exhaustion of a pool of trained cadres meant a real decline in the quality of the FLN 
organisation which, as Harbi has argued, became more and more vulnerable to the emergence of 
incapable, illiterate and even criminel elements like ‘Mourad’.  
     The problem that the Federation, under the leadership of Boudaoud faced, was that as it was 
converted between late 1958 and early 1961, into a more offensive fighting machine, with OS and 
GA commandos , so a militant culture of heroic activism was cultivated at Regional level. When the 
Federation, following orders from the GPRA, tried to reverse this in July 1961, it proved extremely 
difficult to do, and for a short while even threatened the authority of the Committee itself. By the 3 
October, marked by the last in a sequence of police assassinations, the Committee had reimposed 
control on the armed groups, but by then Papon had set in motion his own style of counterviolence. 
Nor was the Prefect inclined to take any notice of a change towards pacifism, even when he had the 
clearest evidence in the orders sent out for 17 October that this was the case. Zouaoui notified 
Germany that all was being done to comply with the Committee orders, but suddenly by 3-5 October 
things were worse since there was growing evidence of Algerians being murdered and thrown in the 
Seine, while the night curfew promised to make the work of the organisation impossible.        
      In the Autumn of 1956 the FLN had decided that street demonstrations in the capital were, at 
least for the moment, to be avoided since they threatened to seriously damage the organisation. 
‘Nous considérons pour l’instant que les moyens d’action constitués par les manifestations de rues 
seraient inopérant et préjudiciables. D’une part pace qu’ils pourraient permettre à l’ennemi de nous 
paralyser car il est impossible d’organiser une manifestation sans se découvrir et d’autre part parce 
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que l’opinion y est hostile......l’engagement de la masse algérienne dans la rue en Métropole ne 
devait être tenté qu’au moment où le gouvernement français serait au bord de la capitulation. La 
Fédération estimait, et estime toujours, qu’une poussée achéverait de l’ébranler’.507 Had the 
Federation by October 1961 reached this final stage, what the police analysts referred to as the 
theory of the ‘coup de boutoir’, by which the FLN would increase pressure as peace negotiations 
drew closer? 
     The Federation was inspired by the great success of street demonstrations in Algeria during 1960-
61 to undertake a mass action, but in doing so it was taking a considerable risk. Firstly, as the 
Federation had warned in 1956, it could suffer from police repression and exposure to mass arrests. 
On the other hand, if the Federation failed to achieve a high level of mobilisation, it could damage its 
claim to be the legitimate voice of the Algerian people in France. But if the FLN exerted too strong a 
pressure, or even threatened the rank-and-file to turn out, it could be exposed as a ‘terrorist’ 
organisation that could only achieve apparent support through coercion. As we have seen, the 
Federation did strive to make an informed decision under difficult conditions, and especially with the 
time restraints that it faced. The trade union leader Ouhadj, and a number of others, were called 
across the border to consultations in Brussels and Germany, but the Committee was still unable to 
gauge accurately the conditions on the ground. The fatal mistake was the failure to appreciate the 
dangerous and violent mood that had, encouraged by Papon, rapidly built up in a police force that 
was extremely nervous, deeply penetrated by OAS sympathies, and geared up for taking revenge on 
the Algerian community, if an opportunity should arise. In addition to this, the Federation policy of 
isolationism from the main-stream French left, especially the powerful PCF and the CGT union, led it 
to reject the possibility of a joint demonstration that would have significantly protected the 
Algerians. As it was, the leaders in Germany decided to lock the French left out from the 17 October, 
and then to appeal to the same forces, rather contradictorily, after the event. 
       The Federation leaders claimed, and continue to do so today, that the 17 October represented a 
great victory, in breaking the mould of silence in relation to the situation of Algerians in France, and 
in galvanising French public and international opinion.  However, if victory it was, it was bought at 
huge costs in human suffering and the propaganda gains proved to be very short-lived indeed. By 
November the GPRA was seeking to bury the events of Paris, either in the interests of negotiations 
with the French, or because the leaders of the GPRA and EMG were intent on grabbing headlines 
that would promote their own profile as the struggle for power deepened. The blood that was spilt 
in Paris before and during 17 October was mainly that of the small people, and did not impinge on 
the Federal organisation to any significant extent. The arrests of the Farès financial network on 3-4 
November, and of the Paris leaders during Operation Flore did, however, inflict very serious damage 
on the organisation. Fortunately for the Federation this damage was sustained just as the final round 
of negotiations got under way, and both sides were increasingly reduced, between November 1961 
and March 18 to shadow boxing, a kind of phony war. The deterioration in the position of the FLN in 
France, and its increasing vulnerability to actions by the police and DST, would have represented a 
catastrophe if they had occurred earlier in the war, but as things wound down such weakness carried 
few serious repercussions. 
    How and why the 17 October was to take on the symbolic and political meanings that it has today 
is an almost entirely different story.       
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    Jean-Luc Einaudi and the Sacralisation of Mohammedi Saddek:an Essay 
    The rituals surrounding a society’s treatment of the dead, as in the village gravestones, 
monuments and annual commemoration ceremonies of the two World Wars, serve important 
purposes in how a local or national community may make sense of its past. Invariably the symbolism 
of dead bodies, who is buried, in which locations, and the scale and expense of monuments, carry 
political meaning through the reinforcement of nationalist narratives, those versions of the past 
which receive official sanction, and legitimate a particular social and political order.508 From the early 
days of Algerian labour migration to France, the return of the body of workers, frequent victims of 
industrial accidents and disease, to be buried in the Islamic soil of the homeland, was of particular 
concern to family, friends and village communities. Desperately poor Algerians would go to great 
expense to pay for the transport of a body and a French administrator in Kabylie during the 1930s 
described how coffins from France arrived in mountain villages tied to the roof of a bus.509 During 
the War for Independence, when, in addition to the ‘normal’ mortality, over four thousand Algerians 
died a violent death on French soil, repatriation of the corpse took on a particular symbolic weight. 
Nationalists wished to remove the bodies of loved ones from the soil of the enemy but, under 
conditions of extreme dislocation of rural society by the French military, this was often not possible.  
      At independence the militants of the FLN French Federation were politically marginalised since 
they had backed the GPRA, the losing side in the struggle for power with the victorious military 
faction led by Ben Bella and Boumedienne. However, by 1968 the Algerian state began to move 
towards recognition of the role of emigrants in the national cause, through the first celebration of 
the National Emigration Day on 17 October 1968 and the repatriation of 537 bodies in three cohorts 
of ‘martyrs’ (chuhada) during 1968 to 1970.510 The repatriation of bodies and the elaborate official 
ceremonials surrounding their arrival and reburial constituted a powerful symbol of the physical 
repositioning of the remains of emigrants, who had sacrificed themselves abroad as militants or 
chuhada, within the sacred soil of the nation. As Ahmed Kaïd, a senior FLN party official, proclaimed 
as the bodies arrived at the Algiers quayside in 1970, ‘Mort pour la Patrie, hors du territoire national, 
ils viennent aujourd’hui reposer sur la terre pour laquelle ils ont versé leur sang généreux’.511  
    Apart from the special prominence given to the bodies of nineteen chuhada (suppliciés) who had 
been executed in France, the repatriation ceremonials did not involve a process of individuation or a 
return to the village or community of origin, but rather a mass reburial in the national cemetery at 
El-Alia, a symbol of centralised state power and national unity. The relative anonymity of the martyrs 
may also have reflected in part the pre-independence funerary rituals in Kabyle villages by which 
graves were never named or individually marked, apart from the the white cupola tombs (qubba) of 
local saints.512 The anthropologist Judith Scheele, in a fine study of Kabyle cemeteries, has shown 
how in recent decades chuhada graves have become more durable, blocks of concrete, 
individualised, and invested with claims to specific heroic acts and biographical narratives, that 
emphasise the forms of self-sacrifice that increased the cultural capital and social and political 
prestige of the family, local clan and village. Such chuhada tombs have been transformed into 
veritable political pilgrimage sites, through which the village asserts both its Kabyle identity, as well 
as its regional, national and even transnational status. 
                                                          
508
 See in particular the thought-provoking Harriman Lectures by Katherine Verdery, Political lives of dead 
bodies. Reburial and Postsocialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
509
 M.Rémond, Djurdjura. Terre de Constraste (Algiers: Baconnier, 1940), 75; on such practices see C. Yassine, 
‘Pour une thanatologie maghrébine: les rapatriements de corps’, in Bruno Etienne (ed.), L’Islam en France 
(Paris: CNRS, 1990(, 337-48; Yassine Chaïb, L’émigré et la mort (Aix-en-Provence, Edisud, 2000); Gilles 
Manceron and Remaoun, Hassan, D’une rive à l’autre. La Guerre d’Algérie de la mémoire à l’histoire (Paris: 
Syros, 1993), 58. 
510
 J. House and N. MacMaster, Paris 1961,  275-77. 
511
 L’Algérien en Europe, 27 March-9 April 1970, ‘Transfert des corps de chouhada tombés en France’, 23. 
512
 Judith Scheele, ‘Algerian graveyard stories’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 12 (2006), 862-3. 
128 
 
    Such an evolution from relative anonymity to individuation occurred in relation to the bodies of 
those who who played a prominent role in the FLN French Federation or who were marked out as 
victims of the Paris massacre. During the repatriation of 375 bodies in March 1970, those exhumed 
came from all over France and, although I have been able to identify from the list of total names at 
least fourteen victims of police violence in October 1961, no official Algerian or media attempt was 
made to identify them as a category separate from the largely anonymous mass into which they 
were merged. However, in time the process by which the ‘lost’ memory of the 17 October massacre 
resurfaced and assumed an increasing political and media dynamic in both France and Algeria after 
the 1980s, became linked to the commemoration of individual militants or chuhada. This is 
illustrated, for example, by the case of Fatima Bedar, a fifteen year old Algerian girl from the 
industrial suburb of Stains, who, against her mother’s advice, may have tried to join the 
demonstration on 17 October. She failed to return home after school, and a police investigation and 
autopsy, following the discovery of her body at a lock-gate in the Canal Saint-Denis on 31 October, 
suggested a probable suicide. Jean-Luc Einaudi turned Fatima Bedar into a cause célèbre by 
dedicating La Bataille de Paris (1991) to her, and providing further documentation in Octobre 1961 
(2001) to suggest, admittedly on rather circumstantial evidence, that she had been killed by the 
police.513  
    Mohammed Gafir, in a book timed to coincide with the 50th commemoration of the Paris 
massacre, includes a detailed documentation in a chapter titled, ‘Le martyre de Fatima BEDAR, 
symbole de sacrifice de la Femme Algérienne’, on the long and complex negotiations with both 
French and Algerian authorities for her disinterment, repatriation and ceremonial reburial on 17 
October 2006 in the ‘carré des Martyrs’ of Tichy, Béjaïa, the home village of her father.514 The 
Organisation Nationale des Moudjahiddines, in seeking in 2006 authorisation from the Ministre des 
Moujahiddines for reburial in Bejaia, included in the supporting dossier a copy of the autopsy by 
Professor Hadongui [sic] on 4 November 1961, ‘qui établit que la mort est due à une torture 
sauvage’. 515  Einaudi, however, quotes from the conclusion of Professor Hadengue’s report as 
follows:  “1) L’examen du cadavre et l’autopsie de la jeune Bedar Fatima n’ont pas montré de traces 
de violences. 2) La mort est vraisemblement la conséquence d’une submersion. 3) Il s’agit 
vraisemblablement d’un suicide”.516 Can the urge to construct a martyrology sometimes lead to a 
cavalier attitude to the historic evidence? However, whatever the truth in the Bedar case, the most 
interesting example of the symbolism attached to location and sanctification of the body of the 
chuhada or moudjahidines, and central to the theme of this book, took place in the Kabyle village of 
Ait Sidi Amar on 16 October 2011 during an elaborate commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the 
Paris massacre. 
      Cultural historians, sociologists and historians have developed an entire sub-discipline in the 
study of the symbolism and rituals of dead bodies. There is fascinating visual evidence for the way in 
which contemporary Algerian society has developed a complex memorial activism through the 
events at Ait Sidi Armar which were not only reported in the press but also extensively filmed and 
posted on Youtube. The 50th anniversary of the 17 October commemoration honoured Mohammedi 
Saddek and Yamina Idjeri, the latter a member of the OS terrorist network in Marseille who planted 
                                                          
513
 J.-L. Einaudi, Bataille, 171, 290-1, and  Octobre 1961, 297-300. The conservative historian Jean-Paul Brunet, 
who betrays an all-consuming dislike of Einaudi, has put the boot in by a section in Charonne. Lumières sur une 
tragédie (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), 36-40, titled, ‘Le myth de l’Enfant Héroïque’, in which he charges his 
adversary with a classic propaganda construct, ‘l’archétype de la jeune fille immaculée et héroïque’.  
514
 Mohammed Ghafir, Cinquantenaire du 17 Octobre 1961 à Paris. Droit d’évocation et de Souvenance (Essai) 
(Algiers: Editions Encyclopedia, 2011), 175-206. The documentation and photographs provide an insight into 
the groups and interests involved in organising and funding the repatriation, from the Fondation 8 Mai 1945, 
the veterans of the FLN French Federation, and private funeral directors, to the Organisation Nationale des 
Moudjahidines, and the Wilaya of Bejaia.    
515
 Letter from Said Abadou, Sécrétariat Général, ONM, to Si Mohammed Cherif Abbas, 25 September 2006, 
reproduced in M. Ghafir, Cinquantenaire, 204.  
516
 J.-L. Einaudi, Octobre 1961, 299. 
129 
 
a bomb at the Prefecture.517 A video film follows the sequence of events with the procession of 
several hundred people beginning at the large, centrally located grave of the village’s most 
prestigious hero, Colonel Mohand Ouldhaj (real name Akli Belhadj Mokrane), commander of Wilaya 
3, who died on 2 December 1972. The village has now been renamed Ait Sidi Amar Oulhadj after him 
in a modern, secular version of the tradition by which hamlets were often named after patron saints. 
After the laying of flowers by Yamina Idjeri and various dignitaries, then a prayer (fatiha), the 
presentation of the national flag while the national hymn was played, followed by a minutes silence, 
the assembly walked to the village cemetery where a similar ceremony took place at the much less 
prominent tomb of Mohammedi Saddek. The column then moved on by foot, to the accompaniment 
of the shrill ululations of women dressed in traditional Kabyle costumes, to a conference hall in the 
large mosque-communal complex of Ait Sidi Amar.518 The walk by the pilgrims through the narrow 
lanes of the village, from one holy location to another, provides a powerful assertion and 
benediction of the physical space and cohesion of the community, one that can be relayed 
electronically to, among others, the sons and daughters now living in France and elsewhere.   
    In the tightly packed conference, decorated with national flags and a huge portrait of Saddek, 
Mohammed Ghafir, popularly known as ‘Moh Clichy’, who had come from Paris for the occasion, 
provided a testament to the heroic clandestine activities of Saddek, his ‘ancien compagnon d’armes’ 
during the war in Paris. Saddek, he assured the audience, was ‘bel et bien l’initiateur du 17 Octobre 
1961’.519 A two page letter, adressed to the village of Ait Sidi Amar by Jean-Luc Einaudi on 9 October, 
was then read out: ‘ne pouvant être parmi vous en cette occasion de commémoration du 50e 
anniversaire des manifestations du 17 Octobre 1961 à Paris, je vous adresse ces quelques lignes à la 
mémoire de celui qui en fut le principal organisateur sur le sol français, et ce, afin qu’il ait droit à sa 
just place dans l’histoire de la Fédération de France du FLN’.520  
    A marked feature of Einaudi’s letter was the extent to which he persisted in underscoring the fact 
that Saddek was beyond doubt, ‘le coordinateur principal sur le territoire français de la Fédération 
de France’, and it was Saddek that had directy received orders from the Federal Committee during a 
meeting in Belgium to organise the demonstration of 17 October. The message was further pushed 
home by an interview with Jean-Luc Einaudi, filmed in Paris and posted on Youtube on 17 October 
2011 by Mohammedi Saddek’s son under the pseudonym ‘Lunettes 1961’, one of the noms-de-
guerre of his father.521 In this interview Einaudi once again engaged in an eliptic and repetitive 
emphasis of the certainty that Saddek was, ‘le coordinateur principal de la Fédération de France du 
FLN’ on metropolitan French soil. A few days earlier, on 13 October, Mohamed Ghafir during a 
speech at Bagneux, announced ‘en exclusivité une bonne nouvelle qui constitue donc un scoop’, that 
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his book on the events of 17 October was about to appear in the bookshops.522 This book, which also 
campaigns on behalf of the primary role of Saddek, likewise omits any reference as to why the 
reputation of Saddek was thought to be threatened.  What is remarkable about the co-ordinated 
Einaudi-Ghafir campaign of October 2011 is not that it sought to defend and honour Saddek’s 
memory, but that nowhere do they dare to mention the dread name ‘Zouaoui’ or the evidence from 
our 2004 article and Paris 1961, that can have been the only source of their disquiet. What was it 
about this monster that so terrified Einaudi that he dare not even name it and remained frozen in a 
paralysis of the intellect? The sustained invisibility of Zouaoui, whose existence is perfectly well 
known to Einaudi, is strategically important since if he was ever to mention the counter-evidence, 
rather than sustaining the illusion that it does not exist, then he would be confronted with the 
threatening task of having to contemplate the DST archival sources on which the claim is based, and 
that might subvert his own version of history and the sacralisation of Mohammedi Saddek.  
     Meanwhile, far from Kabylie, in the western city of Sidi-bel-Abbès, a rather different kind of 
commemoration was taking place on 17 October 2011. Here local patriotism was able to lay claim to 
Mohamed Zouaoui, a native of Sidi-bel-Abbès who died and was buried there on 3 October 2000, as 
the ‘grand militant de la cause nationale’ who was beyond doubt head of the FLN in Paris. To honour 
this important son of the city was a duty: ‘Un devoir de mémoire s’impose ce jour’. This claim to 
ownership of the FLN leader in Paris (no mention here in Oranie of the Kabyle, Saddek!) was 
instrumentally based on ‘un précieux ouvrage’ in which ‘deux chercheurs britanniques...nous 
apporte le meilleur éclairage qui soit en ce qui concerne le rôle de ce meneur d’hommes’.523 
Although I am flattered by such an accolade, it reinforces a feeling of being drawn into some kind of 
minor civil war, in which complex issues of family honour, local patriotism, and claims to regional or 
national status, play a more significant role than historical objectivity.  
      It is not perhaps surprising that the citizens of Sidi-bel-Abbès feel bound to honour their own son 
of the soil, just as the son and daughter of Mohammedi Saddek feel duty-bound to defend the 
prestigious status of their father. Anissa Mohammedi, a poet and academic, based almost entirely 
on evidence from Einaudi, has published an essay to ‘rendre hommage’ to her father, and ‘d’abord 
revendiquer pour lui un passé historique glorieux, indéniable’, especially after the long years during 
which he had received no recognition. This neglect was the subject of her poem La voix du silence:  
Repose en paix, papa....  
Il y a des histoires qui ne se racontent pas 
Et des mémoires qui n’oublient pas.524 
      Dead bodies, as the anthropologist Katherine Verdery has shown, can bestow prestige, or in the 
language of the Maghreb baraka, so the more prestigious the corpse the better, and the more 
potent its quasi-magical potency to reinforce claims of kin and villagers to power and status. In post-
colonial Algerian society, claims made by individuals (or interest groups) in relation to their role 
during the War of Independence, as FLN cadres, ALN maquisards, liaison agents or victims of torture, 
and their degree of sacrifice, often measured in terms of suffering or numbers of dead in the family 
circle, carry very real material and economic consequences in terms of official registration as 
moudjahidines and access to jobs, land, political power, and pensions. Anything that might challenge 
such symbolic claims may be experienced as an assault on the core values and identity of the 
community, as well as its material interests. However, while the popular influence and legitimacy of 
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the tomb (qubba) of traditional village saints depended, rather like those of Catholic relics in 
Medieval Europe, on the test of whether its magical powers could perform miracles or not, the more 
secular baraka of the FLN hero and martyr receives its authentification from oral witnesses 
(témoignages) and historical investigation.525 This is one reason why Algerian political culture is 
notoriously prone to often bitter disputes between ex-FLN militants and others as to who did what 
in the past, backed up by reference to the most authoritative historians or documents. Reference to 
the claimed superiority and status of the historian, his reputation and ‘truth-speaking’ power, 
replaces faith in the demonstrative magical power of the saints’ bones to achieve miracles.  
    Such processes can be seen at work in the mutually reinforcing relationship between Ghafir as 
witness (témoin) and Einaudi as historian, as they intervened to sacrilise Saddek in the Ait Sidi Amar 
ceremonials. Ghafir, as head of Amala or Superzone 12 on the Paris Left-bank during the autumn of 
1961, is potentially one of the most important and well-positioned FLN militants to provide detailed 
first-hand evidence of the massacre of 17 October and its context. Ghafir accepts that he has no 
skills as a historian and, in writing his new book, has no aim, ‘de substitution à un véritable travail 
d’historien lequel exige une capacité scientifique académique qui fait franchement défaut à l’humble 
Auteur que je suis’.526 But, he notes in his introduction, that he has overcome his reluctance to put 
pen to paper, primarily because of a ‘devoir de mémoire’, for which he evokes religious 
confirmation, as prescribed by Koranic verse 283 of the second surate ‘El Baquara’, ‘ne refusez point 
de témoigner’.527 His status as witness was evident to Einaudi who sought him out for further 
interview in 2009 to confirm that Saddek was the key Paris co-ordinator, which Einaudi again 
underlined in the Preface to Ghafir’s book, praising, ‘Ce souci de vérité le conduisait également à 
vouloir que soit restitué à sa juste place Mohammedi Mohand Saddek’.528 In turn Ghafir through his 
claim to the status of a direct observer in 1961, ‘un des acteurs de cet évènement historique en ma 
qualité d’ex-responsable de super-zone’, was able reciprocate by in turn placing a mark of 
authenticity on the ‘Professor’: ‘je considère que les témoignages réunis par l’historien Jean Luc 
EINAUDI dans ses livres sont authentiques et reflètent la réalité...’.529     
     I would argue that the battle between partisans of Saddek and Zouaoui is ultimately of little 
importance since both individuals played an important role in the French Federation and it barely 
subtracts from their honour and status to place them as number two or three in the FLN hierarchy, 
as opposed to number one. Where I disagree with Einaudi is that his systematic denial and blocking 
out of Zouaoui’s role involves a silence in relation to the rich DST archive which not only provides 
incontrovertible evidence of his primary function, but is also the single most important untapped 
source on the 17 October and its context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
525
 On the traditional cult of saints see esp. E. Dermenghem, Le culte des saints dans l’Islam maghrébin (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1954). 
526
 M. Ghafir, Cinquantenaire, 11. 
527
 Ibid. 9. 
528
 J.L. Einaudi, Scènes de la guerre, 209-18; M. Ghafir, Cinquantenaire, 22. 
529
 M. Ghafir, Cinquantenaire, 215.  
132 
 
Appendix 1  
                                     Who was Mohammedi Saddek? 
   Information on Mohammedi Saddek’s life is sparse and scattered and not once, in the extensive 
police and DST archives does his name appear. The main source on his background consists of 
interviews carried out by Jean-Luc Einaudi in Tizi Ouzou, Algeria, in September 1987. What follows  is 
an attempt to reconstruct Saddek’s position and function within the FLN, especially during 1961, 
from the available fragmentary evidence.  
      Mohammedi Mohand Saddek was born on 15 June 1930 in the Kabyle village of Bouzeuène  
where he received a primary education in the French school until aged 12, and then continued, until 
the age of 16, to study in a Koranic school.530 He arrived in France some time before the start of the 
Algerian war (1 November 1954), and settled in the north-west industrial suburbs of Paris, where he 
worked in various unskilled jobs, including as a sweeper and foundry worker. Like many workers in 
France, he left his wife and small son in the care of relatives in Kabylie. Saddek became active in the 
FLN during 1955 and Mohammed Ghafir, while responsable at Saint-Denis in 1956, knew him when 
he was employed at the Ferodo company and an organiser of the FLN commerçants.531 I have no 
information on Saddek’s activities between 1956 and 1960, but he must have worked his way up the 
FLN echelons since in 1960 he was given the high level post of  head of Wilaya 3B, where he 
remained until June 1961. 
      In Wilaya 3B, which covered mainly Marseille, Nice, and Languedoc, he worked closely with a 
support network that was organised by Robert Bonnaud, a university lecturer and Secretary of the 
Fédération UGS, and Lucien Jubelin.532 Also in the network was Madeleine Baudoin, who knew 
Saddek and introduced him to an ex-Resistance member, Jacques Meker, who later provided a safe-
house at Villeneuve-la-Garenne.533 Zouaoui had also operated in Wilaya 3B from June 1959 as head 
of propaganda (DPIW) until his transfer to Paris to organise the information services under 
Haroun.534 The date of Zouaoui’s transfer to Paris  is not known, but he may well have had some 
contact with Saddek in Marseille and both men were to use the same pseudonym, “Maurice” and , 
because of their thick-framed glasses,“Quatre-yeux”.535 It seems likely that Saddek was, for a while, 
Zouaoui’s immediate superior in Marseille, and it is quite possible that the former felt a degree of 
resentment that Zouaoui was promoted over his head as Federal in January 1961, so reversing their 
positions in the hierarchy. Perhaps the Federal Committee preferred Zouaoui for such an important 
position since he was more dependable than the turbulent firebrand Saddek, a keen advocate of an 
armed offensive.  
       Marseille was for FLN cadres and supporters a dangerous place to be at this time, since unknown 
to them, one of the militants, Abdellah Younsi, was a police informer who seriously damaged the 
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Fédération .536 Younsi informed on numerous FLN cadres and French supporters over several years, 
including Bonnaud who was arrested  in June 1961. Saddek, who has been described as exceptionally 
cautious and ‘cat-like’ in his clandestine routines, managed to escape overland. It was on this 
journey in about June 1961 that he stayed with Dr Gabriel Granier, deputy-mayor of the isolated 
town of Saint-Affrique in the Aveyron but, pursued there by the DST,  he managed to escape 
disguised as a priest.537 Both Granier and Saddek were to be involved later with “Mourad” after the 
Evian Accords in 1962 when Saddek, because he had known him in Marseille, played  a central role 
in his arrest, trial and execution. Mohamd Benyounès, who was then living in Granier’s house at 
Bagneux, called the doctor, with considerable embarrassment, to tend to Abdella Younsi after he 
had tried to cut his wrists while in captivity.538 
     Up to this point in time, June 1961, there is nothing unusual about the history of Mohammedi’s 
life as a nationalist militant, but from then until early 1962, the key phase of the October crisis,  his 
trajectory becomes  obscure and the evidence contradictory. After his escape from Marseille in June 
1961 Saddek crossed over into Germany. ‘Je devais sortir parce que brûlé, grillé, ma tête mise à prix. 
Je devais donc transiter par l’Allemagne pour rejoindre soit la Tunisie, soit le Maroc, ou là où le FLN 
voudrait bien m’envoyer. J’arrive sur l’Allemagne, c’était en juin 1961. J’étais à l’époque responsable 
de willaya dans le midi de la France (....) j’arrive donc en Allemagne en juin 61. Un grand coup de filet 
avait été réalisé par la police sur le territoire français. Une vingtaine de responsables haut placés 
sont tombés. Le frère Boudaoud était là, avec le frère Bouaziz, avec Haroun, Souici. Je devais partir 
sur Tunis. Le frère Boudaoud me dit: “tu n’as pas de pot, tu vas y retourner!” (....) On m’a demandé 
de rentrer. Je suis rentré’.539 Saddek’s reference to the capture of some twenty ‘responsables haut 
placés’ does not correspond to any know event in Paris between June and early October, and seems 
to be a confusion with Operation Flore of 9th November. 
      By June of 1961 Zouaoui had been acting as Federal since January. Saddek then makes a 
surprising claim: he referred to Haroun’s La 7e Wilaya, which had been published in May of 1986, 
which contained ‘tout une structure aussi plausible que possible, mais il y a des omissions. Moi, 
j’étais le coordinateur principal, à partir du mois de juin 61’. After his return to France, ‘C’est à partir 
de là que je suis devenu coordinateur principal de la Fédération de France en France avec comme 
frères responsables, qui avaient le même titre que moi, si ce n’est que je supervisais aussi leur 
travail, “Daniel” Ben Younès, Mohamed Akli et Mohamed Attaba dit “Gilbert”. Leur nom est dans le 
livre [Haroun], il y a l’organigramme, il y a la structure. Il y a simplement une omission, c’est de ne 
pas avoir souligné que j’étais responsables principal de ces frères quoi que ce soit un travail collégial. 
J’ai été le premier à être informé, à autoriser cette manifestation du 17 octobre à Paris’.540  
     The organigramme that Saddek was referring to is on page 54 of Haroun’s 7e Wilaya, but this 
diagramme, which includes Saddek, Benyounès and Mohamed Attaba as the three controleurs, is of 
the FLN structure at the moment of the cease-fire (March 1962), one that was put in place months 
after the 17 October and also after Operation Flore.541 As has been shown in this book, Zouaoui and 
all three controlers (RCs) were arrested on the night of 9-10 November, and it was this heavy blow 
that led to a major reorganisation. Mohand Akli Benyounès provides the only published account by a 
leader who had  direct experience of this moment of extreme crisis. On the basis of his excellent 
work in organising Wilaya 2B (East France), he was ordered, first to Lyon (Wilaya 3) in October to 
sort out the problems generated by the informer “Mourad”, and then to Paris in November 
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following ‘une vaste opération d’arrestations’ that had decapitated the Paris FLN. Here he found a 
desperate situation in which the higher levels of the organisation had broken down, and the 
collection, presumably because the Farès network had also been detained, remained blocked in a 
house at Montreuil. Benyounès managed to liaise with Mohamed Attaba, head of Wilaya 2 (Paris 
north) to start the process of rebuilding the network and Attaba handed over a letter from Ladlani, 
appointing Benyounès (“Daniel”) to replace Zouaoui: ‘Le comité fédéral désigne Daniel coordinateur 
pour la France. Demandons à tous les responsables de se tenir à sa disposition; signé Kr/Kaddour’.542 
      However, at this point Benyounès introduces a number of errors that further confuse the picture 
as to Saddek’s position in France between his return from Germany and Operation Flore. Benyounès 
indicates Saddek as head of Wilaya 1 (Paris South) during the events of October 1961, and Kaci 
Mâamar as head of Wilaya 1B (South-West/Atlantic).543 But Mohammed Ghafir, as head of Amala 12 
from June 1961, provides a mass of evidence of his meetings with his immediate superior in Wilaya 
1, who was undoubtedly Mâamar.544 Benyounès claims that Saddek escaped immediately to 
Germany after Operation Flore and remained there until he returned to France shortly before the 
cease-fire of 19 March 1962.545  
     Saddek’s position within the Federation during the October crisis remains a mystery, but certain 
parts of the puzzle can be put in place. Firstly, from the accounts of several leading members of the 
European support network, notably Georges Mattéi and Georges Lepage,  we know that Saddek was 
active at a high level in Paris and co-ordinating some aspects of the 17 October demonstration. 
Mattéi, after the arrest of Henri Curiel on 20 October 1960, continued to recruit new  members into 
the porteurs network, among them Francine Serfaty, who acted as a liaison agent for Saddek, Gérard 
Chaliand, Juliette Mince, Josette Brançon, Marie-Lucie Lanfranchi and others.546 What may be called 
loosely the “Mattéi network”, a grouping that was built up by him in an ad hoc way through personal 
contacts, appears to have been separate from the support organisation created around Zouaoui by 
Mingasson. It appears that Saddek  in October 1961, via the Mattéi linkages, may have been moving 
within clandestine circles that were largely different from those of Zouaoui.547 Members of the 
Mattéi circle appear to have been ignorant of the Zouaoui-Mingasson grouping, apart from one 
telling statement by Gérard Chaliand, ‘Le contact avec le Front passait par Mattéi et moi. Notre 
interlocuteur habituel était Zouaoui, alias “M.H” ou “Mustapha le noir”.548  
   Shortly before the 17 October Mattéi met Saddek in the Rue des Rennes and, as they walked in the 
direction of the Montparnasse Station, Saddek told him of the Fédération plan, ‘ “Nous allons 
descendre dans la rue le 17 octobre, contre le couvre-feu qui oblige nos frères à se terrer chez eux. 
C’est une question de dignité” [.......] Mohammedi m’exposa le plan de la Fédération de France du 
FLN et me demanda de trouver une dizaine de camarades pour les placer en observateurs et en 
témoins aux différents points prévus pour la manif’.549 Unfortunately none of the reports drawn up 
by these witnesses appear to have survived, but several of them have been interviewed as to their 
experience of the 17 October, including Marie-Lucie Lanfranchi, and Clara and Henri Benoits.550 
Mattéi continued to meet Saddek, for example a few days after the 17 October, and again on 13 
February 1962 during the funeral of the victims of Charonne, which suggests that he may have 
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remained in Paris throughout this period, rather than escaping to Germany as Benyounès 
suggests.551 Perhaps the person who knew Saddek best during 1961 was Georges Lepage, who 
worked at Renault in the wages department, and provided a safe-house in his home at Vitry. It was 
also here that FLN cadres held meetings and, once a month money from the collection was 
centralised and counted by Saddek before Lepage delivered it to the Farès banking network.552 It 
was Lepage who, presumably at Saddek’s bequest, recruited Clara and Henri Benoits, as well as 
Eugène Tribout, all three workers at Renault, to act as witnesses on 17 October. 553  
     It is safe to say that Saddek was present in Paris before and after the 17 October in an 
organisational capacity, but none of the French agents or supporters have been able to identify the 
position of Saddek within the Federation organisation. This is to be expected, since the strict 
application of the basic ground-rules of clandestinity should have prevented any such identification 
being made, except at the very highest levels of the hierarchy where a few Europeans acting as 
chauffeurs or liaison agents had direct personal contact.  
     In recent years, Einaudi, looking to confirm the pre-eminent role of Saddek as the Federal in Paris, 
has interviewed two higher level FLN cadres, Mohammed Ghafir and Rabah Athmaniou, who seem 
to support this position.554 Their evidence needs to be examined closely. Ghafir, as we have seen in 
the Essay above (pages 127-131), attended the commemoration for  Saddek in his native village of 
Ait Sidi Amar on 16 October 2011, and provided a testament to his ‘ancien compagnon d’armes’, 
who was ‘bel et bien l’initiateur du 17 Octobre 1961’. Einaudi, in his Preface to Ghafir’s memoires, 
remarks that he was moved by a ‘souci de vérité’ that Saddek ‘soit restitué à sa juste 
place..[....]..dont le rôle au sein de la Fédération de France avait été quasiment passé sous silence 
jusqu’à la parution de La bataille de Paris’. 555  Ghafir, after his release from Larzac in June 1961 
returned to Paris to re-establish contact with the FLN via the lawyer Mourad Oussedik. Saddek, 
whom he had known at St.Denis in 1956, made contact: ‘Il m’a dit qu’il était coordinateur de quatre 
ou cinq wilayas, qu’il allait informer le comité fédéral, qu’on avait besoin de moi ici parce que la 
plupart avaient été arrêtés, qu’on avait besoin que je reprenne mes activités mais cette fois-ci sur la 
rive gauche’. Several days later Saddek arranged to have a false identity card made for him, under 
the name of a student, and introduced him to Mâamar Kaci, head of Wilaya 1,  under whom he 
became a Régional.556 Although Ghafir mentions Saddek in several passages of his Memoirs as 
‘coordinateur de la Fédération de France du FLN’, he provides no further evidence for this claim, 
beyond extended passages quoted from Einaudi’s books. In a curious form of circularity, Ghafir as a 
witness to the historic events of October 1961 confers authenticity on Einaudi’s work, while Einaudi 
in turn deploys Ghafir as confirmation of his thesis on Saddek.557 
      Ghafir’s evidence on Saddek, it might be argued, coming as it does from a relatively high level 
cadre in charge of Amala 12 should be given credence: as a senior militant at the heart of the events 
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surrounding 17 October, he should know what he is talking about. However, the conclusion does not 
necessarily follow. We have no reason to doubt that Saddek did indeed liaise with Ghafir in this way, 
but it is very doubtful indeed if this would have been the task of the Federal to do this. It should be 
born in mind that the structure of the FLN cellular hierarchy was designed to prevent any militant or 
responsable at one level having any contact with or knowledge of any individuals beyond one 
linkage upwards or downwards in the chain. In the case of Zouaoui, for example, the archives show 
that he normally had contact upwards to the Federal Committee and downwards to the three 
controleurs (RCs). The three RCS in turn, only operated downwards to the two or three Wilaya heads 
under their control. The seven Wilaya leaders linked as far as their Amala heads. Thus in the case of 
Ghafir and his superiors, the linkage was as follows: 
 
 
Amala 12             Wilaya 1 (Paris South)            Controler RC1                          Federal  
Ghafir          →           Kaci Mamâar               →      Baba-Hamed            →           Zouaoui 
 
This meant, if the normal rules of clandestinity were applied, that there was a fire-wall between 
Ghafir and his RC Controleur and the Federal. The evidence points to the maintenance of a 
successful barrier between the Federal/Controleurs grouping, that met and conferred frequently in 
person, and the Wilaya/Amala group. The DST intelligence specialist Desbons, in his report on the 
Zouaoui network, remarked on the closed nature of the Federal’s circle: ‘Pratiquement, Zouaoui 
n’avait de contacts directs et fréquents qu’avec ses contrôeurs de wilayas (Amroune Saïd, Baba-
Hamed, Aberkane Younès), les membres de la commission centrale ou les individus ayant un rôle sur 
le plan national’. During his interrogation by Montaner, Baba-Hamed (RC1) was questioned about 
the head of Wilaya 1 “Kadour”[Mâamar] and, ‘comment vous touchait-il? – il ne pouvait pas’.558 The 
watertight nature of the bulkhead was put to the test during Operation Flore when, remarkably, 
despite the huge volume of documentation seized, the long filatures, and numerous interrogations, 
six of the seven Wilaya heads remained undetected and avoided arrest.559 Ghafir’s memoirs, as 
might be expected, give precise and detailed information about his upward contacts with the three-
man Wilaya Committee in which he met regularly with Kaci Mâamar and the second Amala head, 
Mohamed Tahar Labane, usually in the home of the Oussayef family in the Château of the Parc de 
Sceaux.560 That Ghafir never mentions either Baba-Hamed or Zouaoui is not surprising, since he 
would not have had any physical contact with them or known their identity.561 On the other hand, 
the role of Saddek in contacting Ghafir in June 1961, while indicating a high level cadre, does not 
match the tasks of the Fédéral who, as far as possible, avoided carrying out field operations that 
might expose him to detection and arrest. 
     What do we know of Saddek’s personality and how he positioned himself in relation to the 
profound crisis that was confronting the FLN in Paris between August and November 1961? Here the 
evidence of those few individuals who knew him, Mattéi, Lepage, Granier, Baudoin, and Ghafir, is in 
complete agreement: Saddek gave outspoken support for an activist position, a resumption of 
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armed struggle, that went against the policy of the Federal Committee. Early in 1961, in response to 
Saddek’s justification of the assassination of a police officer in Valence, Gabriel Granier objected: 
‘L’opinion française est en train d’évoluer, cela risque de la raidir. C’est une erreur. Vous risquez de 
vous mettre encore plus l’opinion à dos’.562 Likewise, Georges Lepage, his closest aid, criticized the 
attacks on the police, ‘C’est pas normal que vous foutiez en l’air un gars qui est devant un poste de 
police [....] C’est mal perçu par la population et même par certaines personnes qui vous 
soutiennent’. In such exchanges Saddek always presented himself as a hard man, ‘C’est la loi du 
talion: oeil pour oeuil, dent pour dent! [....] S’il faut payer la facture, on paiera la facture!’.563 George 
Mattéi also witnessed  Saddek’s combative, if not aggressive attitude towards the French security 
forces and a supine public, remarking of the huge crowds that turned out for the victims of 
Charonne on 13 February 1962, ‘Tu vois, ce qu’il faudrait maintenant, c’est jeter une grenade!’.564 
Einaudi concludes that Saddek was an ‘activist’, ‘Il est chaud partisan des actions armées, et les 
armes exercent une certaine fascination sur lui. Il n’a pas de pitié pour ceux qu’il considère comme 
des “traîtres” [....].Il est favorable au développement des actions armées en France, à des opérations 
de grande envergue, dans le style de celles du mois d’août 1958. ‘Nous sommes en mesure 
d’incendier le territoire français si l’autorisation nous en est donnée..”’.565 
      We are now in a position to see why it was that the firebrand Saddek, placed in an unidentified 
but senior position within the Paris organisation, represented such a major threat to the Federal 
Committee that was desperately trying to close down the attacks on the police. As we have seen in 
Chapter 7, the Committee made the crucial decision to organise a Paris demonstration, and the form 
that this would take, in a small window of time between the 7th and 10th October.566 It was during 
this brief period that the Committe met several times to consider the issue and to consult with those 
on the ground in Paris.567 Among those who were called across the border to confer with the 
Committee members was Mingasson, Ouhadj and several other trade unionists, and Saddek. Ouhadj, 
head of AGTA at Renault, was called to Brussels to consult with Souici on how the French left would 
react to a major action by the FLN in France.568 Mingasson, acting almost certainly as a liaison agent, 
travelled to Belgium on the 9th and returned the next day, probably carrying the highly important 
and secret instructions dated the 10th  October. Saddek, after crossing the border disguised as a 
miner, met Omar Boudaoud in Belgium. In Einaudi’s first book of 1991, he gives only one reason as 
to  why Saddek was summoned by Boudaoud, to read him the riot act. The demonstration was to be 
pacific and, “Quiconque aura ne serait-ce qu’une épingle sur lui sera passible de la peine de mort!”. 
Clearly the Federal Committee was well aware of Saddek’s incendiary language in Paris. Einaudi 
concludes that Saddek disagreed, but was not prepared to break discipline,  since ‘on ne discute pas 
les ordres’.569 Ghafir, in his memoirs, fundamentally agrees with Saddek’s position: that the truce 
was a big mistake, although the situation was rescued by the decision to organise a demonstration 
since this acted as a safety valve for the mounting pressure among the activist militants. 
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     In October 2011 Einaudi, in his letter sent to the commemorative meeting in Aït-Sidi Amar, rather 
modified his earlier account of Saddek’s voyage to Belgium. Saddek was now, he claimed, called to 
Germany on 9 October in order to receive the order and plans  for the demonstrations of  17 
October and after, ‘Il est revenu le 12 octobre avec les directives fixant les modalités des 
manifestations’.570 However, this version is in contradiction with the Sou’al correspondence that 
Einaudi insists was exchanged with Saddek, rather than with Zouaoui. Why would the Federal 
Committee write to Paris on 10 October giving its detailed instructions  if Saddek  was in Germany 
with the Committee and had received the orders in person? Ali Haroun, who wrote by hand the 
directives of the Committee to Paris on behalf of Ladlani, claims that Einaudi has made a mistake 
,‘en identifiant “Maurice” comme Sadek Mohammedi. Maurice était effectivement le pseudonyme 
de Mohamed Zouaoui qui se trouvait auparavant dépendre de moi-même comme responsable à 
l’information pour la wilaya de Paris....C’est donc Zouaoui qui était responsable organique en 
septembre-octobre 1961. Quant à Mohammedi dont les pseudonymes étaient “Lunettes” ou 
“Raymond” il n’a accédé à cette responsabilité qu’après l’operation de police du 10 novembre 
1961’.571 More recently Haroun has denied that Saddek was called at all to Belgium by Omar 
Boudaoud.572  
     At some time after November 1961 Saddek was briefly appointed RC2, controleur of  Wilaya 2 
(Paris North), and W2 and W2B. We know that he was in Paris on 13 February 1962 since he met 
with Mattéi, and on 17 May Saddek drew the informer Abdellah Younsi (“Mourad”) into a meeting 
that led to his trial and execution. On his return to Algeria Saddek, like many in the French 
Federation, appears to have been marginalised and excluded from high ranking employment or 
other ‘rewards’ that went to the victors in the power struggle. He moved back to his native Kabylie, 
and said little about his war-time experiences until interviewed by Einaudi in 1987. In June 1989 he 
was arrested for fraud, and eventually condemned to seven years prison in December 1991, but was 
soon to be freed on the intervention of  President Boudiaf, victim soon after of an assassination plot. 
His family and Einaudi suggest that Saddek was the victim of  some kind of political machination, 
although the nature of this plot against him remains obscure or has not been clarified.573 Saddek 
died of a heart attack in August 1994. 
      To conclude, the evidence relating to Saddek and his position and role during 1961 remains 
fragmentary and opaque and several questions remain unanswered. However, we can state with 
certainty, given the considerable volume of evidence contained in the DST and police files, that 
Zouaoui was the ‘Fédéral’ who headed the overall organisation in France from January to November 
1961. But Saddek was not a mere ghost: the testimony of Mattéi and others confirms that he 
fulfilled some quite high-level role in the overall organisation in Paris during the October crisis.574 
What remains elusive is the identification of the precise niche that he occupied in the structure.  
    Saddek appears to during 1961 to ahve occupied none of the ‘official’ or normal posts to be found 
within the FLN organisational pyramid. Perhaps the most likely solution to the puzzle is that Saddek 
functioned as an ‘adjoint’ to Zouaoui. As we have seen, the FLN appointed deputies to the leaders at 
all levels of the hierarchy so that the latter could be rapidly replaced in the event of their arrest.This 
might explain why Saddek and Zouaoui shared the same pseudonyms, “Maurice”, and “Quatre-yeux” 
or “Lunettes”, since this could serve to confuse the security services. More interesting is the fact that 
the DST, after Operation Flore, drew up a very detailed plan or organigramme of the entire network.  
On this Zouaoui and Mingasson, as the key hubs, are indicated by larger circles, from which 
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connecting lines radiate out to other members of the organisation. Located in between them is an 
equally large circle, size here representing the level of importance, and this remains empty, 
suggesting that a key member of the network remained unidentified by the DST.575 Such a deputy 
function might best explain why Saddek was taking on some senior responsibilities just before and 
during 17 October, and also why he felt able to claim that he was ‘head’ of FLN operations in Paris. 
But if this was the case, Saddek was, during his interview with Einaudi in 1987, being  rather 
economic with the truth. 
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Appendix 2  
 
La Guerre des chiffres: how many Algerians died at the hands of the police? 
 
     Can the  DST archives, and access to the internal FLN reports which they contain, tell us anything 
new about the highly controversial issue of the number of Algerians who were killed by the police 
during the October crisis? 
    I do not propose to re-examine the arguments surrounding this debate, which I have already 
addressed in Paris 1961, except to emphasise again that no definitive or conclusive figure as to the 
fatalities will ever be arrived at.576 Michel Levine, as early as his 1985 book Les Ratonnades 
d’Octobre, stated: ‘Quel est le nombre réel des morts? Sans doute ne le saura-t-on jamais’.577 This 
does not prevent the historian from arriving, with some confidence,  at an idea of the general scale 
of the killings in which over 120 Algerians lost their lives during the months of September and 
October. However, what did the Federation in particular have to say about this issue? In principle 
the Federation, which maintained an impeccable record of the monthly movements of Algerians in 
Paris, was in a good position to find out what had happened to the militants who attended the 
demonstration of 17 October. But such an accounting process could not be achieved, for a number 
of reasons. 
    The Federation made plans for European observers to be present on 17 October, but it was only 
after the event, from 22 October onwards, that it made a systematic effort to collect eye-witness 
reports from Algerian participants and data on wounded, killed and ‘disappeared’. The eye-witness 
reports, which provide a still largely unexplored and rich historical source, were never centralised in 
one place in 1961 so that the FLN could subject the entire corpus to a systematic analysis. Some did 
reach the Federal Committee and can be found today in the FLN archives deposited by Ali Haroun in 
the Algerian National Archives, but others had only reached Wilaya or RC  level when they were 
seized by the DST on 9-10 November. Other reports can be found in the FLN archives deposited by 
Mohammed Haroun, also in the Algerian National Archives, while an untold number are in private 
hands. Even if all such reports could be located and studied, they would still not be able to provide 
global statistics. The eye-witness accounts I have studied provide a vivid picture of events, but given 
the confusion of the demonstration, the violence and chaos, they can in most instances give only 
vague, locally restricted or uncertain impressions in which, for example, men who were seen by 
witnesses  to have fallen from bullets remained anonymous or unknown. 
    The most accurate statistics would have been made possible if the lower echelon leaders at 
Regional level and below had, over a period of several weeks, checked – as they did every month – 
the number of men who had gone missing, and they had made enquiries to find which of these were 
in hospital, detailed in the CIV, had been returned to Algeria, sent to camps in France, or were dead. 
However, the mass arrest of 14,000 demonstrators from the lower ranks of the FLN hierarchy meant 
that local organisations were in disarray. On 20 October Zouaoui wrote to the Federal Committee, ‘le 
nombre de morts et blessés est certainement plus élevé que celui annoncé par diverses voies. Sur 
cette affaire, nous ne serons définitivement fixés que d’ici une semaine et mêmes....plus, car il va 
nous falloir rétablir la liaison entre divers comités et au sein de nombreuses régions, procéder à leur 
reconstitution. Cela ne va pas être sans peine, mais réalisable dans de brefs délais’.578 Soon after, on 
9 November, the RC leaders that served to centralise information from the Wilayas were all 
arrested. In addition, from about early November onwards, the FLN leadership decided that it no 
longer wished to use the information of violent repression and deaths in Paris for propaganda 
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purposes, a shift that meant any information that had been collected was never collated.579  An 
additional complication arises from the fact that as many, if not more, Algerians were killed by the 
Paris police between 1 September and 17 October than on the demonstration itself. The information 
that militants were asked to supply related only to the 17-18 October, or shortly afterwards.   
      If we look at the later statements made by leading members of the French Federation, one can 
detect signs of uncertainty as to the figures, betrayed by the give-away sign of rounded up numbers. 
Ali Haroun remarks: ‘La fédération a été dans l’incapacité d’en fixer le nombre de manière précise...’, 
especially as the numbers detained or transferred elsewhere was unknown. ‘Cependant la synthèse 
des rapports sur les cas précis des tués, les 17 octobre et jours suivantes, par balles, matraquages, 
noyades et autres moyens, permet de les chiffrer approximativement à 200, et les blessés à 
2,300’.580 The figure of 200 has since 1986 become the ‘official’ figure of the ex-Federation leaders. 
Omar Boudaoud notes: ‘Nous avions comptabilisé 200 morts à l’époque. Mais nous savons 
aujourd’hui que ce nombre était plus élevé. Nous n’avions en effet pris en considération que les 
chiffres mentionnés dans les rapports de l’organisation. Mais il y en eut beaucoup plus, sans 
compter les disparus. Nous ne savions pas exactement qui, parmi les disparus, avait été jeté dans la 
Seine et qui avait été arrêté et transféré dans les camps d’Algérie par le pont aérien établi dès le 20 
octobre’.581 The two Federal Committee members are right to remain cautious or approximative. 
     Mohammed Ghafir, in his undated report for Amala 12, described the situation for his own area, 
corresponding to about a quarter of Paris, in the following terms:- 
   ‘Jusqu’à présent nous n’avons pas pu avoir le bilan exact des blessés et des disparus – quant aux 
morts, nous avons eu 3 jetés à la Seine: TLEMSANTI, GUENDOUZ jeté au pont Montbéllo le 18-10-61 
à 21 h 30, LOUCIF Lakhdar, 15 rue d’Ouessant 15e, et AREHAB-BELAïD 20 rue Maitre Albert 5e, 
repéché de la Seine. Pour les blessés et les disparus, nous avons un élément blessé par une balle 
dans le dos et se trouve actuellement à l’hôpital NECKER – le nommé GUERFI MOHAMED 11 rue 
Général Boeurré 15e; un élément réscapé, le frère Bournouar 8 rue Maitre Albert 5e; un 2e rescapé, 
CHAMOUN [chaouzoun?] Ahmed, 245 rue d’Alésia 14e; un autre élement blessé par une balle à la 
jambe demeurant au 64 rue Mouffetard 5e.’582  
      Four of these seven men can be further identified from the books of Jean-Luc Einaudi. Three of 
the victims lived in the Rue Maitre Albert in the 5th arrondissement, a small road between the Place 
Maubert and quayside opposite Notre-Dame. Guendouz Telemsani and Ahcène Boulanouar lived in 
the same hotel (number 8) and worked on the same building site, and joined a demonstration on 18 
October near the Seine. Telemsani was later found in the Seine, his hands tied behind his back, while 
Boulanouar, because he could swim, survived.583 Belaïd Arehab who lived at No.20 Rue Maitre 
Albert, also died from drowning in the Seine on 18 October.584 However, typical of the confusions 
that can arise with such data, is Ghafir’s inclusion of Lakhdar Loucif who, far from dying on 17-18 
October, had disappeared on 15 September and his badly decomposed body was recovered from 
the Seine on the 1st or 9th of October.585 Ghafir, in trying to establish the situation in Amala 12, a 
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considerable part of the city, was only able to establish the identities of three dead men. A similar 
report for Wilaya 1 (Paris south of the Seine) stated: ‘Pour le moment, sept de nos frères morts dans 
les manifestations nous ont éte confirmés par des rapports’, but it was hoped that an exact number 
would be known, after further enquiry, in a few days.586 The difficulty of arriving at accurate 
statistics can be appreciated. 
    In his memoirs Mohammed Ghafir recognises the problem of finding sources that can be used to 
verify the numbers killed on 17 October: ‘les chiffres donnés sur les martyrs de cet évènement n’ont 
jamais été cernés d’une façon officielle, pour deux raisons: la destruction des archives de la wilaya 1 
[et]  la déstabilisation des structures de l’Organisation durant les mois suivants’, a cryptic reference 
to Operation Flore.587 However, this has not prevented him elsewhere in his book from advancing, 
without any evidence, the most fantastic figures, ranging from 327 ‘drowned’ in the Seine, to ‘un 
chiffre approximatif de 1000 martyrs’, and 50 militants in the courtyard of the Prefecture of Police, 
‘fusillés [sic] et jetés à la Seine’.588 But in particular, Ghafir extols and quotes at great length from 
Einaudi, referred to him as the final authority in these matters, and reproduces from October 1961 a 
list of victims.589 Einaudi’s victim  lists, that he has frequently expanded and revised over the last 
twenty years, are worth examining, especially since they or their figures have been endlessly 
reproduced by the media and set the tone for many memory activists. 
      In 1991 Einaudi had the good sense to recognise the impossibility of a precise count: ‘Combien y 
eut-il de morts? On ne le saura jamais avec exactitude’, but immediately flew in the face of his own 
critical  reason by producing ever longer and more detailed lists of victims.590 The 1991 list  included 
142 victims, 74 of whom had died and 68  ‘disappeared’, and  in 2001 this was  increased to 393 
dead and disappeared, and then after various minor revisions, was reduced to 389 in 2009 and 2011. 
Throughout this process, although laying claim to the most careful investigation of individual cases, 
his work has been marred by numerous, careless mistakes. For example, he included in his early list 
of FLN victims  a number of harkis who had been killed by the GA, including the case of Mohamed 
Larbi Boulahia who, in Octobre 1961 (page 363) he designated as a ‘membre de la FAP’, but thirteen 
pages previously (p.350), included him on the list of FLN victims. 
     Unfortunately such carelessness  is endemic. Here I examine just one aspect of this, relating to a 
serious issue of counting the same individuals twice or even three times. The question of the 
orthography of  Algerian names had presented a major problem for French authorities and police in 
Algeria since the nineteenth century, since multiple variants in spelling on identity cards, official 
documents, and fichiers, could pose a serious administrative and security issue. The historian needs 
to be aware of this problem in compiling identification data. The Algerian and French colonial 
convention was also to usually invert first and surname, as in the case of the writer always known as 
‘Yacine Ketab’, and this could also lead to obvious confusion, as  in the case of Einaudi’s listing of 
‘Hammiche Mohand’ and ‘Mohand Hammiche’ as separate individuals. In October 1961, Einaudi 
admitted that in 1991 he had confused Ahmed Khlifi with Ahmed Khalfi as two disappeared, when in 
fact  this was the same person, but clearly this did not alert him to a wider problem. In 2003 Jean-
Paul Brunet, in commenting on the question of ‘les doublons’, remarked that, ‘certains noms ont 
une similitude troublante’, and referred specifically to the cases of Bennehar, Djahmoum, Meziane, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
séjourné plusiers jours dans l’eau, avait reçu une balle de revolver dans la tête’. In Octobre 1961, 142, Einaudi 
reports that he was found in the Seine on 9 October, a date that contradicts his earlier book. 
586
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and Yahiaoui.591 In Paris 1961 we also indicated an issue here, and that ‘at least’ eight victims had 
been counted twice, as in the case of ‘Seddik Kenniche’, also listed as ‘Sedik Kheniche’ who had 
‘both’ died on the same day.592  
     Einaudi, although claiming to subject Brunet’s work to close critical scrutiny, has ignored the issue 
of double counting and the five examples named by Brunet and in Paris 1961, continue to be 
included in the victim lists he published in 2009 and 2011.593 Einaudi’s most recent, revised list of 
2011, contains the following  dubious cases:-   
 
Abbas Ahmed (17/10/61) and Habbas Ahmed (Autumn 61) 
Bellal Mohammed (Autumn 1961) and Bellil Mohammed 
Benakli Ahmed (5/9/61) and Benakli Ahmed (22/9/61) 
Benjahoub Ammar (7/10/61) and Benyahoub, Ammar (Oct. 61) 
Bennehar Abdelkader (18/10/61) and Bennehr Abdelkader (Oct. 61) 
Chemloul Abdelkader (3/10/61) and Chemloul Amrane (3/10/61) 
Hammiche Mohand (Autumn 61) and Mohand Hammiche (Autumn 1961) 
Kenniche Seddik (29/9/61) and Kheniche Sedik (29/9/61) 
Khelifa Ali (30/10/61) and Khelisi Ali (30/10/61) 
Makhnane Mohammed (23/10/61) and Makhnache Mohammed (26/10/61) 
Medjahdi Abdelkader (17/10/61) and Medjahi Abdelkader (17/10/61) 
Melouche Amar (Autumn 61) and Meklouche Amar (18/10/61) 
Tarchounet Layachi (10/10/61) and Tarchouni Abdelkader (9/10/61) 
Yahiaoui Larbi (17/10/61) and Yalaoui Larbi (16/9/61) 
Counted three times:- 
Meziane Mohammed (17/10/61), Meziane Mohand (Autumn 61) and Mohand Meziane (Autumn 
61). 
 
Most of these can be shown, through an inspection of the evidence in Einaudi’s own books, to be 
the same individual. In some instances individuals and dates get in a complete mess as in the case of 
Yahlaoui Larbi, identified in La Bataille (p.114) as shot by the police on 17 October, but who is then 
listed (p.316) as Yahiaoui Larbi. The latter mispelling is then repeated in the Octobre 1961 list, 
alongside another Yalaoui Larbi who was shot in or near the Rude de Chaligny on 16 September 1961 
(p.90). So here we have a case of one individual, with three variants of name spelling, killed on two 
dates one month apart. Einaudi’s most up-to-date 2011  list thus counts 15 individuals as 29.594  
    Does this really  matter?  I think that it does for several reasons. By a rather careless attitude to 
the analysis of this historical evidence Einaudi runs the danger of undermining confidence in his 
overall treatment of other sources. Secondly, he does no favours to the important cause of memory 
activism by providing it with inflated figures that sooner or later are going to backfire and possibly 
damage the legitimacy of the cause. Thirdly, Einaudi is playing to a tempting, but counter-
productive, aspect of anti-colonial militancy that makes a naive equation between the quantifiable 
level of French repression and the self-righteous wrath of its opponents.595 In this mind-set the 
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worse the horrors of torture and killings the better, since the higher the figures, the more grim the 
butchery, the more legitimate the cause. Has Einaudi’s incessant drive to a maximalist position been 
influenced by a secret ambition to corroborate the mythical figure of 327 given to him by 
Mohammedi Saddek in 1987? The reality of French colonial repression was sufficiently grim and 
nasty not to require any fictional elaboration or inflation, and it could be asked whether the moral 
and inhumane weight of a massacre of, for example, 140 Algerians is somehow ‘less’a crime than 
that of 387? The data is simply incommensurable. 
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